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FOREWORD
The United States has had a bitter set of experiences
with insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations,
but it is by no means alone in having to confront such
threats and challenges. Indeed, according to Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev, the greatest domestic
threat to Russia’s security is the ongoing insurgency
in the North Caucasus. This insurgency grew out of
Russia’s wars in Chechnya and has gone on for several years, with no end in sight. Yet it is hardly known in
the West and barely covered even by experts. In view
of this insurgency’s strategic importance and the fact
that the U.S. military can and must learn for other contemporary wars, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
felt the need to bring this war to our readers’ attention
and shed more light upon both sides, the Islamist (and
nationalist) rebels and Russia, as they wage either an
insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign.
While the evident and primary cause of this current war is Russian misrule in the North Caucasus in
the context of the Chechen wars, it also is true that
Russia is now facing a self-proclaimed fundamentalist, Salafi-oriented, Islamist challenge, that openly
proclaims its links to al-Qaeda and whose avowed
aim is the detachment of the North Caucasus from the
Russian Federation. Therefore, we should have a substantial interest in scrutinizing the course of this war
both for its real-world strategic implications and for
the lessons that we can garner by close analysis of it.
The three papers presented here are by well-known
experts and were delivered at SSI’s third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on
September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, Euv

ropean, and American experts to engage in a regular,
open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security; this panel realized that ambition,
as Dr. Hahn is American, Dr. Markedonov is Russian,
and Dr. Cornell is Swedish.
SSI believes that such regular international dialogue plays an important role in expanding the repertoire of ideas and potential course of action available
to Army and other strategic leaders, and we look forward to continuing this process in the future. Bearing
these objectives in mind and with the goal of informing senior Army and other strategic leaders about contemporary strategic and military developments, SSI
is pleased to present this monograph to our readers
for their consideration. We hope that it will stimulate
further debate, reflection, and learning among our
readers, as the issues of insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as Islamist-driven terrorism, will not go
away anytime soon.
			
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

vi

CHAPTER 1
THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE JIHADISTS:
THE SECURITY AND STRATEGIC
IMPLICATIONS
Gordon M. Hahn
In 1994, before the outbreak of the first post-Soviet
Russo-Chechen war, Shamil Basaev, the leading operative of the then self-declared independent Chechen
Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI), took a group of some 30
men from his battalion of Abkhaz fighters to Osama
bin Laden’s al-Qaeda (AQ) training camps in Khost,
Afghanistan.1 From this fleeting but nevertheless seminal contact between the ChRI and AQ, an increasingly closer relationship gradually developed between
Chechen as well as other Caucasus nationalist and
Sufi Islamic insurgents on the one hand, and AQ and
the burgeoning global jihadi revolutionary movement
on the other. After more than a decade of evolution,
this trend culminated in the full “Salafization” or “takfirization” of the ChRI’s ideology and the jihadization
of its goals, operations, and tactics.2 With the dissolution of ChRI by its then President Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov in October 2007 and his creation of the
Caucasus Emirate (CE) in its place, the Salafization
and jihadization processes were made official.
We can point to a series of factors that for more
than a decade drove the radicalization and jihadization of the Chechen/Caucasus mujahedin. These factors include: the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement and ideology realized through the
Internet and other means; brutal Russian warfighting
and counterinsurgency methods; the North Cauca-
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sus’s colonial experience at the hands of the Russians;
the region’s relatively low standard of living and socioeconomic development; corrupt and ineffective local and Russian governance; and, Caucasus customs
of blood revenge and martial courage. What is clear
is that the CE is an explicitly self-identified global
jihadist organization. Somewhat belatedly in May
2011, the CE was placed on the U.S. State Department’s
list of specially designated international terrorist
organizations.
Still, the overwhelming weight of journalistic,
analytical, and academic work on the violence in the
North Caucasus tends to avoid mention of the global
jihad’s role in the region, the attractiveness of jihadism to a consistent portion of youth across the entire
umma, or the influence of these factors on the CE’s
ideology, goals, strategy, and tactics. The focus is
almost always on factors related to Russian responsibility for the generically named violence: the form
of siloviki brutality, poor governance, and economic
dependence and limited investment in the region’s
development. Given this chapter’s purpose of providing a strategic threat assessment of the current CE insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus and its broader
regional implications, it will focus on the CE’s theoideology, goals, strategies, tactics, and capacity to deliver violence inside Russia. Given the CE’s new place
within the global jihadi revolutionary alliance, I will
also look at the CE’s broader strategic regional and
global security implications.
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THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE: THEO-IDEOLOGY,
GOALS, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONAL
CAPACITY
The CE’s ideology and goals are now defined entirely by the global jihadi revolutionary movement’s
Salafi takfirism and jihadism. They have broadened
exponentially to include not only the internationalist aspirations of the global jihadi revolutionary alliance but also an expanded vision of the CE’s territorial claims. Those claims now extend beyond the
pan-Caucasus goal of the emirate to all of Russia’s
Muslim lands, defined so broadly as to encompass all
of Russia for all intents and purposes. Operationally,
I discuss the CE’s wide range of tactics, including the
use of the typically jihadi istishkhad, that is, martyrdom or suicide operations.
The CE’s Salafist Theo-Ideology.
The Salafist theo-ideology made serious inroads
beginning in the inter-war period and reached critical mass in 2002 when a ChRI shura subordinated the
ChRI constitution to Shariah law, approved a strategy
of bringing jihad to the entire North Caucasus, and
appointed the Islamist-oriented Abdul Khalim Sadulaev as Chairman of both the new ruling Madzhlisul Shura’s Shariah Law Committee and the Shariah
Court, and designated him successor to ChRI president and former Soviet general Aslan Maskhadov.3
With Umarov’s declaration of the CE in October 2007,
the monopoly of the Salafist theo-ideology and its violent universal jihadism over the North Caucasus mujahedin was fully secured and institutionalized. The
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CE’s ideology is now precisely the same Salafist theoideology as that proselytized by AQ and other groups
in the global jihadi revolutionary alliance (global jihad) and movement.
The key elements of this theo-ideology are tawhid,
takfir, jihad, and martyrdom. These principles have
been elaborated upon in great detail by three successive CE Shariah Court qadis (judges or magistrates).
Of the three, it was the CE’s first Shariat Court qadi
“Seifullah” Anzor Astemirov, who most effectively
propagated the principles of tawhid and takfir. Astemirov, like many of the CE’s young generation of
leaders, studied Islam abroad in the late 1990s before turning to Salafism and jihadism. Appointed
by CE amir Umarov as the CE’s qadi in early 2008,
Astemirov founded the website, Islamdin.com, which
incorporated his library of foreign Salafi jihadi texts,
audiotapes, and videos.4 By then, Islamdin.com and
the other CE vilaiyats’ websites carried jihadi literature exclusively, including numerous translations of
the writings of leading radical Saudi, Egyptian, Iraqi,
and Pakistani jihadist theologians, ideologists, and
propagandists, including AQ’s Osama bin Laden and
Ayman al-Zawahiri;5 the American Yemeni-based AQ
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Anwar AlAwlaki; and, tens of others.6 CE sites now post Russian-language summaries and translations of editions
of and articles from AQ’s English-language journal Inspire and within days of bin Laden’s death published
at least 15 articles, announcements, and testimonials.7
Among the most prominent of the foreign jihadi
theo-ideologists who Astemirov featured on Islamdin.com was the Jordanian Sheikh Abu Muhammad
Asem al-Maqdisi. According to the United States
Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center
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(CTC) among others, Maqdisi is “the most influential
living Jihadi Theorist” and “the key contemporary
ideologue in the Jihadi intellectual universe,” and
his website Minbar al-Jihad wa’l-Tawhid is “al-Qa`ida’s
main online library” and “very representative of Jihadi literature.”8 Astemirov and Maqdisi struck up a
close student-mentor relationship of correspondence
and consultations that would cement the CE’s alliance
with AQ and the global jihadi revolutionary movement. Astemirov translated and generously cited
Maqdisi’s works. Astemirov’s key video lecture “On
Tawhid” was based on Maqdisi’s Millat Ibrahim (The
Religion of Abraham), both becoming staples on CE and
other jihadi websites.9 Maqdisi’s website began publishing articles about the CE, which were translated
into Russian and posted on CE sites.10 Maqdisi endorsed the CE in September 2009 as a fervent global
jihadi organization, praising Astemirov for his Islamic
knowledge.11 In September 2010 Maqdisi urged Muslims to support the CE, “so the Emirate becomes the
door to Eastern Europe.”12 Since then, the CE has entered Europe.
The theological elements of tawhid and takfir are
encoded in Shariah law on the basis of the Koran and
Sunna as interpreted by true (and self-selected) Salafi
leaders. They have profound political, economic, and
operational implications, since they define jihadists’
political ideology and goals and thereby their militarily strategy and tactics.13 Tawid, or strict monotheism,
requires that Muslims worship only Allah; even worship of, or prayers to the Prophet Mohammed are forbidden. This puts the CE’s ideology within the mainstream of global jihadism but decidedly at odds with
the North Caucasus’s chief Islamic tendency, Sufism,
which holds a prominent place for prayer to Sufi saints
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and teachers, the creation of shrines at their graves,
and prayers to the Prophet Mohammed. Tawhidism’s
call to “raise the word” or “raise the religion of Allah
above all others” influences every aspect of the jihadi
theo-ideology and political philosophy. It renders
all other ideologies and identities—democracy, communism, socialism, nationalism, and class or ethnic
identity—to be sacrilegious. Its exclusivist focus on
the Deity’s will for guidance in all matters, presupposes the possibility that this will is made privy to the
movement’s leaders, opening the way to a totalitarian
monopoly over thought and power.
Much as international communism’s party of professional revolutionaries were afforded a vanguard
role in divining what was best for the proletariat,
under jihadist theo-ideology the power to interpret
Allah’s will devolves by default to a small coterie of
leaders (amirs), theologians (ulema and qadis), and
ideologists among the mujahedin, regarded as the
most devout and committed of the umma’s Muslims.
The special knowledge, faith, and commitment of the
mujahedin vanguard—the amirs and qadis—justify
their monopoly on the interpretation of the Koran and
Sunna. According to Astemirov and other jihadists,
the amirs, advised by Shariah court qadis, possess dictatorial powers to take unilateral decisions on the most
important questions, such as that taken by Umarov in
formation of the CE. The CE amir holds the ultimate
reins in a circular flow of power, as he appoints the
amirs and qadis for each of its largest substructures—
the CE vilaiyats (from the Arabic word “welaiyat” for
provinces or governates). The amir cannot be challenged on any decision unless he is deemed by a qadi
to have deviated from Shariah law as interpreted by
the qadi whom he has appointed.14 The qadis’ author-
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ity to advise and confirm the decisions of the amirs
gives them great power. CE and some vilaiyat qadis
have passed death sentences, some of which have
been carried out.15 Not surprisingly then, Astemirov
and other jihadi leaders regard democratic institutions and primary allegiance to country or nationality as major deviations from monotheism and thus
sacrilege, even manifestations of nonbelief. Similarly,
all other philosophies, allegiances or interests that intervene between the all-knowing amirs and qadis and
their interpretation of the holy texts are forbidden,
since they undermine Muslims’ unity in their fight
against nonbelief and, more to the point, undermine
their monopoly over interpretation of the Koran and
Sunna, the foundations of Shariah law. Thus, nationalism is rejected as a legitimate ideological basis and is
regarded as a manifestation of nonbelief, for it places
the religion of Islam below ethnicity.16
Among Salafists and jihadists violating the principle of tawhid by worshipping these false gods leads
to what is the second basic building block of the global
jihad’s and the CE’s theology, takfirism, a trend informed by an extremely exclusivist definition of what
constitutes true Islam and a real Muslim. The designation of takfir means the excommunication from the
Islamic religious community and is reserved for those
Muslims who are deemed to have violated fundamental tenets of Islam, such as tawhid, in accordance with
Salafist interpretation. Many takfirists hold that those
ruled apostates may be subject to the death penalty.
Given the extremist nature of their monotheism, tawhidists and jihadists have a low threshold in deciding
who should be designated takfir and subjected to the
harshest of penalties. For Astemirov and the CE, those
who help the Russian infidel and those who practice
Sufism are at risk of takfir denunciation.17
7

The iconoclastic nature of the battle between those
who observe the supposedly true Salafi version of Islam and those who do not, whether Muslim or infidel,
leads to the jihadist’s third main principle: a kinetic
rather than contemplative definition of jihad and an
offensive rather than defensive global jihadism. Rather than Islam’s traditional emphasis on the greater
jihad of the inner search for faith in Allah, takfirists
require that all Muslims support to the best of their
ability an Islamic war against nonbelievers, whether
Christian, Jew, Hindu, secularist or any other nonMuslim religion, as well as fallen Muslim apostates;
otherwise, they themselves can be subject to takfir and
be deemed targets of the jihad. The implication of takfirism is that the world is divided into two camps: the
takfiri jihadists and everyone else. The catholic nature
of this schism combines with the general trend toward
globalization fostered by technology to push Salafists
towards a global rather than a local vision of jihad.
Since neither ethnicity nor state borders can trump the
principle of raising Islam’s word above all others, the
jihad cannot be confined to specific regions or targeted attacks; it must be carried out globally. Given the
maximalist, sacred, and twilight nature of the struggle
between the abode of Islam and the abode of the infidel in the takfirist jihadis’ vision, the jihadists permit themselves rather extremist methods to maximize
their capacity to attain the goal. Using Islamic holy
texts’ frequent praise for martyrdom in battle with the
infidel during the early centuries of Islam’s expansion
across the Arabian Peninsula and beyond, jihadists
routinely proselytize, train, and deploy the ultimate
form of self-sacrificial martyrdom, (istishkhad)—that
is, suicide operations. The ability to offer one’s life for
the jihad is incontrovertible evidence of one’s purity
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and closeness to Allah.18 The remainder of this chapter
demonstrates that all of these jihadi tenets have become part and parcel of the CE’s theo-ideology, behavior and aspirations.
The CE’s Goals and Strategic Vision.
The ChRI’s implicitly expanding pan-Caucasus
ambitions became explicit and institutionalized in October 2007 with Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov’s declaration of the CE.19 Umarov’s declaration of the CE
claimed not only domain over the entire North Caucasus from the Caspian to Black Seas, but it also included a declaration of jihad against the United States,
Great Britain, Israel, and any country fighting Muslims anywhere on the globe.20 The unilateral nature of
this decision, although prompted and supported by
both foreign jihadists and many North Caucasus mujahedin as well as by their Islamic texts, demonstrates
the totalitarian essence of the Salafi takfirism. In order to achieve their local emirate, Umarov divided the
Caucasus mujahedin into some five vilaiyats loosely
based along the territorial borders of Russia’s North
Caucasus republics: the Nokchicho (Chechnya) Vilaiyat (NV), the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV); the Galgaiche
Vilaiyat (GV) covering Ingushetia and North Ossetiya;
the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya, and Karachai (OVKBK) covering the republics of KabardinoBalkaria (KBR) and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; and, the
Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat (NSV) covering Krasnodar and
Stavropol Krais. Except for the NSV, which has never
been fully developed, each is headed by an amir with
similar dictatorial powers. The chief theo-ideological
figure is the vilaiyat’s shariah court qadi. Qadis sometimes are amirs simultaneously.
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In a May 2011 interview, Umarov again elaborated
on the CE’s expansive goals:
We consider the CE and Russia as a single theater of
war.
We are not in a hurry. The path has been chosen, we
know our tasks, and we will not turn back, Insha’Allah,
from this path. Today, the battlefield is not just Chechnya and the Caucasus Emirate, but also the whole [of]
Russia. The situation is visible to everybody who has
eyes. The Jihad is spreading, steadily and inevitably,
everywhere.
I have already mentioned that all those artificial
borders, administrative divisions, which the Taghut
drew, mean nothing to us. The days when we wanted
to secede and dreamed of building a small Chechen
Kuwait in the Caucasus are over. Now, when you tell
the young Mujahedeen about these stories, they are
surprised and want to understand how those plans
related to the Koran and the Sunnah.
Alhamdulillah! I sometimes think that Allah has
called these young people to the Jihad, so that we, the
older generation, could not stray from the right path.
Now we know that we should not be divided, and
must unite with our brothers in faith. We must reconquer Astrakhan, Idel-Ural, Siberia—these are indigenous Muslim lands. And then, God willing, we shall
deal with [the] Moscow District. 21

The evidence of the CE’s adoption of the global
jihad’s universal goals as its very own is overwhelming. Yet, most analysts and activists appear unaware
or unwilling to acknowledge the fact.22 Umarov has
repeatedly associated the CE with the global jihad,
from his announcement declaring the foundation of
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the CE and its jihad against anyone fighting against
Muslims anywhere across the globe to his most recent
February 2011 “Appeal to the Muslims of Egypt and
Tunisia.”23 For example, in October 2010, Umarov addressed the global jihad:
Today, I want to describe the situation in the world because, even if thousands of kilometers separate us, those
mujahedin who are carrying out Jihad in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Kashmir and many, many other places, they
are our brothers, and we today (with them) are insisting
on the laws of Allah on this earth.

He also noted that the CE mujahedin follow the
Afghani jihad closely by radio and Internet and that
the Taliban are “opposed by Christian-Zionist forces
led by America.” In traditional jihadi fashion, Umarov calls jihadism’s enemies “the army of Iblis” or the
“army of Satan,” uniting “the Americans, who today
confess Christian Zionism, and European atheists,
who do not confess any of the religions.” Iblis fight
so “there will be no abode for Islam (Dar as-Salam)”
anywhere on earth.24 A leading ideologist for the CE’s
Ingush mujahedin of its Galgaiche (Ingushetia) Vilaiyat, Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, laid out in detail the
connection between the CE’s prospective emirate and
the grander global caliphate:
In the near future we can assume that after the liberation of the Caucasus, Jihad will begin in Idel-Ural
and Western Siberia. And, of course we will be obligated to assist with all our strength in the liberation
of our brothers’ lands from the centuries-long infidel
yoke and in the establishment there of the laws of the
Ruler of the Worlds. It is also possible that our help
will be very much needed in Kazakhstan and Central
Asia, and Allah has ordered us to render it. And we,
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Allah willing, will destroy the laws of the infidel on
the Central Asian lands in league with the mujahedin of Afghanistan. And it is impossible to forget our
brothers in the Crimea, which is also land occupied by
non-believers.25

The CE’s top qadi has put it more explicitly and
concisely: “We are doing everything possible to build
the Caliphate and prepare the ground for this to the
extent of our capabilities.”26
Domestic Strategy.
The CE issues few documents indicating their
strategy. However, some implicit strategic approaches can be sketched from some of its statements and
propaganda articles. Essentially, the CE is attempting
to create a revolutionary situation through the establishment of a credible, alternative claim on the sovereign right to rule in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia. This state-building political strategy
includes: (1) establishing a judicial system based on
Shariah courts and qadis; (2) enforcement of Shariah
law through attacks on owners, workers, and patrons
of gaming, prostitution, drinking, and alcohol-selling
establishments; (3) tax collection in the form of the Islamic tithe or zakyat to fund CE military, police, and
judicial functions; and, (4) a more expanded propaganda strategy focused exclusively on proselytizing
the Salafist theology and jihadist ideology by multiplying the number of CE-affiliated websites.27 Military
strategy compliments this political strategy, weakening the infidel state and regime by targeting state
institutions, officials, and personnel—civilian, police,
military, and intelligence alike.
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Creating a credible alternative sovereignty requires not simply weakening local branches of the
present Russian regime and state but also the federal government in Moscow and its affiliates across
the federation. Combined with the basic homeland
strategy focused on creating dual sovereignty in the
Caucasus, there is an effort to expand operations and
eventually more state-building efforts across Russia,
using concentrations of Muslim populations in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and elsewhere as platforms
from which the network could conceivably expand.
Thus, CE amir Umarov promised to liberate not just
Krasnodar Krai—part of its still very virtual Nogai
Steppe Vilaiyat—but also Astrakhan and the entire
Volga mega-region, which would include Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, and other predominantly Muslim
Tatar-populated regions in Russia’s Volga and Urals
Federal Districts.28 Simultaneously, attacks like those
on the Nevskii Express St. Petersburg-Moscow train
in November 2009, the Moscow subway system in
March 2010, and Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport in
January 2011 serve the purpose of terrorizing the Russian elite and population, creating political disunity,
and undermining the Russian will to fight for the region’s continued inclusion in the federation.
Operational Capacity and Tactics.
Although the CE is overlooked by most terrorism
or jihadism experts, its operational capacity puts the
North Caucasus a distant third among the world’s
various jihadi fronts behind the Afghanistan-Pakistan
(AfPak) theatre of AQ including the Taliban and their
numerous allies in the region, and Yemen. In recent
years, jihadi-related violence in the North Caucasus
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has outstripped that in Iraq. From late October 2007
through June 2011, CE mujahedin have carried out
or been involved in approximately 1,800 attacks and
violent incidents, with an increase in the number of
attacks/incidents each full year of the CE’s existence,
2008-10.29 Those 1,800 attacks have killed approximately 1,300 and wounded 2,100 state agents (civilian officials and military, intelligence, and police officials and personnel) and killed 300 and wounded
800 civilians, for a total of some 4,500 casualties.30 This
amounts to nearly two attacks/incidents and more
than three casualties per day. For comparison, for the
period 2008-10, there were 1,527 U.S./North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) troops killed and 9,703
U.S./NATO casualties in Afghanistan.31
Like its allies in the global jihadi revolutionary
movement, the CE has carried out spectacular and horridly effective attacks, in particular tens of istishkhad
operations—that is, suicide bombing operations. For
example, in November 2009, the CE, perhaps its Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs Brigade (RSMB), was behind
the bombing of the Moscow-St. Petersburg Nevskii Express high speed train, which killed 21 and wounded
74 civilians. The explosion of the train was followed
by a second as investigators arrived on the scene that
slightly wounded several officials. In April 2009 amir
Umarov announced after the CE’s traditional spring
planning shura that the CE had revived warlord and
notorious terrorist Shamil Basaev’s RSMB in 2008, and
that it had already carried out two operations, including the November 2008 suicide bombing of a bus in
Vladikavkaz, Ingushetia, that killed 14 and wounded
43 civilians.32 In June 2009, the notorious ethnic BuryatRussian Muslim convert Aleksandr Tikhomirov, a.k.a.
Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, masterminded the
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suicide bombing that severely wounded and nearly
killed Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov and
the August 2009 suicide bombing of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) district headquarters in Nazran
that killed 24 MVD servicemen and wounded approximately 260 people, including 11 children, on the very
day that Yevkurov returned to Ingushetia after months
of hospitalization. Based with the CE’s GV mujahedin
and RSMB, Buryatskii wrote prolifically about the importance of istishkhad operations and his preparation
with RSMB suicide bombers.33 The equally notorious
‘Seifullah Gubdenskii’ Magomedali Vagabov, CE DV
amir and CE qadi in 2010 until his demise in August
of that year, organized the double suicide bombing of
the Moscow Metropolitan subway in March 2010 that
killed 40 and wounded 101 civilians, including some
10 traveling foreigners. (Both Buryatskii and Vagabov
received Islamic education abroad before turning to
jihad; the former—in Egypt, Yemen and perhaps Saudi Arabia; the latter in Pakistan.) On amir Umarov’s
orders, the CE’s RSMB prepared and dispatched 20year old Ingush Magomed Yevloev from Ingushetia
to carry out the January 2011 suicide attack in the international terminal of Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport that killed 37 and wounded 180.34 In total, the CE
has carried out some 36 suicide attacks since CE amir
Umarov revived the RSMB: 1 in 2008, 16 in 2009, 14
in 2010, and 5 during the first 6 months of 2011. Istishkhad bombing operations are a distinct symptom
of the CE’s global jihadist theo-ideology and a symbol of its alliance with the global jihadi revolutionary
movement.

15

THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE AND THE GLOBAL
JIHADI REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
The CE’s jihadization of the Chechen and North
Caucasus insurgency, in particular its alliance with
the global jihadi revolutionary movement, imparts it
strategic importance. The process of the Salafization
of the ChRI’s ranks was a long process and was driven
by both the external influence of jihadist groups and
the weak but nevertheless existing Salafist elements
in the North Caucasus. The connections between AQ
and the ChRI were common knowledge by the late
1990s among U.S. Government officials, intelligence
analysts, and terrorism experts.35 It was well-known
and well-documented as early as the mid-1990s, for
example, that the notorious Abu Ibn al-Khattab was
an AQ operative and fought in the North Caucasus.
The declassified Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA)
Swift Knight Report documents not just Khattab’s deep
involvement, but also that of AQ and Osama bin Laden personally with the ChRI in the mid-1990s.36
After the visit by Basaev and his ethnic Circassian
or Akhaz fighters to Afghanistan, other radical nationalist and Sufi Chechen and Caucasus leaders followed
with visits to bin Laden. An important but often overlooked DIA document details the results of some of
those visits occurring in 1997. Thus, “several times in
1997 in Afghanistan bin Laden met with representatives of Movlady (Movladi) Udugov’s party ‘Islamic
Way’ (Islamskii Put’) and representatives of Chechen
and Dagestani Wahhabites from Gudermes, Grozny,
and Karamakhi.”37 Udugov would become the chief
ideologist and propagandist for both the ChRI and
CE for a decade or more. The village of Karamakhi
would be the locus of one of the self-declared Salafi
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Islamic states that popped up intermittently in the late
1990s and the focal point of Khattab’s, Basaev’s, and
Bagautdin’s incursions and ultimate full-scale invasion of Dagestan in July and August 1999 that kicked
off the second post-Soviet Russo-Chechen war. The
result of this local-global nexus rooted in a common
theo-ideology, mutual training camps, and overlapping personnel was a gradual but significant spread
of Salafism and exclusionary takfirism among young
Muslims across the Caucasus, creating an unprecedented recruitment pool for both the local and global
jihads.
AQ and the Caucasus Islamic separatists agreed to
create a jihadist movement and insurgency across Russia with AQ supplying funding, training, and fighters
towards the goal of attacking Russians and Westerners. AQ money funded the establishment of training
camps in Chechnya and Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, a
steady supply of trainers for those camps, and fighters who spread out across Chechnya and the North
Caucasus bringing the message of Salfism and global
jihadism to the ChRI insurgents and their still very
few allies in other North Caucasus regions such as the
Republic of Dagestan and the Republic of KabardinoBalkaria (KBR).38 The DIA document details AQ’s
plans for the North Caucasus and Russia’s Muslims:
[R]adical Islamic (predominantly Sunni) regimes are
to be established and supported everywhere possible, including Bosnia, Albania, Chechnya, Dagestan,
the entire North Caucasus ”from sea to sea”, Central
Asian republics, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, all of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and the
states of the Persian Gulf. Terrorist activities are to be
conducted against Americans and Westerners, Israe-
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lis, Russians (predominantly Cossacks), Serbs, Chinese, Armenians, and disloyal Muslims. . . .
Special attention should be given to the Northern Caucasus, and especially Chechnya since they are regarded as areas unreachable by strikes from the West. The
intent is to create a newly developed base for training
terrorists. Amir Khattab and nine other militants of
Usam Ben (sic) Laden were sent there with passports
of Arab countries. They work as military instructors in
Khattab’s three schools; they also work as instructors
in the army of Chechnya. Two more schools are being
organized in Ingushetiya and Dagestan.39

“’Volunteers’ from ben Laden’s ‘charity societies’ from
Pakistan and Afghanistan” went to Chechnya and the
Northern Caucasus for a “new round of jihad against
Cossacks and Russia.”40
These AQ-affilitated “charity societies” ensured a
steady flow of AQ funds, Salafist Wahhabi literature,
and equipment to the region. The DIA’s Swift Knight
Report, as well as numerous trial transcripts, document
the support rendered by the AQ-affiliated Benevolent
International Foundation (BIF) and Al-Haramain to
the ChRI or at least its radical wing beginning in the
early 1990s.41 The U.S. criminal prosecution of BIF
for supporting terrorist activity reveals much about
the AQ-BIF-ChRI connection. AQ used BIF for “the
movement of money to fund its operations” and the
support of “persons trying to obtain chemical and
nuclear weapons on behalf of AQ,” and BIF funded
and supplied the Chechen separatist mujahedin before, during, and after the first Chechen-Russian war
before Moscow forced BIF to shut down its operations
in Russia.42 AQ ruling Majlisul Shura member Seif
al-Islam al-Masry was an officer in BIF’s Grozny of-

18

fice, which moved to Ingushetia in 1998.43 A BIF officer “had direct dealings with representatives of the
Chechen mujahideen (guerrillas or freedom fighters)
as well as Hezb i Islami, a military group operating in
Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.”44 BIF’s work with Hezb
i Islami in Azerbaijan was likely related to AQ’s corridor to the North Caucasus noted in the DIA document. BIF worked to provide the Chechen mujahedin
with recruits, doctors, medicine, “money, an X-ray
machine, and anti-mine boots, among other things.”45
Beginning around 2000, the pro-Khattab and likely
AQ-backed website, Qoqaz.net (Qoqaz is Arabic for
Caucasus) sought funders and recruits for the Chechen
jihad. Qoqaz.net, Qoqaz.co.uk, Webstorage.com/~azzam,
and Waaqiah.com were created and supported by the
AQ-affiliated Azzam Publications run by Babar Ahmad, both based in London. Azzam Publications produced numerous video discs featuring the terrorist
attacks carried out by Khattab and Basaev as well as
other ChRI operations.46 According to the U.S. indictment of Ahmad, through Azzam he
provided, through the creation and use of various
internet websites, email communication, and other
means, expert advice and assistance, communications equipment, military items, currency, monetary
instruments, financial services, personnel designed
to recruit and assist the Chechen Mujahideen and the
Taliban, and raise funds for violent jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other places.”

Azzam’s web sites were created for communicating
with: (1) “members of the Taliban, Chechen Mujahideen, and associated groups;” (2) others “who sought
to support violent jihad” by providing “material support;” (3) individuals who wished to join these groups,
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“solicit donations,” and arrange money transfers; and,
(4) those who sought to purchase “videotapes depicting violent jihad in Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan,
and other lands of jihad, and the torture and killing
of captured Russian troops.” Videotapes, including
those eulogizing dead fighters, were intended to help
and indeed were used to solicit donations for the jihad
in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Ahmad also assisted
terrorists to secure temporary residence in London,
and to travel to Afghanistan and Chechnya in order to
participate in jihad. He also assisted terrorists in procuring “camouflage suits; global positioning system
(GPS) equipment; and, other materials and information.” Ahmad even put Shamil Basaev in touch with
an individual who had traveled to the United States
in order to raise money and purchase footwarmers for
the ChRI fighters.47
Documents found in BIF’s trash revealed that 42
percent of its budget was spent on Chechnya. During
a 4-month period in 2000, BIF funneled $685,000 to
Chechnya in 19 wire bank transfers through the Georgian Relief Association (GRA) in Tbilisi and various
BIF accounts across the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), according to Citibank records introduced to the court. The GRA was actually a BIF front
organization and was run by the brother of Chechen
field commander Chamsoudin Avraligov, who was
operating in AQ’s training camp in Georgia’s Pankisi
Gorge.48 Given that BIF was able to function in Russia
for nearly a decade, claims made by Russian officials
that AQ sent tens of millions of dollars to the North
Caucasus mujahedin are plausible. One expert claims
that AQ has funneled $25 million to the Chechen resistance including a one-time contribution in 2000 of
$2 million, four Stinger missiles, 700 plastic explosive

20

packs amounting to over 350 kilograms, remote detonators, and medical supplies.49 Basaev acknowledged
in a 2004 interview receiving funds from international
Islamists “on a regular basis,” perhaps understating
the amount he received that year at some $20 thousand.50 Despite the crackdown on Saudi-sponsored
and AQ-tied foundations like the BIF and the deaths
of Khattab in 2003 and Basaev in 2006, both the ChRI
and then its successor organization the CE continued
to receive foreign funding from Middle Eastern contributions funneled through foreign and AQ-tied mujahedin through 2010.51
There were two principal figures involved in leading AQ’s work in Chechnya and the North Caucasus:
Khattab, who turned high-ranking ChRI warlord and
Prime Minister Shamil Basaev to Salafi global jihadism
and together with him ran training camps and numerous operations, and Abu Sayif, who headed the Saudi
BIFs office in Grozny before the second war and ran
communications and the transport of supplies, fighters, and funding from AQ to the Caucasus. Upon arriving in the Caucasus, Khattab linked up with Shamil
Basaev, a notorious terrorist in Chechnya, and married
the sister of Nadir Khachilaev, the leader of the Union
of the Muslims of Russia (Soyuz musul’man Rossii) and
an ethnic Lak from Dagestan.52 By so cementing his
connection to a pan-Russian Islamist organization and
to Dagestan, Khattab was clearly using a standard AQ
approach of imbedding into the local social fabric in
the service of highjacking local Muslim nationalist and
Islamic movements for the global jihadi movement.
Excluding Khattab, AQ operative Abu Sayif, who
worked in the Chechen Foreign Ministry under Movladi Udugov in the inter-war years, played the most
important role in developing AQ’s presence in Chech-
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nya and the North Caucasus. Sayif coordinated the
travel route, which was used to route volunteers and
drug trafficking, and Sayif and Khattab were the only
ones permitted to know the real names of the foreign
volunteers. A travel route from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Chechnya, via Azerbaijan and Turkey, was established. The first group of some 25 “Afghan Arabs”
arrived in Khattab’s Vedeno camp in June 1998. Some
were to pass through Tatarstan on their way to Central Asian Republics, where they were supposed to
create “Wahhabite and Taliban cells, spreading terror
against U.S., Russian, and other Western officials and
businessmen.”53 It is now common knowledge that the
lead perpetrator of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, Mohammed Atta, was on his way to Chechnya
when he was sent to Germany and later the United
States. Rohan Gunaratna claims that already by 1995,
there were some 300 Afghan Arabs fighting in Chechnya against the Russians. They were joined by mujahedin from Bosnia and Azerbaidzhan.54 Thus, there
were perhaps as many as 500 foreign fighters in the
North Caucasus on the eve of the Khattab-Basaev-led
invasion of Dagestan. Indeed, the nexus of Dagestan,
Karamakhi, bin Laden, and Khattab’s and Basaev’s
Chechnya training camps draws a straight line from
AQ in Afghanistan to the second post-Soviet RussoChechen war and the ChRI’s expansion of operations
across the North Caucasus.
Not only did AQ mujahedin fight in the North
Caucasus during the ChRI struggle but North Caucasus mujahedin fought on other fronts in the global
jihad during the same time frame. Two ethnic Kabardins from KBR were among eight ethnic Muslims
from regions both in the North Caucasus and Volga
area captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2001
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fighting among the Taliban and AQ and sent to the
Guantanamo Bay prison camp in 2002.55 A brief official CE biography of late Dagestani amir and CE
qadi Magomed Vagabov (a.k.a. Seifullah Gubdenskii)
shows that in 2001-02 some members of his Gubden
Jamaat went to Afghanistan after the rout of the joint
Chechen-Dagestani-foreign jihadi force that invaded
Dagestan in August 1999. Among those Gubden Jamaat members who went to Afghanistan was its then
amir Khabibullah, who became the amir of “a Russian-speaking jamaat of AQ.”56 More recently, some
members of the DV-tied cell, that was uncovered in
the Czech Republic and discussed below, were at one
time based in Germany and underwent training in Afghanistan and Pakistan.57 We also know that the Tatar
jihadi “Bulgar Jamaat,” made up mostly of ethnic Tatars who made the hijra from Russia and now based
in Waziristan, Pakistan, has declared jihad against
Russia and stated that it includes “Dagestanis, Russians, Kabardins” and has carried out operations in
Afghanistan.58
If one prefers to narrow the issue to Chechens, Bryan Glynn Williams claims that after extensive travel
across Afghanistan, he was unable to find evidence
that even one Chechen fighter ever fought there.59 But
there have been numerous reports of Chechens fighting not just in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq against
U.S. forces.60 In 2003, Indian police uncovered an AQ
cell led by a Chechen planning to assassinate Vice
Admiral V. J. Metzger, commander-in-chief of the
U.S. Seventh Fleet, forcing the admiral’s trip to India to be cancelled.61 Every officer and junior officer
with whom I have had the pleasure of speaking has
claimed that he encountered a Chechen presence in
both Afghanistan and Iraq. Almost all of these officers
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spoke some Russian. It is certainly true that some of
these testimonials are cases of mistaken identity, taking Russian-speaking Central Asians for Chechens.
But it simply strains credulity to believe that not a
single Chechen has fought in Afghanistan, when we
have seen that Americans, Germans, other Westerners, Central Asians, Tatars, Kabardins, and Dagestanis
have been there.
These are a few examples of CE ties to other fronts
in the global jihad. In the same month that the CE was
formed (October 2007), the Lebanese government arrested four Russian citizens, including three ethnic
North Caucasians (one from Dagestan), who were
charged with belonging to Fatah-el-Islam, fighting
in northern Lebanon that summer, and carrying out
terrorist attacks against Lebanese servicemen while
participating in an armed revolt in the Nahr el-Barid
Palestinian refugee camp. Along with 16 Palestinians,
they formed a Fatah cell.62 According to a recent report by Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee,
a Kabardin, who allegedly was recently fighting in
Lebanon, returned home and was killed in Nalchik.63
Thus, there have been some, but very few Chechen
or other North Caucasus mujahedin who have fought
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other fronts of the global
jihad. The Chechen and then Caucasus mujahedin’s
operational connections with, and influence on the
more central fronts of the global jihad are evident.
However, these connections are less than robust and
of limited strategic significance, with the caveat that
a small number of well-funded and capable terrorists
can do great damage, as we saw on 9/11. Neither the
ChRI nor the CE ever declared themselves AQ in the
Caucasus or North Caucasus. But the close ties that
developed between the ChRI and AQ beginning in the
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inter-war period meant that the ChRI units and camps
of foreign fighters and their local allies led by Khattab and Basaev became AQ’s de facto, unofficial North
Caucasus affiliate and a key, if relatively weak, front
in the global jihad. The AQ-tied foreign fighters, many
of whom settled down and even married in Chechnya
and other North Caucasus republics after the second
war, were in large part responsible for the growing
influence of jihadist ideologies in the region and fundamentally altered the nature of what began as a secessionist struggle for Chechen independence; this is
precisely what AQ had counted on when it infiltrated
the ChRI.
AQ’s intervention and the growing influence of the
global jihadi revolutionary movement led the radical
Chechen national separatist movement down a path
traversed by many such movements across the Muslim world in recent decades. In the Caucasus, especially Dagestan, they mixed with the very limited indigenous history of Salfism and significant contemporary
flood of young Caucasus Muslims to study abroad in
the Middle East and South Asia, on the one hand, and
of Wahhabi and other Salafi teachings from there to
the Caucasus through the Internet on the other. In the
18th and certainly by the 19th centuries, Salafism was
brought in from abroad by Caucasians like Mukhamad Al-Kuduki after travels in Egypt and Yemen introduced him to scholars like Salikh al-Yamani.64 The
revival of this relatively recent, if thin, Salafi Islamist
usable past, along with the national myths during the
perestroika and post-perestroika periods, yielded the
rehabilitation and of the 19th century imams and religious teachers who led the gazavats against Russian
rule teachers.65 But the nationalist ideas and cadres
were gradually displaced by jihadist elements, trans-
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forming the secular movement into a jihadist one. This
process was increasingly legitimized and gained momentum as Islamic elements were incorporated into
the ChRI proto-state and foreign Salafists, Wahabbis,
and other Islamic extremists continued to infiltrate
the movement throughout the 1990s and early 2000s,
bringing finances, guerrilla and terrorist training and,
most importantly, a new jihadist ideo-theological orientation. The Salafist historical myth and related historical figures served as models for some local Salafists, who played key roles in the ChRI’s incomplete
Islamization even before 2007.66
The combination of AQ and other foreign Salafi intervention, a usable indigenous Salafi historical myth,
and locals studying Islam abroad influenced a small
but highly motivated group of Islamist and ultimately
jihadist leaders across the North Caucasus. Beginning
in the early 1990s, thousands of Muslims from Russia traveled abroad to receive Islamic education in
Islamic schools which were experiencing the rise of
a significant global jihadi revolutionary movement.
They returned home with Wahhabist and other forms
of Salafist zeal for jihad and a strong sense of kinship
with radical Islamists and mujahedin in Afghanistan,
Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere. Three young, foreigneducated Muslims—”Sefullah” Anzor Astemirov,
Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii (Aleksandr Tikhomirov), and “Seifullah Gubdenskii” Magomedali
Vagabov—joined the ChRI’s jihadi wing or later the
CE and rose quickly up the CE’s ranks, driving its expanding jihad on three main fronts outside Chechnya:
Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KBR.
In the early 1990s, the foreign-educated Dagestani
Salafist Ahmad-Kadi Akhtaev taught the first important post-Soviet Dagestani jihadi theo-ideologists, Ma-
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gomed Tegaev and Bagautdin Magomedov (Kebedov),
and the two leading ethnic Kabard jihadists, Musa
Mukozhev and “Seifullah” Anzor Astemirov, both of
whom studied abroad as well. Astemirov would play
a key role in the formation of a small cadre of jihadi
fighters in the KBR, in Umarov’s decision to form the
CE and jettison the ChRI Chechen nationalist project,
and in the development of the CE’s relationship with
Jordanian Sheikh Maqdisi and thus the global jihadi
revolutionary movement. In the mid-1990s, as one of
the leading students at a madrassah run by the official
Muslim Spiritual Administration (DUM) of the KBR,
Astemirov was one among many sent by the DUM to
study Islam abroad in an unknown higher education
religious school in Saudi Arabia.67 This set him and
many other young Muslims from the KBR on the path
of Islamism and ultimately jihadism.68 In summer
2005 Mukozhev and Astemirov met with Basaev, and
they agreed that they would transform their Islamist
Jamaat of KBR into the ChRI North Caucasus Front’s
Kabardino-Balkaria Sector (KBS) on the condition that
Sadulaev and Basaev saw through to the end the formation of a pan-Caucasus jihadi organization like the
future CE based on a strict takfirist interpretation of
Shariah law. In addition to this and his abovementioned role as CE qadi, Astemirov’s organizational efforts as amir of the CE’s OVKBK resulted in its becoming the CE’s second most operationally active vilaiyat
in 2010, ahead of Chechnya’s NV and Ingushetia’s
GV.69
Sheikh Buryatskii is representative of an even
more disturbing transformation which shows that one
does not need to be a victim of Russian brutality and
bad governance or the product of the Caucasus traditions of martial violence and blood revenge to join the
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Caucasus jihad and that the jihadist theo-ideology is
by itself a substantial driver of jihadism in the region.
As his jihadi nom de guerre suggests, Buryatskii was
part ethnic Buryat, a Mongol and traditionally Buddhist ethnic group, and part ethnic Russian. Born as
Aleksandr Tikhomirov in 1982, he lived in far away
Ulan-Ude, the capitol of Russia’s republic of Buryatia. His mother was Russian and Orthodox Christian;
his father was an ethnic Buryat and Buddhist. 70 Buryatskii studied at a Buddhist datsan, but at age 15 he
converted to Islam. He moved to Moscow and then to
Bugurslan, Orenburg where he studied at the Sunni
madrasah, Rasul Akram. Buryatskii then studied
Arabic at the Saudi-supported Fajr language center
in 2002-05 before traveling to Egypt to study Islamic
theology at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University as well as
under several authoritative sheikhs in Egypt, Kuwait
and, according to Russian prosecutors, Saudi Arabia.71
Buryatskii himself reveals what his education in the
core of an umma plagued by global jihadi revolutionary ideology taught him:
At one time when I was in Egypt at the lecture of one
of the scholars, who openly said to us: “Do you really think that you can so simply spread the Allah’s
religion without the blood of martyrs?! The disciples
of Allah’s prophet spilt the blood of martyrs on many
lands, and Islam bloomed on their blood!”72

Running afoul of the Egypt’s secret services, Buryatskii returned to Russia.73 Buryatskii left for the Caucasus jihad in May 2008.74
Assigned by Umarov to the CE’s GV in Ingushetia,
the fervent Buryatskii became a recruiting draw. In
2009, Buryatskii was the CE’s main, if fatal, attraction
and its most effective propagandist and operative,
28

showing shades of the charisma and ruthlessness for
which Shamil Basaev became infamous. His articles
detailing his mentoring of RSMB suicide bombers and
his video lectures propagandizing jihadism and the
importance of istshkhad drew new forces to the CE’s
once relatively quiet Ingush mujahedin. Buryatskii’s
activity was perhaps the main factor making the CE’s
GV the most operationally capacious of its vilaiyats in
2008-09, leading in the number of attacks both years.75
Thus, there is a direct line between Buryatskii’s Islamic conversion and study abroad to the explosion of
terrorism in Ingushetia during 2008-09. Buryatskii is
but one of several ethnic Russian and Slavic converts
to Islam from outside Russia’s Muslim republics who
have become prominent CE terrorists in recent years,
including Pavel Kosolapov, Vitalii Razdobudko, Maria Khorsheva, and Viktor Dvorakovskii.76
In contrast to Astemirov and Buryatskii, Vagabov
was influenced by Pakistani Salafism. After studying
Islam locally in Dagestan, he began to work with missionaries of the peaceful Pakistan-based international
Salafist sect Tabligh Jamaat in Dagestan. His native
Gubden District was declared the Tablighists’ center
for the call to the Tabligh in Russia. Vagabov then
traveled in 1994 to Raiwand, Pakistan, the center of
the Tabligh Jamaat movement, and studied there for
several months in a madrassah learning the Koran by
heart and receiving the diploma of a khafiz. Traveling
on to Karachi, he studied the fundamentals of Shariah
law apparently both at university and privately with
sheikhs and became an adherent of Salafism and the
writings of imam Abul Hasan Al-Ashari, Al-Ibana,
and Risalyatu ila Aglyu Sagr-Vibabil Abvab. Vagabov
returned home in 1997, opened the School of Khafiz
in Gubden to courses on the hadiths, and traveled to
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Chechnya where he met with Khattab and underwent
military training in the AQ-funded camps. He fought
for the Salafis, who declared an independent Islamic
state in Karamakhi and two other Dagestani villages
in 1998, and in the 1999 Khattab-Basaev invasion of
Dagestan that kicked off the second Chechen war.77 In
the 2000s, Vagabov rose up the ranks of the ChRI’s
Dagestani Front and then the CE’s DV. He played a
lead role in building up the DV’s dominant Central
Sector, which has made Dagestan the locus of the
highest number of attacks of any Russian region since
April 2010. Vagabov also organized the pivotal March
2010 Moscow subway suicide bombings carried out by
the respective wives of his predecessor and successor
as DV amir. In June 2010, Umarov appointed him as
the DV’s amir, and Astemirov’s successor as the CE’s
qadi.78 Vagabov’s biography draws a direct line from
the umma’s global jihadi revolutionary movement and
radical Pakistani madrassahs, mosques, and universities to the rise of the Dagestani jihad within the overall
CE and to terrorism in Moscow itself with the Moscow
subway bombing among others. Although Astemirov,
Vagabov, and Buryatskii were killed in 2010, by then
each had left their mark on the CE’s expansion across
the Caucasus and transformation into a viable jihadist
project allied with the global jihadi revolutionary alliance inspired by AQ and its takfirist theo-ideology.
As AQ and the global jihadi revolutionary alliance
have evolved into a more decentralized network of
jihadi groups, interacting increasingly for theo-ideological sustenance, funding, training, and operational
planning through the Internet rather than directly,
the CE integrated into the AQ’s wider network of
jihadi websites. In this way, it developed relationships with jihadi leaders and philosophers such as
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Maqdisi, mentioned earlier, and AQ in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and Anwar Al-Awlaki. The AQaffiliated website, Ansar al-Mujahideen (www.ansar1.
info/), is used to recruit fighters and raise funds for the
CE by those involved in the Belgian plot uncovered
last autumn and is closely linked to AQ. The Ansar
al-Mujahideen network is typically regarded as a selfstarted jihadi and pro-AQ site that helps propagandize and recruit for the global jihad and AQ.79 Ansar al
Mujahideen’s English-language forum’s (AMEF) leading personality was “Abu Risaas” Samir Khan until
mid-2010 when he turned up working with Awlaki in
AQAP.80 The Virginian Zachary Adam Chasser, alias
Abu Talhah al-Amriki, in prison for assisting the Somalian AQ affiliate Al-Shabaab, also participated in
AMEF.81 Ansar al Mujahideen’s German-language sister site is closely associated with the Global Islamic
Media Front (GIMF), which also has produced several
operatives arrested for involvement in AQ terrorism
plots.82 The Taliban has authorized the Ansar al-Mujahideen network as one of three entities that may publish its official statements, and Ansar al-Mujahideen’s
founder noted “we have brothers from Chechnya and
Dagestan.”83
In December 2010, Ansar al-Mujahideen announced
“the Start of a New Campaign in Support of the Caucasus Emirate,” signaling a request for fighters and
funds for the CE and emphasizing: “We ask Allah to
make this year a year of constant discord and increasing enmity for the enemies of the Islamic Emirate of
the Caucasus.” The announcement welcomed emerging signs of jihadism in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan,
asking Allah for “a new generation of scholars” to replace Astemirov, Buryatskii, and AQ operative Omar
al-Sayif, all mentioned by name.84 Ansar al-Mujahedeen
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soon partnered with Astemirov’s and the CE OVKBK’s
Islamdin.com to create a new Russian-language global
jihadi website (al-ansar.info) no later than July 2010.85
In August, the webmaster of Ansar al-Mujahideen, an
ethnic Moroccan named Faisal Errai, was arrested in
Spain. Spanish authorities also reported that the website was already raising money for terrorists in Chechnya and Afghanistan.86 The Russian-language Al-Ansar.info was set up to “highlight news summaries of
the Jihad on all fronts, both in the Caucasus and in
all other lands of the fight” and publish old and new
works of scholars of the “ahli sunny ual’ jama’a.” The
fact that it contains primarily Russian-language but
also English-language content suggests, along with
other factors, that AQAP’s Awlaki may be a driving
force behind the Ansar al-Mujahideen network of which
Al-Ansar.info is a part. Thus, Islamdin.com’s announcement of the joint project with the Ansar al-Mujahideen
network extensively quotes Awlaki (who otherwise
retains a high profile on CE sites) on the value of being a “jihadist of the internet.”87 Islamdin.com posted
the first part of Awlaki’s Al-Janna the day after this
announcement, and CE websites continue to post Awlaki’s works.88 With the CE tied into the global jihadi
revolutionary alliance and once again plugged into
the AQ-affiliated Internet network, it was just a matter
of time before it developed a more international role.
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS
The CE’s more expansive aspirations and growing ties with the global jihad revolutionary movement
have been accompanied by closer propaganda and operational ties to jihadists in other regions of Russia, the
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former Soviet Union, other fronts in the global jihad
and, per Maqdisi’s call, even Europe. Moreover, there
are even broader strategic implications impinging on
both international and U.S. national security.
To the Volga and Beyond.
Aside from the abovementioned train, subway,
and airport attacks in and around Moscow, the CE
is involved in several projects inside Russia far beyond the virtual emirate’s supposed borders. But the
CE also has plans to expand operations beyond Russia. Already in January 2006, Basaev warned that by
summer, the ChRI’s combat jamaat network would
“cross the Volga,” suggesting expansion to Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, and likely beyond.89 In June 2006, then
ChRI amir Umarov issued a decree creating Volga
and Urals Fronts, hoping to expand operations to
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and other ethnic Tatar and
Bashkir communities across Russia.90 Through 2009
there was much CE propaganda targeting Tatars and
Bashkirs but few jihadi deeds. A group called Islamic Jamaat was uncovered in 2007, but there was no
evidence that it had CE ties.91 Rather, the group may
have been the predecessor of the allegedly CE-tied
so-called Oktyabrskii Jamaat uncovered in 2010, both
of which could have been connected to the so-called
Uighur-Bulgar Jamaat (UBJ), which may be one and
the same as the abovementioned Bulgar Jamaat, fighting with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.92 The UBJ, like the Bulgar Jamaat, is Tatardominated and adheres to the ideology of resettling
in order to fight the infidel (at-Takfir Val Khidzhra).
Several alleged operatives from the UBJ were arrested
in Bashkortostan in August 2008 after a shootout with
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Bashkir police in Salavat, Bashkortostan. They went
on trial in April 2009 for allegedly planning terrorist
attacks in the republic. According to Bashkir authorities, the UBJ was founded by Bashkiriya native Pavel
Dorokhov, who underwent training in al-Qaeda and
Taliban camps.93
More recently, during 2010 and early 2011, several
arrests of alleged mujahedin with ties to the CE have
been made and the first apparent jihadi attacks occurred in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Astrakhan.94
This suggests that the CE may indeed be expanding
operations to these key Muslim communities. In addition, this past winter a group from Tatarstan and/or
Bashkortostan appealed to Umarov to recognize their
self-declared Idel-Ural Vilaiyat (IUV) and provide
financial and other assistance in setting up training
camps in the southern Ural Mountains and in organizing attacks.95 As of mid-summer 2011, there had been
no public response by Umarov, though clandestine assistance cannot be ruled out. The UBJ/Bulgar Jamaat
also could be playing a role in these possible efforts by
these Tatars and Bashkirs. Bringing Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Astrakhan would help form a bridgehead to Siberia, the Far East, and Central Asia. Gaining a foothold in ethnic Bashkir and especially Tatar
communities in these regions would vastly expand the
CE’s pool of potential recruits and geographical reach
into both Russia and Central Asia, since Tatar communities can be found in almost all of Russia’s provincial
capitals, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, and
in Central Asia. Expansion along these lines would
further tax Russian resources, already burdened by
massive federal subsidies to the North Caucasus. Although it is unlikely that the CE will achieve substantial progress in expanding to a permanent presence in
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the Volga, Urals, or Siberian regions, the ChRI’s and
CE’s record in expanding operations across the North
Caucasus argues against complacency. Few expected
that Ingushetia rather than Chechnya would be the
center of gravity of the jihadi in 2008 and 2009, or that
Dagestan and KBR would supersede both Vainakh
republics in the number of jihadi operations in 2010.
Even a small IUV enterprise could significantly complicate Moscow’s coordination problems, given some
creativity and modest resources on the part of the mujahedin.
More disturbing is the threat posed by the CE mujahedin to the 2014 Olympic Games to be held in the
North Caucasus resort city of Sochi, Krasnodar. The
area comes under the CE’s NSV, which is responsible
for Russia’s Krasnodar and Stavropol regions but it
has not demonstrated much of an existence no less capacity, with a caveat: Recent suicide operations, failed
and successful, have involved ethnic Russian Islamic
converts from Stavropol. The advantage that less conspicuous ethnic Russian mujahedin might offer in an
operation targeting Sochi raises red flags. These same
ethnic Russian mujahedin’s ties to the most capacious
of the CE’s vilaiyats, the DV, raise more concerns.96
Not only have the Dagestani mujahedin carried out
the highest number of operations each month since
April 2011, but the DV has also led in the number of
suicide bombings and created its own Riyadus Salikhiin Jamaat (RSJ).97 In August 2010, Dagestani mujahedin issued an explicit promise of “operations in
Sochi and across Russia and more ‘surprises’ from the
horror of which you will blacken.”98 The CE’s OVKBK
mujahedin also might be involved in an attack on the
Sochi Games. Its field of operations, the republics of
KBR and lesser so Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (KChR),
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are geographically closer to Sochi than is Dagestan.99
In February 2011, the OVKBK carried out a series coordinated attacks against the winter ski resort area
around Mt. Elbrus. The entire operation resembled
a training operation for an attack on Sochi, and the
OVKBK warned it would continue to fight infidel Russian development efforts and international culture in
the region.100 Thus, CE plans for Sochi could include
a joint DV-OVKBK operation or separate ones by the
DV and OVKBK with built-in redundancy, utilizing
ethnic Russian suicide bombers. The possibility that
the CE might strike at the Sochi Games, an international target, is strengthened by its active support for
the global jihadi revolutionary alliance’s goals.
The Eurasian Horizon.
There already are connections between the CE
and other post-Soviet jihadists. At the most general
level, mujahedin from Central Asian states, Azerbaijan, and even Georgia, have turned up among the CE
mujahedin, but the reverse has not been true, putting
aside the CE’s use of Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge as a rear
base. The CE has declared not only all Muslim lands
in Russia, but also the entire Caucasus as its rightful
domain.101 In the Caucasus writ large, Azerbaijan, bordering and having some ethnic and Islamic overlap
with Dagestan, the present spearhead of the CE’s activity, is most vulnerable to CE penetration. Its Islamic
population includes nationalities such as the Lezgins,
who straddle the Azerbaijani-Dagestan border and are
an important nationality in Dagestan. As noted above,
the ChRI, AQ, and its affiliated charity societies used
Azerbaijan as a transit point for funneling funds, cadres, and weapons to Chechnya in the 1990s. The CE also
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seems to be taking note. Recent incursions south by
likely CE mujahedin into northern Azerbaijan as well
as jihadist activity in Baku suggest mujahedin could
threaten this strategically important state.102 Recently,
the DV added an Azerbaijan Jamaat with unidentified
locale and goals.103 The CE’s capacious vanguard DV
puts Umarov within striking range of international
and U.S. interests in Azerbaijan such as oil company
headquarters, refineries, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline carrying oil to Europe. Clearly, a CE or other
significant jihadi presence in Azerbaijan would have
security implications for the entire Transcaucasus and
the Persian Gulf region.
The bad blood between Moscow and Tbilisi created
by the 2008 Georgian-Russian 5-day war is beginning
to influence the situation in the North Caucasus. To
be sure, there is little evidence of the ethno-nationalist
mobilizational effect on Russia’s Circassian nationalities that many predicted would be a result of Russia’s
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia. However, Georgia has been speculating on the situation in
the region, especially the Circassian genocide issue,
as the Sochi Olympics approach. It has opened up a
television and radio company that broadcasts propaganda to the region, waived visa requirements for
North Caucasus residents, and adopted a parliamentary resolution calling for a boycott of the Sochi Olympics and Russian and international recognition of the
Russians’ rout and partially forced exile of Circassians
in the 1860s as a genocide. Some Georgian opposition
figures and one former U.S. official claim that President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government is providing
financial and training assistance to the CE.104 Georgia’s policies could radicalize some Circassians and
thus improve the CE OVKBK’s and NSV’s prospects
for recruitment.
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Consistent with the interrelated goals of recreating
the caliphate and extending the CE through the Volga
and southern Urals regions as a bridge to Central Asia,
the CE maintains relations with Central Asian jihadi
organizations tied to AQ and the Taliban in AfPak
such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
and the IMU splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union
(IJU). Both the IMU and IJU have fighters in Afghanistan, train in Pakistan, and fight in both as well as in
Central Asia. In a May 2007 statement, IJU amir Ebu
Yahya Muhammad Fatih stated that the IJU had “also
been working on our common targets together with
Caucasian mujahedeens.”105 In March 2011, the IJU’s
media department, Badr At-Tawhid, sent a 7-minute
video message to the CE mujahedin from the IJU’s
amirs in the “land of Horosan,” Afghanistan.106 It
praised the CE mujahedin for joining the global jihad
and noted: “In our jamaat, there are many brothers
who were trained or fought on the lands of the Caucasus Emirate.”107 The CE DV cell uncovered in the Czech
Republic discussed below could have been training
with the IJU or IMU. CE websites regularly cover and
provide at least propaganda support to Central Asia’s
leading jihadi organizations, including the IMU and
IJU. Thus, the CE reported extensively on the series of
suicide, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ambush attacks and skirmishes carried out by the IMU,
IJU, and/or a possible subunit thereof, the “Jamaat
‘Ansarullah’ in Tajikistan,” during autumn 2010 in
Hujand, Sogdo Oblast’ and elsewhere in Tajikistan.108
The CE Ingush GV’s website Hunafa.com, founded by Buryatskii, has shown a special interest in the
emergence of jihadism in Kazakhstan, carrying propaganda materials from a Kazakhstan jihadi jamaat
“Ansaru-d-din,” calling Kazakhstan’s Muslims to
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jihad and a fatwa issued by Sheikh Abul-Mundhir
Al-Shinkiti, asserting the Shariah legality of attacking
police and fighting jihad in Kazkahstan, even though
the Muslims there are weak and small in number.109
It is unclear whether the CE, GV independently, or
Absaru-d-din played a role in recent bombings and attacks on police this year.110 The CE’s main website Kavkaz tsentr also reported in March 2011 the bayat to the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammad
Omar Mujahid, the Islamic group taken by a group of
Kyrgyzstan mujahedin, Jaish Jamaat al-Mahdi (Amirul-Mu’minin), and their call to the Kyrgyz to take up
jihad.111
Thinking Globally: The CE and Jihad in Europe.
The CE’s rabid anti-infidelism is not new; the ChRI’s
websites were replete with anti-Western, anti-Semitic,
and anti-American articulations as far back as 2005.112
The CE’s growing ties with AQ and the global jihadi
revolutionary alliance produced in 2010 what appears
to have been the first CE-tied activity in Europe: the
plot by “Shariah4Belgium” broken up in November
2010, and the DV-tied Czech cell uncovered in April
2011. On November 23, 11 suspects tied to the jihadi
Shariah4Belgium group were arrested in Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Morocco, and Saudi
Arabia on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks in Belgium, recruiting “jihadist candidates” and financing
the CE. Earlier in 2010, Shariah4Belgium leader Abou
Imran declared that the White House would “be conquered,” and “Europe will be dominated by Islam.”113
The Belgian-based detainees included six Moroccan
Belgian citizens detained in Antwerp, three Moroccan
Belgian citizens arrested in the Netherlands, and two
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Chechens apprehended in the German city of Aachen
near the Belgian border 114 All the suspects held dual
citizenship and belonged to the Antwerp-based Shariah4Belgium.115 Belgian police said the Shariah4Belgium cell had ties to a local Islamic Center and had
been under investigation since at least 2009. One of
the Russian nationals was a 31-year-old “Chechen” arrested in Aachen, Germany, under a European arrest
warrant issued by Belgium who was suspected of having recruited young people to fight in Chechnya. All
the detainees, including the two Chechens, were said
to have been involved in both recruiting and financing for the CE and planning attacks in Belgium 116 A
third Chechen supporter of Doku Umarov allegedly
involved in the Shariah4Belgium plot was arrested on
December 1 at Vienna’s Schwechat airport on the basis
of one of nine international arrest warrants issued by
the Belgian government.117 The 32-year old Aslambek
I., as he was identified by the authorities, was detained
upon his return from the hajj to Mecca in connection
with an international plot to attack “a NATO facility
in Belgium.”118 Aslambek I. reportedly lived in the
Austrian town of Neunkirchen with this family and
was planning to bomb a train carrying NATO troops.
Earlier, he reportedly lost both his hands in a grenade
attack in Chechnya and had been arrested in Sweden
for smuggling weapons, was released, and then left
for Mecca 119
It remains unclear whether this CE-connected plot
was part of the reported AQ plan to carry out a series
of Christmas terrorist attacks in the United States and
Europe last holiday season. 120 Besides the Chechen origins of three members of the Belguim4Shariah cell and
their assistance to the CE, there was other evidence
of the plot’s connection simultaneously to the CE,
.

.

.

.

40

AQ, and the global jihad. On June 20, the OVKBK’s
Islamdin.com posted an appeal from Belgian Muslims
to Maqdisi, underscoring once again the way in which
the CE’s tie to Maqdisi unites it with the larger global
jihadi revolution.121 More significantly, the arrested
Shariah4Belgium suspects were said to have been using the jihadi website Ansar al-Mujahidin in carrying
out their activity.122 As noted above, the CE OVKBK’s
Islamdin.com co-sponsored with Ansar al-Mujahidin the
Russian-language forum Al-Ansar.info.
In April 2011, counterterrorism officials in the
Czech Republic uncovered an international cell in
Bohemia connected to the CE’s DV. According to the
chief of the Czech Unit for Combating Organized
Crime (UOOZ) Robert Slachta, the group included
one Chechen, two or three Dagestanis, two or three
Moldovans, and two Bulgarians, who are accused
variously of weapons possession, document falsification, financing and supplying terrorist organizations,
specifically the DV’s new members, with weapons
and explosives.123 Documents relating to the Dagestan
mujahedin in both Arabic and Russian were found
during the arrests. The apartment of the Chechen
involved in the Czech cell was reported to have contained significant quantities of arms and ammunition.
Six of the eight accused were arrested in the Czech
Republic, with two members still at large in Germany.
There was also an unidentified ninth member. Profits made from the falsification of passports and other
documents were sent to Dagestan as were weapons
and explosives purchased by the cell. None of those
arrested were suspected of planning terrorist attacks
in the Czech Republic.124 However, one press report
claimed that the Bulgarian members of the group were
involved in planning terrorist attacks in unidentified
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other states.125 In June 2011, two more unidentified
Russian citizens were arrested in Germany engaging
in the same activity for the DV and perhaps working
with the abovementioned DV Czech cell.126 The CEand DV-tied Czech Republic cell represents global jihadi thinking and suggests the CE and its DV as clear
and present dangers to the Sochi Games.
On July 5, 2010, French police and security carried
out a counterterrorism operation arresting five Chechens, three men aged 21 to 36, and two women, in several districts across the city of Le Mans. One of the
three males was described as an imam and father of
five. Reportedly, French counterterrorism was tipped
off by Russian security after they arrested a Chechen
citizen in Moscow in possession of weapons, explosives, plans for making bombs, and a residence permit issued by France’s Prefecture de la Sarthe. Russian investigators also discovered that the wife of the
arrested Chechen lives in Le Mans. The three males
were arraigned on July 9 and charged on suspicion of
“criminal association in relation with a terrorist enterprise.”127 The CE also could be connected directly or
indirectly to several Chechens arrested individually
in Europe in recent years; for example Lors Doukaev,
who was sentenced in May 2011 to 12 years in prison
for planning an attack on the offices of the newspaper
Jyllands-Posten, which published the famous 12 caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005.128 In sum, the
CE and perhaps lone wolf terrorists inspired by it are
posing a new threat to Europe and the West.
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Potential Threats to U.S. Interests.
The CE also poses a potential threat to U.S. interests
and citizens, if not the homeland. It may be significant
that both the Nevskii Express and Domodedovo Airport attacks targeted transport infrastructure where
foreigners, in particular Americans, are often present.
The potential threat to U.S. interests and even personnel is suggested by the Nevskii Express attack. The
Moscow-St. Petersburg rail route is located within 100
miles of the northern stretch of the Northern Distribution Route (NDR) supplying U.S. and NATO troops in
Afghanistan. Beginning in Latvia, it traverses through
northeast Russia on its way to Central Asia and Afghanistan. If the Shariah4Belgium plot was intended
to target NATO transport, then a similar project to
one that would target the NDR has already been on
the CE-tied jihadists’ agenda. Finally, aside from the
numerous propaganda attacks on the U.S. extant on
CE websites, in 2010 two sites taken together thrice
published the infamous al-Fahd fatwa calling for the
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against
the Americans.129 To be sure, in contrast to the ChRI,
there is only limited evidence to suggest that CE operatives intend or have attempted to acquire chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear materials.130 However, the CE’s jihadization and the al-Fahd posting
suggest a theo-ideological orientation that could so
incline CE operatives to employ such tactics, and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Aleksandr
Bortnikov’s claim in June 2010 that terrorists continue
to “attempt to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical components” across the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) underscores the point.131
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RUSSIAN COUNTER-JIHADISM POLICY
How is Moscow dealing with the CE insurgency
and its alliance with the global jihad? It must be noted
that the derision that many in the West devoted to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims that Russia was
dealing with international terrorism was misplaced.
Putin was exaggerating his claim but not inventing it
out of whole cloth, as the discussion above of AQ’s
ties to those ChRI elements involved in the 1999 invasion of Dagestan clearly shows. There is probably
some truth to the assumption that Putin’s claim was
intended to serve as a justification for Russia’s heavyhanded tactics in dealing with the ChRI and CE. Russian military, police, and special security forces have
committed and, to a much lesser degree, continue to
commit atrocities. However, the last few years have
seen a considerable shift in the Russian strategy and
tactics to include more elements of soft power in its
overlapping counterinsurgency and counterterrorism,
including attempts to combat jihadism theo-ideologically and through greater investment in the socioeconomic development of the North Caucasus.
Federal Policy.
Already during Putin’s second term, there was a
shift to include nonmilitary means: (1) better intelligence gathering and dissemination and better interoperational coordination among the siloviki with the
creation of federal and regional anti-terrorism committees for searching out and destroying CE amirs
and operatives; (2) the removal from office of the oldest, longest-serving, and most odious of the North
Caucasus republics’ presidents, with the exception of
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Chechenya’s Ramzan Kadyrov and Ingushetia’s Murat Zyazikov; and, (3) “draining the pond” of mujahedin through a fourth amnesty in 2006 which brought
in 600 mujahedin from the forest.132 Russian security
and local police forces have become quite efficient at
eliminating top CE leaders, with the exception of CE
amir Umarov.133 On June 9, 2009, the FSB managed for
the first time to capture rather than kill a major CE
amir, the CE’s military amir, and the CE GV’s amir and
vali “Magas” Ali Taziyev (a.k.a. Akhmed Yevloyev).
His capture likely led to actionable intelligence that
has facilitated many of the increasing number of CE
amirs killed since then. Also during his second term,
Putin undertook a massive reconstruction effort for
Chechnya, which after years of slow progress finally
achieved considerable results. Groznyi has been almost completely rebuilt, and Chechnya’s second city,
Gudermes, is also making progress. The reconstruction efforts provided some employment for Chechen
youth, but unemployment remains high, and Kadyrov
has been criticized for funneling work to his Benoi and
political clans. Putin-era anti-extremism laws remain
in force and far too broad, allowing Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and FSB operatives to apply them
occasionally against journalists, moderate Muslims,
and certain Islamic texts.
Under the Medvdev presidency, Russia has moved
further in complimenting hard power with a robust
soft power component in attempting to tackle jihadism in the Caucasus. In his first annual presidential
address to Russia’s Federal Assembly in November
2009, President Dmitry Medvedev called the North
Caucasus Russia’s “most serious domestic political
problem” and announced a federal program to invest
800 billion rubles in Ingushetia, which since the sum-
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mer of 2007 had been the center of gravity of the jihad,
with the largest number of CE attacks of any North
Caucasus region.134 Medvedev also fired the extremely
unpopular, incompetent, and violence-prone Ingushetiyan president Murat Zyazikov, who, largely on
the strength of his FSB career, had been ensconced in
power by Putin through a series of electoral manipulations. Under Zyazikov, Ingushetia saw abductions
skyrocket, with many suspecting Zyazikov’s cousin,
who headed the security forces, of organizing the abductions. The final straw for Zyazikov came when Ingushetia’s top opposition leader Magomed Yevloyev
was shot while in the custody of the Ingushetia’s MVD
chief, after arguing with Zyazikov on a plane flight
in August 2008. Zyazikov’s removal and the security
forces’ killing of Buryatskii and GV amir Taziyev were
followed since March 2010 by a fall both in attacks by
the CE and abductions in the republic. Medvedev’s
federal assistance program for Ingushetia has made it
since 2009 the most highly subsidized region in Russia, with 91 percent of the republic’s budget being
federally funded. From 2008 to 2010, expenditures increased for sectors crucial to socioeconomic development and jobs: by 282 percent for housing, 110 percent
for economic development, 103 percent for education,
with slightly lower increases for state agency expenditures, culture, health, and sport.135
Medvedev also moved to increase, better target,
and ensure proper use of funding for the North Caucasus as a whole by creating the North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO) and appointing as its presidential
envoy and as federal government deputy premier,
the former businessman and Krasoyarsk Governor
Aleksandr Khloponin. It is planned to fold the federal
targeted programs for the North Caucasus, Chechnya,
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and Ingushetia into a single program, with one-third
of the unified program designated for the most jihadplagued republic, Dagestan.136 Medvedev’s June 2011
proposal to decentralize aspects of government to the
regions and municipalities appears to be dictated in
part by the situation in the North Caucasus, as SKFO
envoy Khloponin has been assigned to draft the details
for the decentralization of interbudgetary relations
along with his fellow vice premier Dmitrii Kozak.137
Since 2008, federal expenditures have increased in all
the SKFO’s regions, except for Chechnya. This has led
to some modest economic growth for the SKFO as a
whole, with some republics’ economic growth outpacing the federal average. However, unemployment remains high, especially youth unemployment.138
In line with Medvedev’s overall liberalization
policies and his turn to more use of soft power in the
North Caucasus, Prime Minister Putin announced a
radical departure in Kremlin policy in the Caucasus,
unveiling an ambitious economic development program for the region that was long overdue. He also
called for the North Caucasus governments to open
up in order to attract private investment, to pay more
attention to the views of human rights activists, to encourage the development of civil society, and to air
more federal broadcasts offering “objective and honest stories about life in the North Caucasus” and not an
“artificially” drawn “soft and pleasing picture.” The
new development strategy detailed in Putin’s speech
is to integrate the North Caucasus into the Russian
and global economies and to create 400,000 new jobs
in the region by 2020 by: (1) plugging the region into
the international North-South transit corridor linking
Russia and Europe with Central Asian and Gulf states;
(2) organizing several major public works and con-
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struction projects toward that end, to include building
a major oil refinery in Chechnya’s capital; (3) creating a modern tourism industry including a system of
ski and other recreational resorts; and, (4) increasing
North Caucasians’ access to university education.139
Specifically, these goals are to be achieved by
building a network of highways, renovating airports,
and developing energy projects and recreation resort
areas across the region. The construction and resulting
resort-related businesses will help solve the region’s
unemployment problem. The government is already
constructing highways around and between cities
such as Mozdok in Republic of Ingushetia, Nalchik
(the capital of the KBR), and Stavropol (capital of Stavropol Krai or Territory). A highway is being designed
for Chechnya’s second largest city, Gudermes, and another for Beslan, North Ossetia, will be commissioned
by 2015. Another approximately 150-kilometer highway will link Cherkassk with Sukhum, the capital of
Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia, through
a six-kilometer tunnel to be constructed through
the mountains. The airports in Magas (Ingushetia),
Beslan, and Stavropol’s Shpakovskoye and Mineralny Vody airports will be modernized. In the field of
energy, he announced new hydroelectricity projects
for the mountainous region and the construction of
a Rosneft oil refinery in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny,
to be commissioned in 2014. The total sum of investments for these anticipated economic projects will be
3.4 trillion rubles, according to Putin. The government
is ready to cover risk for private investors guaranteeing up to 70 percent of project costs. The government
will choose investors and distribute money through
a new North Caucasian branch of Russia’s Development Bank. This year, three federal programs—one
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for the entire region and one each for Chechnya and
Ingushetia—will invest 20 billion rubles (some $700
million) in social and economic development projects
in the North Caucasus. Putin also announced plans
to develop the education infrastructure in the North
Caucasus. A new proposal is to require that Russia’s
leading universities admit 1,300 students from North
Caucasian republics annually. A project to build one
of the eight federal universities in the North Caucasian District was announced in January.140
Putin also proposed “alpine skiing, ethnographic,
or family” tourism. Specifically, he proposed creating
a network of ski resorts across the region stretching
from the Caspian to Black Seas building on the Elbrus
ski resort in KBR. Mt. Elbrus is the highest mountain in
Europe. This resort area was targeted by the OVKBK in
February 2011, which issued an explicit statement that
it would fight to prevent any resort development and
keep out Russian and foreign infidel influence.141 The
planned tourism cluster will include resorts in Dagestan, North Ossetia, KBR, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and
Adygeya. The resorts should accommodate 100,000
tourists and create 160,000 jobs. Putin also announced
plans to upgrade the Mineralnyi Vody hot springs
and spa resort in Stavropol into a “hi-tech resort” and
the nucleus of the healthcare and tourism industries of
the region. He promised eight billion rubles in investments to kick start the tourism industry component
of the development strategy.142 At the June 2011 St.
Petersburg International Economic Forum, Medvedev
endorsed Khloponin’s additional proposal to attract
foreign direct investment of some 300 billion rubles
on the basis of a 60 billion rubles initial investment to
lay down infrastructure in the first 4 years followed
by 240 billion rubles in tax breaks and investment.143
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Credit Suisse and the United Arab Republic’s (UAR)
Abu Dhabi Investment Company (Invest AD) have already declared their readiness to invest in the project.
Included among these plans is the KBR’s 2008 plan for
five major investment projects that would be able to
entertain 25,000 visitors at any one time and provide
20,000 jobs. In 2009 the South Korean company Hanok and Russia’s Olimp agreed to invest 600 million
euros in Elbrus to build 300 kilometers of trails, eight
lifts totaling 100 kilometers, a skating rink, hotel, and
sports complexes.144 Following a joint statement on development of the North Caucasus by President Medvedev and French leader Nicolas Sarkozy during the
G8 summit in Deauville, France’s Caisse des Depots et
Consignations holding company signed an investment
agreement at the June 2011 St. Petersburg Economic
Forum.145
Local Policy.
Each Muslim republic where the CE has a permanent network—Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and
the KBR—has its own style and counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism (anti-jihadism) policies. Under
Ramzan Kadyrov’s brutal rule, Chechnya maintains
the harshest regime, while Ingushetia and the KBR
have taken a softer line with the arrival of new presidents, and Dagestan falls in the middle between Ramzan Kadyrov’s harsh rule and the more conciliatory
line in Ingushetia and the KBR. Kadyrov has made
some gains in reducing insurgent and terrorist activity in Chechnya, which by 2010 was the least active
of the CE’s four main vilaiyats in terms of the number of jihadi attacks and related casualties. This result
has been achieved through a mixture of the carrot and
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the stick, with a clear emphasis on the latter but with
far less violence than that inflicted by the mujahedin.
Localized counterterrorist operations are carried out
ruthlessly, on occasion with casualties among civilians
or innocent family members of mujahedin. Abductions, though fewer and sometimes driven by blood
revenge rather than jihad-related problems, continue
at a somewhat lower level in several of the Caucasus
republics. Kadyrov’s policy towards the families of
mujahedin differs significantly from that of his North
Caucasus counterparts. The families of known or suspected mujahedin are often harassed, detained, and
beaten, and their homes are occasionally demolished.
Such policies negate any progress Kadyrov has made
in the battle for “hearts and minds” by attempting to
co-opt the banner of Islam claimed by the CE. This cooptation effort has been built around the construction
of Europe’s largest mosque and an Islamic university
and moderately enforcing some Islamic holidays and
customs, including restrictions on female dress. At the
same time, Kadyrov, like his Caucasus counterparts,
has supported the traditional Sufi clerics under theoideological and physical attack from the takfirist mujahedin, and he has tried to enlist clerics in efforts to
counter the CE’s increasingly sophisticated and effective propaganda.
Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov has
employed a very different policy—the most liberal
policy of any North Caucasus leader—initiating a sea
change from Zyazikov’s brutal regime and showing
enormous courage in the process. Upon assuming
office in 2008, he reached out to the nationalist and
democratic opposition, offering them positions in his
government, and created an advisory body of societal
and opposition organizations. Yevkurov also moved
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aggressively to talk young Muslims out of joining the
jihad and into leaving it, working with families, councils of village elders, and teip or clan councils.146 According to Yevkurov, 16 mujahedin were convinced
to turn themselves in during 2009 and 36 in 2010, and
there were only 15 mujahedin active in the republic by
early 2010.147 In some cases, the courts applied no punishment to those who surrendered, and many were
provided work or education.148
Yevkurov was targeted by Buryatskii in a car
bomb assassination attempt in June 2009 that left the
Ingush President severely wounded. Nevertheless, after rehabilitation, Yevkurov returned to work within
2 months, publicly forgave his attackers, and continued to work with families of mujahedin to convince
them to leave the jihad. In February 2010, Yevkurov
reiterated the cornerstone of his anti-jihadism policy
of “showing good will towards those who have deviated from the law” and even offered mujahedin an
amnesty of sorts, promising that if mujahedin turned
themselves in, they would receive soft sentences and
would be eased back into society:
Today a unique opportunity has been created, and a
chance to become a fully engaged citizen of society included in the process of the economic rebirth of our
Ingushetia, applying your strength and knowledge in
creative places of work and showing yourselves favorably in any of the spheres of social and public political
life, is still being preserved for each of you [mujahedin].149

Two days after Buryatskii’s demise in March 2010,
Yevkurov met with the relatives of those who had
sheltered Buryatskii and the other mujahedin who
were planning a major terrorist attack in Ingushetia.
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Yevkurov told these families and, by extension, all
Ingushetia’s families, that they should know who is
coming into their homes. He added that the authorities would continue his policy of trying to persuade
mujahedin to abandon jihad, but that the security infrastructure would go into action for those who could
not be persuaded.150 Similarly, Yevkurov has led in
reducing violent outcomes of the notoriously violent
Caucasus tradition of blood feuds that contribute to
both jihadi and non-jihadi violence in the region. In
a 2-year period, the Ingush authorities reconciled 150
families, according to Yevkurov, in part by raising the
ransom for resolving them from 100 thousand rubles
to one million rubles.151
Compared to his colleagues in the North Caucasus,
which is plagued more by corruption than any other
region, Yevkurov has carried out the most aggressive
anti-corruption campaign. Greater social expenditures
and economic investment plus Yevkurov’s struggle
against corruption and clean bookkeeping is improving the situation, but slowly. Yevkurov policies have
allowed Ingushetia to double its revenues from 810
million rubles in 2008 to 1.744 billion rubles in 2010!152
This is not to say that Yevkurov has ignored the stick.
In early January, rumors claimed that Yevkurov had
requested 20 units of additional military intelligence
(GRU) forces for the republic.153 However, whereas
Kadyrov has overemphasized the “stick” of hard
power, Yevkurov has heavily favored the “carrot” of
soft power. Yevkurov’s policies have corresponded
with a significant decline in the number of attacks in
Ingushetia, according to my own estimates, from some
138 in 2008 and 175 in 2009, to only 99 in 2010 and approximately 40 in the first 6 months of 2011.154 However, it remains unclear whether Yevkurov’s policies
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are responsible for the decline, factoring in the killing
of Buryatskii and the capture of CE military amir and
GV amir “Magas” Ali Taziyev.
Since Putin’s removal of the ailing Valerii Kokov
(the KBR’s ancient Soviet-era communist party first
secretary) from the KBR presidency in 2005, the republic has adopted policies closer to Yevkurov’s. Like Zyazikov, Kokov had been harshly criticized by official
Islamic clergy, the general populace, young Muslim
Islamists, and jihadists. He was replaced by the energetic 48-year-old ethnic Kabardin businessman Arsen
Kanokov. He immediately moved to address the concerns of Muslims as well as the ethnic Balkar minority. Kanokov replaced the republic’s premier with an
ethnic Balkar and its hard-line MVD chief Khachim
Shogenov with an ethnic Russian, Yurii Tomchak.
Shogenov had been sharply criticized by almost everyone in the republic, including the KBR’s DUM, for
his heavy-handed and broad-brushed crackdown on
Muslims in 2003-04 in an effort to contain the burgeoning jihadi movement in the republic. Tomchak
took immediate steps to assuage the KBR’s Muslims,
especially the more volatile young generation, including the inclusion of KBR DUM representatives on the
MVD’s public council. The ministry also signed a cooperation agreement with the DUM and other confessions’ public organizations.155 Not a single jihadi attack was carried out in the KBR in 2006.156 KBR DUM
chairman, mufti Anas Pshikhachev, quickly acknowledged the MVD’s efforts under Tomchak to address
the DUM’s grievances but warned that the threat of
Islamic extremism persists in the KBR.157 In addition,
Kanokov set aside 4.5 million rubles in April 2007 for
the construction of two new mosques in the capital
Nalchik. The closing of mosques by the authorities in
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2004 had helped spark the rise of the jihadist combat
jamaat “Yarmuk” in 2004 and irritated moderate Muslims and official clergy alike. Kanokov also attracted
new investments for developing tourism in the Elbrus
District resort area.
However, rather than seeing a decline in jihadi
attacks, Kanokov presided over a marked increase:
28 in 2008, 23 in 2009, and 113 in 2010, despite amir
Astemirov’s demise in March 2010.158 In January 2011,
OVKBK mujahedin killed chief mufti of the KBR’s
DUM, Anas Pshikhachev, in the republic’s capital of
Nalchik. The KBR plunged into a state of desperation.
In February, the Council of Elders of the Balkar people
called for the introduction of direct federal rule and
Kanokov’s resignation. Kanokov, speaking before
the KBR parliament, appealed to the federal authorities for additional assistance in combating jihadism
in the republic, adding that the mujahedin “are not
afraid.”159 At the end of February, the OVKBK carried
out the noted series of attacks across the Elbrus resort
area. In May, the OVKBK attempted to assassinate
Kanokov in the largest attack in the KBR since Basaev’s and Astemirov’s October 2005 Nalchik raid by
exploding a bomb under the VIP reviewing stand at a
horse racing track during Nalchik’s May Day festivities. The attack killed at least one civilian, a 97-yearold Great Patriotic War veteran, and wounded some
40 civilians and officials. Among the wounded were
the KBR’s Culture Minister Ruslan Firov and former
MVD chief Khachim Shogenov.160 At this point, Kanokov or someone in the KBR may have adopted Kadyrov’s approach of forming special units to fight the
mujahedin. A group calling itself the “Black Hawks”
(chernyie yastreby) declared war on the OVKBK, but
nothing much seems to have come of the group. In
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April, security forces killed Astemirov’s successor,
OVKBK amir “Abdullah” Asker Dzhappuev, along
with his naibs and several other top OVKBK amirs.
Since then, there has been a slight decline in the rate
of attacks in the KBR.
In Dagestan, today the CE’s spearhead, a new
president and his team, have borrowed more elements
from Yevkurov than from Kadyrov. Unlike Chechnya,
the origins of jihadism in Dagestan are driven entirely
by intra-confessional tensions created by the emergence of a significant Salafi community at odds with
traditional Sufis. Successive leaders have failed to resolve the religious tensions. In February 2006, Putin
replaced long-standing ethnic Dargin Dagestan President Magomedali Magomedov with the ethnic Avar
chairman of Dagestan’s Legislative Assembly, Mukhu
Aliev. His tenure saw a steady increase in jihadi activity and no perceptible improvement in the civility
of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism polices in
the region. Aliev was replaced in 2010 with Magomedov’s son, Magomedsalem Magomedov, who endeavored to engage the Salafi community in Dagestan, coordinating the formation of a council of Salafi Islamic
scholars (ulema), which drafted a series of demands
for the government to meet. According to the Russian
human rights group “Memorial,” a government representative was authorized to meet with the council, but
the dialogue has not produced notable results other
than the regular appearance of Salafi representatives
at public ceremonies. Magomedov has also endeavored to replicate Yevkurov’s efforts in Ingushetia by
succeeding in enticing some young mujahedin from
the forest and back to civilian life, and institutionalizing the process in November 2010 in the form of an
adaptation commission. The commission includes the
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imam of Dagestan’s Central Mosque and the head of
the Salafist umbrella organization, Akhlyu-s-sunna,
A. K. Kebedov and is chaired by Rizvan Kurbanov,
deputy premier in charge of the power ministries in
the republic who personally led talks with prospective defectors from the mujahedin. Kurbanov was
described by Memorial as “open to representatives
of civil society, reacted without fail, personally, and
immediately to reports about the crudest violations of
human rights . . . met with the relatives of abductees,
[and] cooperated with lawyers in specific cases.”161
Magomedov has also worked on the economy. Dagestan’s government has developed a joint project with
the majority state-owned Russian Copper Company
to develop the North Caucasus’s largest ore deposit of
Kizil-Dere in southern Dagestan’s Ahtynsky District.
The mining project plus the accompanying development of transport infrastructure and utilities should
provide considerable employment.162 Another investment project for the region is Dagestani oligarch Suleiman Kerimov’s purchase of the republic’s Anzhi
Makhachkala (AM) premier soccer team. This is being
followed up by further investments of $1.4 billion by
Kermiov into AM’s stadium and Makhachkala hotels
and AM’s recent $30 million purchase of global soccer superstar Samuel Eto’o in August 2011. Kerimov
is also investing in the North Caucasus tourist resort
cluster project.163
During his still short tenure, Magomedov’s new
course has yielded few results unless one can show
that jihadi violence would be even more prevalent
without his policies. The CE’s DV has been able to step
up its violence, threatening Magomedov and killing
numerous government officials. Since April 2010, the
DV has been the most prolific of the CE’s vilaiyats in
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terms of number of attacks, including suicide bombings, with approximately 267 total attacks (including
six suicide attacks) in 2010 and 200 attacks (including three suicide attacks) during the first 6 months of
2011, compared to 144 total attacks, including one suicide bombing, in 2009.164 Nor is there a demonstrable
improvement in the republic’s human rights record,
either.165
Siloviki.
A key problem is that neither the republic presidents nor SKFO envoy Khloponin exercise much, if
any, control over the siloviki as the latter continue to
violate Muslim citizens’ human, civil, and political
rights. How much Moscow or the civilian leadership
controls federal forces in the North Caucasus also remains a question, though not their responsibility for
rights violations. Both federal forces and local police,
often working jointly in counter-terrorist operations,
continue to employ detention on the basis of mere
suspicion and falsified evidence, beatings, and torture
during detentions, and extrajudicial punishments, including abductions and killings. The European Court
for Human Rights continues to hand down judgments
against Russian authorities regarding such violations.166
Federal forces still deployed in the region include
military, FSB specially designated forces (spetsnaz),
and GRU. MVD forces, which according to federal law
are supposed to be under federal control, are often
an object of contestation in numerous regions across
Russia. Kadyrov appears to control not only his own
forces but the MVD and perhaps its Internal Troops in
Chechnya, both of which have made incursions into
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Ingushetia sometimes coordinated with Ingushetia’s
MVD and sometimes not. Military forces, including
new mountain fighting forces created a few years ago
and based in Botlikh (Dagestan) and Zelenchukskaya
(Karachaevo-Cherkessia), maintain a low profile, remaining on their bases. In rare cases when military
units are called upon to take part in counterterrorist
operations, military helicopters, and more rarely artillery are called in to target mujahedin uncovered in
mountainous areas. For example, CE amir Umarov’s
naib Supyan Abduallev was killed in March 2011 in an
operation that used helicopters and artillery. Military
and other convoys occasionally come under ambush
by mujahedin in all four of the main republics where
the CE maintains a permanent presence. The creation
of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK) and
regional counterparts appears to have improved coordination and intelligence-sharing between the various
power ministries. Security and police forces have become proficient in tracking and killing leading amirs,
but they have been less successful in capturing high
value targets that would provide invaluable additional intelligence. The only such case was the July 2010
capture of GV amir and CE military amir “Magas” Ali
Taziyev; ever since, the Ingushetia mujahedin’s fortunes have been in steady decline.
Chechnya’s Kadyrov maintains considerable control over MVD forces in his republic and deploys his
own presidential guards, which in the past have come
into conflict with special battalions subordinated to
federal power ministries and led by the leaders of families and teips or clans in competition with Kadyrov
as a counterweight to Kadyrov’s power. In 2010 the
federal authorities decided that the dire situation in
Dagestan required a new approach. It was decided to
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replicate the Chechenization of the conflict in Chechnya under Kadyrov with the formation of special battalions under the control of various federal organs
of coercion, and by establishing under the Dagestan
MVD a separate volunteer special motorized battalion
of native Dagestanis for carrying out counterinsurgency operations. The first 300 volunteers were trained by
November 2010, with another 400 intended to complete the 700-man force.167 There is no evidence that
this measure has produced any appreciable results.
In sum, Russian and North Caucasus authorities’
continuing rights violations largely, if not entirely,
negate the positive development of an increased use
of soft power methods in fighting jihadism pushed by
Medvedev, Yevkurov, and Kanokov. However counterintuitive it may be, the steepest decline in jihadi
activity has occurred in the republics with the harshest policy line, Kadyrov’s Chechnya, and the softest,
Yevkurov’s Ingushetia.
THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The rise of the CE, and attendant theoretical concepts, have concrete security policy implications for
Russia, the United States, and globally. The CE’s rise
refutes many widespread assumptions, biases, hypotheses, and theories extant in the scholarly, analytical, activist, and policymaking communities regarding the violence in the North Caucasus and the
organization and causality of terrorism and jihadism
in general. The CE’s continuing capability to recruit
and attack is not simply a response to Russian brutality and poor governance, but is also a consequence of
the CE’s effective deployment of jihadi propaganda,
training, leadership, and substantial ties to AQ, as

60

well as the global jihadi revolutionary alliance, and an
umma in the throes of radicalism and revolution. The
CE’s long-standing though evolving relationship with
AQ and the larger global movement and its organization and structure do not confirm the leaderless jihad
hypothesis which argues that AQ has lost much of its
relevance and the global jihadi movement is devolving into a diffusion of atomized lone wolves.168 Similarly, the CE’s own decentralized network structure
and functioning and the nature of its relationship with
AQ and the global jihadi alliance supports a more
traditional view of a network inspired and loosely
grouped around AQ and its affiliates. The CE, like the
inspirational, if not institutional, AQ hub and more
nodal elements among the global jihad’s innumerable
groups, is likewise decentralized, but it retains a hub
consisting of Umarov and top amirs and qadis and
loosely coordinating interconnected nodes or vilaiyats
working largely independently but towards one and
the same set of goals: The creation of an Islamist CE
state and a confederated global caliphate.
If one regards AQ as the inspirational core, if not
the organizational leader, of a highly decentralized
global jihadi revolutionary movement, then a conceptualization of the CE’s place would find it several
degrees removed from the core, comprised of AQ central and affiliates like AQAP and AQ in the Maghreb
(AQIM). Groups like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba
comprise the first concentric circle around the AQ core
because of both their involvement in international
attacks and their deep involvement with, and geographical proximity to AQ central. The CE’s position
is similar to that of as-Shabaab in Somali and other
groups in the second concentric circle, since they are
not located near and do not cooperate as closely with
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AQ central, are only just beginning to participate in
international operations, and prefer to, or because of
resource shortages must, focus largely on establishing
their local emirate. The third concentric circle would
be lone wolves inspired by but having no ties to a formal jihadi group. The fourth, most outer concentric
circle lies outside the alliance but within the movement. It consists of groups that ascribe to the violent
establishment of their own Islamist government but
reject the goal of creating a caliphate and cooperation
with other global jihadi revolutionary groups.
Nor do patterns in the CE correlate with the conclusion put forward by Robert Pape that suicide terrorism is largely a response to foreign occupation, having
little or no connection to jihadi ideology or goals.169
Leaving aside the fact that suicide terrorism is almost
exclusively a jihadist phenomenon, this mono-causal
explanation is simplistic, especially when it comes
to any jihadi organization, including the North Caucasus. CE suicide bombers’ videotaped martyrdom
testaments state explicitly that their motivation is to
“raise the banner of Allah above all others.” The CE’s
chief propagandist and organizer of suicide terrorism
from mid-2008 to early 2010, Sheikh Said Abu Saad
Buryatskii was an ethnic Buryat-Russian, converted to
Islam, and never set foot in the Caucasus until spring
2008 after he returned from abroad to study Islam in
Egypt and Kuwait. The goals and strategy of the CE
and other global jihadi revolutionary groups are not
simply local or defensive, seeking merely to drive out
occupiers, but are explicitly offensive and expansionist. Thus, the CE’s expansionist goals aimed at seizing
all of Russia and the Transcaucasus and recreating the
Islamist caliphate defuse Pape’s theory.
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These theoretical conclusions have policy implications: First, the CE’s ties to AQ, its own sophisticated
organization and decentralized functioning, and its
religious rather than nationalist motives are transforming it from a local to an international actor and
emerging threat. Second, even if it were, like the ChRI,
only a threat to Russian national security, this threat
would still have international security implications,
since Russia remains an important Eurasian power
and is emerging as a useful ally of the United States
and the West in the war against jihadism. Third, the
CE’s emergence as a transnational threat with growing radicalization, capacity, and aspirations marks a
newly emerging threat to U.S. national and international security. Fourth, the CE’s transformation and
integration into the global jihadi revolutionary alliance demonstrate the ability of AQ and its affiliated
movements to evolve, adapt, and flourish in response
to Western counter-jihadism efforts. Fifth, the global
jihadi revolutionary alliance’s ability to evolve and
adapt is facilitated by the existence of the larger jihadi
and Islamist social movements emerging from a prerevolutionary Muslim world that includes democratic,
nationalist, communist, Islamist, and jihadist forces.
Sixth, except in the most failed states like Yemen and
Somalia, the groups that make up the global jihadi
revolutionary alliance are unlikely to seize power precisely because of the limited appeal of their narrow
and strict ideological orientation. Seventh, given this
larger revolutionary and radicalizing context, international, Western, Eurasian, American, and Russian
security are likely to be threatened by this revolution’s
intended and unintended destabilizing and violent effects for decades to come; the most virulent of which
are the global jihadi revolutionary alliance and its in-
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dividual groups. Finally, the jihadi revolutionary alliance’s globalism dictates a global and cooperative
response on the part of those whom it targets.
Operationally, Caucasus jihadists are now recruits
for major terrorist attacks against the West. Sheikh alMaqdisi has designated the CE as the global jihad’s
bridgehead into Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the
CE inserted cells into Belgium and the Czech Republic
and its apparent involvement in its first international
terrorist plot in Belgium. The CE itself could attempt
to attack U.S. targets in Russia or elsewhere, including the northern supply route for U.S. and NATO
troops fighting in Afghanistan. Its most capacious DV
and its Azerbaijan Jamaat put Umarov within striking
range of international and U.S. interests in Azerbaijan
such as oil company headquarters, refineries, and the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carrying oil to Europe.
Clearly, a CE or other significant jihadi presence in
Azerbaijan would have security implications for the
entire Transcaucasus and the Persian Gulf region. In
addition, the CE is a recruiting ground of mujahedin
for other fronts in the global jihad. Moreover, Russia has the largest stockpiles of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials and WMD in the
world. The CE adds potential demand to this supply.
In the past, there have been reports of Chechen separatist and Caucasus jihadi attempts to acquire WMD
in Russia, and the CE websites’ posting of the famous
2003 Al-Fahd fatwa three times in 2010 suggests that
some in the CE may wish to obtain them.
Given the emerging CE threat, the U.S. Government should maximize cooperation across Eurasia to
include Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the war against jihadism. The United
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States and Europe should also attempt to stabilize
the Caucasus by resolving the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and at least minimizing
Russian-Georgian tensions, so these do not play into
the hands of CE or other jihadists. One goal might be
to rein in Georgian efforts to whip up trouble in the
North Caucasus, especially among the Muslim Circassian ethnic groups. Tbilisi has opened up a television
and radio company that broadcasts anti-Russian propaganda to the region, and some Georgian opposition
figures and one former U.S. official have claimed that
President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government is providing financial and training assistance to the CE.170 Speculating on the Circassian genocide issue as the Sochi
Olympics approach, Tbilisi adopted a parliamentary
resolution calling for a boycott of the Sochi games and
for Russian and international recognition of the Tsarist forces’ rout and exile of the Circassians in the 1860s
as a genocide. Georgia’s policies could radicalize
some Circassians and thus improve the CE prospects
for recruitment and attacking the Sochi games. Tbilisi
also waived visa requirements for Iranians and North
Caucasus residents, which could facilitate the movement of global jihadists from South Asia and the Persian Gulf region to the North Caucasus and Europe.
Finally, Western-Eurasian (NATO-CSTO) cooperation can be used to nudge Eurasia’s authoritarian
regimes, including Moscow, to conduct their anti-jihadism and other policies with a greater eye towards
citizens’ human, civil and political rights, and the
implications of all of the above for the war against jihadism. Only with broad and effective regional cooperation involving all of the post-Soviet states will the
United States and the West be able to defeat the global
jihadi threat.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN RUSSIA
AND RUSSIA IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS:
STATE APPROACHES AND POLITICAL
DYNAMICS IN THE TURBULENT REGION
Sergey Markedonov
Any attempts to make generalizations about Russian policy on the North Caucasus face serious methodological difficulties. In spite of analysts’ personal
attitude to the problem, all observers agree that this
area is the most acute one in Russia. Here the problem
of Russia’s territorial integrity and sustainability is being resolved.
The growth of political violence (the most impressive example is the tragic terrorist bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport in January
2011) has brought the danger of growing instability
in the region to the attention of foreign countries, especially on the eve of the Sochi Olympics of 2014 and
World Soccer Cup of 2018. While in the 1990s violence in the North Caucasus was primarily based in
Chechnya, over the last years it has increased for other
republics like Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KabardinoBalkaria (KBR). The North Caucasus agenda today
is extremely tense with the events and challenges of
terrorism and counterterrorism. In 2009, the counterterrorist operation (CTO) regime in Chechnya was
cancelled, but in 2010 there was not only a quantitative but also qualitative rise in the attacks in this republic (like the attack on Tsentoroy, the native village
of Ramzan Kadyrov, as well as that of the Chechen
parliament in Grozny). At the same time, violence in
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the neighboring republics (Dagestan, Ingushetia, and
KBR) has not declined either. In 2010, KBR, which had
a reputation of being a “Sleeping Beauty” during the
1990s surpassed Chechnya in the number of acts of
terrorism, taking a place in the top three, after Dagestan and Ingushetia, with 48 explosions, 21 shootings,
and 14 attempts on the life of law enforcement officials and special troops. During the same period, local CTOs were launched twice in the republic, with
the operation in Tyrnauza lasting from October 20
through December 25. For the first time in the recent
history of North Caucasus terrorism, there was an attack on an industrial facility in 2010: targeted at the
Baksan Hydroelectric Plant in KBR.1 Almost every
day, sabotage and terrorist attacks on representatives
of law enforcement and military personnel take place
along with civilian murders. We can also observe the
revival of ethnic nationalism (despite the fact that radical Islamism has not handed over its positions, rather,
on the contrary, it has grown), and at the same time,
we see a fundamentally important step to resolving
long-standing ethno-political confrontation between
North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The struggle for power
inside the Caucasus constituencies repeatedly makes
itself felt through corrupt, authoritarian, and even occasionally violent means.
Apart from the growing violence that plagues
the region, the Caucasus has become a subject of
great importance in Russia. This thesis was proven
by the events on Manege Square in December 2010
and increasing interethnic clashes between Russians
and Caucasian peoples (Chechens and Dagestanis).2
This is becoming a serious issue. Interestingly, the
phenomenon of Russian ethnic chauvinism directed
against the peoples of the Caucasus has recently as-
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sumed a macro-economic veneer. In April 2011, the
Russian Civil Union movement organized a rally in
Moscow under the slogan: “Stop feeding the Caucasus.”3 Participants objected to the federal government
subsidizing its counterparts in Chechnya, Dagestan,
and other republics, likening the North Caucasus to “a
voracious crocodile which demands more blood and
money.” This problem could become more serious if
the Russian officials attempt to exploit these ideas. We
can already see attempts to use anti-Caucasus public
opinion to obtain additional popularity on the eve of
both parliamentary and presidential elections.4
However, Russian policy in the region has not
really been conceptualized or even verbalized, and
this circumstance creates many obstacles (first and
foremost for Russian authorities) for adequately
comprehending what Moscow wants to do. There is
a great paradox in this situation. Identifying itself as
a guarantor of Caucasus stability and security and
demonstrating its willingness to pretend to be a key
stakeholder for the whole region, including newly
independent and de facto states of the South Caucasus, Russia faces challenges inside its own country
regarding the North Caucasus area. Moreover, in 2009
the situation there was characterized as the most important domestic policy issue by President Dmitry
Medvedev in his Presidential Address to the Federal
Assembly (Parliament).5 As a result, the Kremlin and
the federal government brought in an official position
of special plenipotentiary—with broadened functions
in the newly created North Caucasus Federal District.
For the first time in Russia’s post-Soviet history, this
official has the rank of deputy prime-minister.
In this chapter, some basic aspects will be considered. To what extent has recognition of the systemic

101

and internal natures of the North Caucasus challenges
helped to change political dynamics in the region?
Why has the activity of the new plenipotentiary not
been effective and failed to reach expectations? What
new challenges would define the agenda in the most
turbulent area of Russia? The purpose of this report
is to examine major social and political trends in the
North Caucasus region, with an emphasis on the last 3
years because historical aspects (including the 1990s)
are separate topics for discussion.
“SOFT POWER”: MADE BY ALEXANDER
KHLOPONIN
In the early 2000s, the Russian authorities were
all too ready to speak about the North Caucasus. Discussion centered on several topics. The first was the
Caucasus as a platform for international terrorism,
where Russia was being put to the test. The image of
the “international terrorist” changed according to the
political situation of the time. Sometimes the face had
Georgian features, at other times Afghan and sometimes even the “treacherous West” seemed to be involved. The role of the West in affairs of the North
Caucasus was actually interpreted in two ways. On
the one hand, the West was seen as a natural ally at
risk from Third World intrigues, and on the other, an
unimaginative and bothersome partner trying to impose its incorrect ideas (or “double standards”) upon
Russia. The second topic was the swiftly stabilizing
Caucasus, an image that effectively came to mean
Chechnya under the wise leadership of Akhmad and
then Ramzan Kadyrov, father and son. There were
attempts to diversify the North Caucasus issue: The
most outstanding examples were the speeches by
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Dmitry Kozak, the Russian President’s representative
in the South (in this position from September 2004 to
September 2007). He tried to focus the attention of his
immediate superiors and society on the problems of
the clan system and the inefficiency of the regional
administrations (particularly in conditions of budget
dependency on the federal centre). However, Russia’s
ruling elite was not concerned with the region’s domestic situation, at least until the middle of 2011.
The decision to end CTO in Chechnya in April
2009, dictated as it was by public relations considerations, did not have the effect of reducing the number
of terrorist acts in that republic. Diversionary terrorist activity actually spread to the neighboring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia. That summer saw a
brazen attempt to assassinate Ingushetia’s president
Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, which temporarily put him out
of action. Aldigirei Magomedtagirov, Interior Minister of Dagestan, the largest North Caucasus republic,
was murdered. All this required some coherent explanation. It was impossible just to keep saying that
the region would soon be stabilized, although “some
people are working against this.”
Medvedev’s Makhachkala speech on June 9, 2009,
marked the moment when the focus changed from
external to internal threats. The Russian President
talked of “systemic problems” in the North Caucasus
region. For the first time since the 1990s, the head of
state was officially admitting that socio-political turbulence in the Russian Caucasus was not the result of
foreign interference, but of internal problems like corruption, unemployment, and poverty. However, both
the President and the Prime Minister still kept talking
about the battle with “bandits” and “organized crime
groups,” as if the current problems of the Caucasus
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could be compared to the situation in Harlem, New
York, or Southeast Washington, DC, in the 1980s. The
failures of government in the North Caucasus were
not honestly discussed. Blame was laid on the regional and local authorities, while the federal authorities
escaped criticism. This was the origin of bizarre ideas
like the introduction of special jurisdiction for matters
involving terrorism. Regardless, in his address last
year, Medvedev called the North Caucasus the main
problem of Russian domestic politics. That was when
another idea emerged: a new bureaucratic structure,
backed by Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, entrusted
with “establishing order” in the North Caucasus.
As a result, Alexander Khloponin arrived in the
Caucasus in January 2010 as Moscow’s plenipotentiary. This looked like an innovation. The man responsible for Russia’s most unstable region was not one of
the siloviki (members of the central bureaucracy), but
a manager who had worked for “Norilsk Nickel” enterprise and served as governor of the Taymyr Peninsula and Krasnoyarsk. The media adopted a different
language when discussing the North Caucasus. Apart
from the usual reference to “terrorists” and “extremists,” they began talking of “clusters,” “investments,”
and “innovations.”
But Khloponin’s appointment had nothing to do
with modernization. It was a typical behind-the-scenes
advancement of a person lacking the appropriate experience, motivated by internal bureaucratic logic,
rather than pressing national interest. In addition, the
functions of this new head of the Caucasus were very
limited. Khloponin was thrown in the deep end of the
pool, without being given the necessary political powers to keep himself afloat. And how can there be any
real investment or innovation in a region so close to

104

a state of war? In the end, things did not turn out for
the better, but as usual, as Viktor Chernomyrdin so
memorably put it in 1993: “We wanted the best but it
came out like it always does.”
The economy and the social sphere were recognized as important. The Kremlin and the Federal
Government put all their efforts into developing these
sectors, but political themes (ethnic conflicts and the
relations between the different religions) remained
taboo. They were seen as merely superficial, a function of the socio-economic situation. This has made
it impossible to produce a large-scale strategy for the
development of the Caucasus. When the politics of the
region are as unstable as they are, socio-economic conditions matter, but while unquestionably important,
they do not play a determining role.
Still, on July 6, 2010, Putin asked for a strategy document to be delivered “within a period of 2 months,”
a reasonable amount of time for a good academic article or a chapter of a book, but not for a document
with a 15-year perspective. By September 6, 2010, the
draft of the strategy was ready. In less than a month,
it went through the entire cycle from being signed to
publication by the federal government. The aims and
objectives of “Strategy-2025,” as set out in the initial
“General Provisions,” are skewed from the very beginning. We read that:
The Strategy takes account of:
•	The current state of the economy of Russian
Federation administrative entities which are part
of The North Caucasus Federal District;
• The Russian economy;
• The global economy;
• Their potential for development; and,
•	Regional and inter-regional projects and their outcomes.6
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But what about the political development of the
Caucasus? Don’t the facts of terrorism, subversive
actions, and an ethnocratic leadership automatically make any business plan a “risky undertaking”?
Shouldn’t future investors be taking this into account
(unless the money comes from the federal budget,
which does not depend on public opinion)?
The North Caucasus District offers favorable conditions for developing the agro-industrial complex, the
spheres of tourism and health tourism, electricity,
mining and manufacturing. It also affords developed
transit facilities. However, economic and socio-political instability mean that natural advantages remain
unrealized and make the North Caucasus Federal District an unattractive environment for investment.7

The political element is mentioned in passing, after the economy, and is not elaborated upon in any
way. What does socio-political instability mean? Is it
the separatist threat or the “religious revival” which is
incompatible with the constitutional and legal regulations and laws of the Russian Federation? According
to Strategy-2025, “The main goal of the Strategy is to
provide conditions conducive to the rapid growth of
the real sector of the economy in Russian Federation
administrative units that make up the North Caucasus
Federal District. Also to create new jobs, and improve
the standard of life.” What a wonderful goal! But is this
possible in an area that is practically on a war footing
(This is the felicitous description of the present situation given by the head of the Prosecutor General’s
Office Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin
in an interview with radio “Moscow Echo”)8? It is not
the grey economy, which makes its living from illegal
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or semi-legal deals, that is being discussed in this document. Incidentally, Strategy-2025 does not set itself
to deal with institutional change, i.e. creating a new
generation of managers who could give the economy
the chance to breathe without killing it with their kickbacks and pay-offs. The abuse of power and illegal
methods of carrying out anti-terrorist operations give
rise to a lack of trust in the authorities, and even a situation where people start regarding law enforcers as
enemies. Young people who are constantly victimized
become particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the
rebels. There is plenty of evidence that the activity of
the armed underground has been growing recently.
The crisis will only get worse if the state keeps fighting
the insurgents using methods like kidnapping and executions without trial. Two incomplete subsections of
Strategy-2025 are devoted to ethnic relations, but they
are limited to generalities. There is no real information and no analysis. “The current socio-political and
ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus Federal District is characterized by several pronounced
negative social tendencies, manifestations of ethnopolitical and religious extremism, and a high risk of
conflict.”9
Any specialist could probably find a great many
negative tendencies in any part of the Russian Federation, if he or she so desired. They exist in Moscow
and St. Petersburg (Is not xenophobia a “negative social tendency”?), and in the Volga area (where there
is both ethnic and religious extremism). But the difference between the Caucasus and the Volga area is
that only in the North Caucasus is there a situation
akin to war. This document of considerable strategic
importance offers no explanation for why events developed as they did. The reader is left to guess. The
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Strategy’s analytical section does not even have a subsection dealing with the religious revival, although
radical Islam is the main vehicle for protests in the
Caucasus. Anything to do with relations between the
religions is relegated to the subsection “Ethnic Relationships.” The reasons for the growth of radical Islam
are set out with alarming simplicity: “Radical forms
of Islam (have been) imported into the said Federal
District.” The text offers no explanation as to what
these “imported forms” are, why they have been imported into the region, what the expectations of the
importers are, or the extent to which the importers
have gained indigenous support.10 In the interests of
objectivity, one can say, of course, that other reasons
for the dissemination of extremist views (the Strategy
makes no special distinction between nationalists and
Islamists) include “widespread corruption” or “questions relating to the owning and disposing of land,
which are unregulated and the cause of most of the
ethnic conflicts, including at the level of the man in
the street,” and also “ethnic tension as a result of illdefined civic identity.”11 But again, none of this can be
linked to the need for institutional change in the Caucasus. In short, the objectives of “Strategy-2025” are
clearly unachievable. It focuses on economic growth
without addressing the socio-political preconditions
that make the North Caucasus explosive and unstable.
This document seems to isolate the economy and the
social sphere from the rest of the complex whole.
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NORTH CAUCASUS: RADICAL ISLAMISM
ON THE RISE
Since the Beslan tragedy in September 2004, the
main anti-Russian discourse in the North Caucasus
has not been under the slogans of ethno-political selfdetermination but under the green banner of radical
Islam. On October 31, 2007, President of the so-called
“Chechen Republic of Icheria,” Doku Umarov, built
upon his powers as the head of the separatist government and proclaimed a new formation —the Caucasus Emirate (CE).
Umarov proclaimed himself as “the only legitimate
authority in all areas where there are Mujahideen.” He
also said that he denies the laws of the secular authorities that exist in the North Caucasus. It is hard to define Umarov personally and many of his supporters as
real Islamists in the fullest sense of the word; they lack
the necessary theological training and, in some cases,
elementary education base. But for such unskilled Islamists the ideals of “pure Islam” are the main drivers of protest activities against the Russian State. With
them, they have to determine the effectiveness of its
potential for mobilizing extremists. To some extent,
belonging to a radical Islamist current is a marker of
radicalism in general (ethnic nationalism in this context is regarded as a moderate political movement that
could include dialogue and certain concessions to the
Russian State).
However, at the same time, we can report the presence in the ranks of the North Caucasian Islamists
trained preachers who fully meet the standards of
“Mujahedin of the future” (that is competent theologians, who could exploit both explosives and Kalashnikovs). The most famous of them were not ethnic
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Chechens by origin. In 2009 they came to the forefront
in the Caucasus radical Islamist movement. They
brought new characters into the anti-Russian struggle in the North Caucasus. It is unlikely that such a
man as Said Buryatskii (1982-2010, a.k.a. Alexander
Tikhomirov, on his father’s side a Buryat and on his
mother’s side a Russian) could inspire the defenders
of a secular nationalist project to fight. Rather his appeal was religious.
In June 2009, Umarov’s supporters claimed responsibility for the murder of the interior minister
of Dagestan, Adilgerei Magomedtagirov as well as
murders of Aza Gazgireeva, deputy Chairman of
the Supreme Court of Ingushetia, and Bashir Aushev, former Deputy Prime Minister of Ingushetia. In
July 2009, they announced their involvement in the
attempted assassination of the President of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In August, 2009, they issued a statement saying that the “accident” at the
Sayano-Shushenskaya power plant was a matter of
their hands. In November-December 2009, militants
claimed responsibility for the murder of an Orthodox
priest, Father Daniel (Sysoev) and the explosion of
the train “Nevsky Express.” On March 31, 2010, in his
video address, Doku Umarov talked about his own orders for the suicide bombing in the Moscow subway,
carried out on March 29. In January 2011, he claimed
credit for the Domodedovo Airport terrorist attack.
Even if the responsibility for one or another of
these attacks is not true, and is part of a public relations campaign, the struggle for “true faith” is selling
and becoming a popular political commodity. This
product will be even more in demand than would
be the level of social injustice, judicial, and administrative efficiency. The aforementioned Buryatskii is
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a phenomenon in this regard. Not being a preacher
from Pakistan or Arab countries, he found a fertile
environment in the Caucasian audience as a result of
his own religious and political evolution. Note that
nowadays this audience knows the Soviet and Russian reality far less than what Jokhar Dudayev and
Aslan Maskhadov did. The works of Sheikh Anwar
al-Awlaki, Sheikh Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi, and
others feature prominently on various web portals
associated with the Caucasus rebels. The Caucasus
rebels have indeed embraced the political lexicon of
the “global jihad,” styling their leaders as “amirs”
and establishing a “Caucasus Emirate” with its own
“Shariah Court.” It is much less connected with the
nationwide socio-cultural environment. However,
while assessing the “Islamic factor” it is necessary to
add some nuances. Often many stories regarding the
intra-administrative-bureaucratic struggle are hidden
under the “Wahhabis” (as the Russian media define
radical Islam). It would seem that the authorities both
at regional and federal levels must do their utmost to
understand where there are religious radicals or simple criminals, and where their synthesis takes place
(the latter is extremely important to discredit the militants and their ideological patrons). But instead of doing this, officials repeat propaganda theses about the
“agonizing bandits.”
ETHNIC NATIONALISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES?
The last 3 years showed, among other things, that
the hope of “self-liquidation” of nationalism has not
been justified. Rallies of Balkars and Circassians, interethnic relations in Dagestan and tensions between
Ossets and Ingushsis forced the authorities to pay at-

111

tention to the problem, which by the early 2000s had
seemed generally to be clearing up. A revival of ethnic nationalism in the North Caucasus has taken place
since 2008. For this development, there are both internal and external prerequisites. The Circassian issue revival has occurred after a series of personnel decisions
of the fourth president of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya
Republic (KCR), Boris Ebzeev. Russia’s recognition
of Abkhazia’s independence on August 26, 2008, also
played a role in the revitalization of Circassian ethnic
nationalism as well as the upcoming Sochi Olympic
Games. Since 2010, the “Circassian question” has become one of the focal points of the Georgian foreign
policy agenda. Two conferences (March and November 2010), began the discussion at the parliamentary
level of the problem of the so-called “Circassian genocide” in the Russian Empire in the 19th century, and
finally Georgian recognition of this massacre as a case
of genocide in May 2011 created a serious precedent.
Before it, Russian policy in the Caucasus was not recognized as genocide by foreign states. This charge
therefore contributes to the internationalization of
debates about this troubled Russian region. Thus it
requires from the Russian government and society
more thoughtful action. Moscow must find competent
answers to this problem as soon as possible.
However, the “new” nationalists in their statements remain within the Russian political-legal space.
Balkars, the Ingush human rights activists, and Circassian activists are trying to appeal to the Federal Russian government, and not to the Council of Europe,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE), or the European Union (EU)/United States.
In March 2010, at a meeting dedicated to the 66th anniversary of the Russian deportation—of Balkars, Kara-
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chais, Chechens, Ingush, and Kalmyks to Siberia—the
representatives of the Council of Elders of the Balkar
people prepared an appeal to the presidential envoy
in the North Caucasus Alexander Khloponin.
It is necessary to make a distinction between nationalism in the period of the “parade of sovereignties” in the early 1990s, and that of 2009-10. “The old
nationalism” was a political riposte to the Soviet (and
to a lesser extent the imperial) era. The current Balkar
or Circassian movements, though using the historical
material, have another nature. This is the reaction to
today’s realities (e.g., land issues and the attendant
corruption, human resource policies, and issues of local self-government). Using quantitative approaches
(and certain of their manifestations we see in KBR in
the form of conciliation of the national movements)
the danger of nationalism’s revival can be minimized
(but not eliminated completely). However (and 20092010 have demonstrated it), there are cases when the
republican authorities try to extinguish the fire of Islamist activity by using nationalist kerosene. Such a
tool (playing the ethnic card) is extremely dangerous
(as shown in 1989-91).
The Ossetian-Ingush reconciliations have inspired
cautious optimism. The third President of Ingushetia, Yunus Bek Evkurov, has played a great role in
its promotion. Ingushetia now insists on the return of
displaced persons who fled their homes during the
conflict in October-November 1992, namely in the
villages of the Suburban District (Prigorodnyi rayon)
where they lived before the conflict, but the Ingush
leadership clearly rejects the claims for the return of
the district itself! At a meeting on the problems of displaced persons held on October 2, 2009, the President
of North Ossetia, Teimuraz Mamsurov, said that the
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Ingush would be free to return to the Suburban District and the authorities of his republic, North Ossetia,
would not be an obstacle.
According to various sources, approximately 1520,000 displaced people (DP) could return to their
former places of residence. In this case, both the conflicting parties are dissatisfied with federal policy to
resolve this problem. The Ossetian side said that the
return of the Ingush is being done at a forced pace,
while the Ingush are unhappy with the low intensity
of the return. Soft apartheid is preserved. In particular, on March 1, 2009, during the elections of local bodies in the Suburban District, the vote was conducted in
the villages settled by the Ingushis. The situation for
all these years is complicated by the conflict between
Georgia and South Ossetia because North Ossetia was
forced to place Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia
and interior regions of Georgia in its territory. Regardless of this, on December 17, 2009, the leaders of the
two republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed
a bilateral agreement.
For the first time in the post-Soviet era Ingush DPs
had the right to return to their homes in an official
document. (Previously they were offered different
versions of arrangements at the new location.) Human and civil rights took precedence over the “right
of blood.” Practically for the first time since 1992, it
was recognized that the Ossetians and the Ingush are
two peoples of the Russian nation-state project that
should be more than just neighbors, and become fellow citizens of one country.
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NORTH CAUCASUS: PUBLIC POLICY
OF LIMITED DURATION
In addition to Islam and ethnic nationalism, bureaucratic competition for dominance in the framework of a single republic has been a serious challenge.
This management struggle has once again proved that
disputes over power are not maintained in rigid adherence to an ethnic or religious affiliation. This is a
complex configuration of clan interests and pressure
groups both in Moscow and within the region itself.
Perhaps the most exemplary republic in this respect
is Dagestan, the largest (in territory and population)
of the North Caucasian republics. It is no accident because the year of 2009 was a preparatory period for the
Republican presidential elections (in February 2010,
the Presidential term of Mukhu Aliev expired). In the
absence of direct elections of the Republic’s president,
we witnessed complex bureaucratic fights with very
specific ideas about public policy.
As a result, the procedure for determining a candidate for the presidency in Dagestan unprecedentedly
dragged on from November 2009 until February 2010.
In fact, it took 2 additional weeks beyond the legal
procedure for Moscow to announce the final decision
on the candidacy of the head of the Republic. Finally,
Magomedsalam Magomedov got the support of the
Federal Center. But as the Russian political scientist
and journalist Ivan Sukhov justly remarked, “[The]
appointment of the president in Dagestan looked like
the most problematic one for the entire period.”12
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THE NORTH CAUCASUS FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF THE KREMLIN
At first glance, the tragic events at the Manege
Square on December 11, 2010 (and their echoes in St.
Petersburg and Rostov-on-Don), are not connected
directly with ethno-political and religious dynamics. Activity, clashes, and pogroms under the Russian
ethno-nationalist slogans are not a response to one
or another act of terrorism, sabotage, or injustice to
the ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus republics.
The Manege incident was provoked by the murder of
Spartak soccer club fan Yegor Sviridov. In other cases, reasons are different, but they do not refer to the
North Caucasus regional issues. Meanwhile, it would
be very naïve to consider those clashes as absolutely
isolated problems. The Sviridov case became a kind
of trigger for anti-Caucasus opinions existing in the
central parts of Russia. It also showed that Russia
lacks a coherent national policy (or rather, it substituted folklore and ethnographic considerations) and
that the inhabitants of the Caucasus and the rest of
Russia had long lists of grievances against each other.
Regardless of what it was, it revitalized the problem
of a divided community and actualized the necessity
to find ways for a civic nation option. It also demonstrated the challenge of Russian separatism because
it displayed numerous groups of Russian citizens
who would be ready to separate from the Caucasus.
This fact violates the stereotype that the region can
only be put beyond Moscow’s strategic influence by
means of a conscious campaign to free itself of Russia’s suzerainty. But what if the unilateral separation
of the Caucasus by Russian power took place? In this
scenario, it would matter little whether the North
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Caucasus followed a nationalist or Islamist agenda. It
does not mean that Russia would have great benefits
from the realization of this scenario. But now it has
created new options for Caucasus politics as well as
Russian domestic policy as a whole. The fact that the
central government on the eve of the election year decided to play the Russian chauvinist bargaining chip
is also dangerous because it makes two groups of the
citizens of one country (ethnic Russians and Caucasus
peoples) confront each other.
Thus, the North Caucasus has not become a more
secure, and most importantly, predictable region. The
region poses for the Russian state and society a wide
variety of challenges, ranging from Islamic radicalism
to sophisticated closed bureaucratic confrontation and
Russian separatism. Despite the fact that in 2009 the
Russian central government had recognized the crisis
in the North Caucasus, breakthrough strategies for
the development of the region have not surfaced. The
state bodies continue focusing on bureaucratic methods of improving the situation, refuse to be engaged in
dialogue with the civil society, and use “soft power”
(integration projects, the introduction of elements of
civic identity, and attempts to redefine the religious
sphere such as ”Euro-Islam” as an alternative to radical Islamism) in promoting their own interests. While
modernization has been proclaimed as the strategic
goal of the Russian policy, the North Caucasus has
not been meaningfully considered in this context. By
inertia, it is regarded rather as an underdeveloped
outskirt, rather than an integral part of the nationwide
political-legal space. Encouragingly, there is some
safety margin; the region’s population is interested in
strengthening the Russian state’s presence and the effectiveness of arbitration by the central government,
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while there is simultaneously a more active desire of
the Russian authorities to make a critical assessment of
the regional realities. However, an ad hoc situational
response remains the dominant political and managerial style of the Russian elite for the Caucasus region.
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CHAPTER 3
THE “AFGHANIZATION” OF THE NORTH
CAUCASUS: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS
OF A CHANGING CONFLICT
Svante E. Cornell
The situation in the North Caucasus, particularly
in Chechnya, frequently made headlines in the 1990s
and early 2000s. In fact, it was a key issue in affecting Western views of Russia, a particular mobilizing
factor for the democracy and human rights agenda as
Russia was concerned. This changed, however, with
President Vladimir Putin’s successful curtailing of
media freedoms in Russia, and the gradual decline of
violence in Chechnya, with violence sinking to a low
point in 2006. For the past 5 years, the North Caucasus
has hardly had an effect on relations between the West
and Russia; in fact, both the media and policy communities in the West have largely ignored the region.
That has nevertheless begun to change in the recent
past, for two main reasons: First, there has been a clear
upsurge in violence in and related to the North Caucasus since 2007, with the completion of the process of
transformation of a Chechen nationalist rebellion to a
region-wide Islamist insurgency. It has become clear
that far from pacifying the region, Moscow is failing
to exert sovereignty there. Second, the International
Olympic Committee’s decision to hold the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi on the Russian Black Sea coast
adjacent to the North Caucasus has made the North
Caucasus a magnet for attention. This chapter seeks to
assess the current situation in the North Caucasus, the
reasons behind the evolution of the past decade, and
its implications for Russia, the region, and the West.
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THE NORTH CAUCASUS TODAY
The republics of the North Caucasus are presently characterized by a combination of factors that the
present author has likened to “Afghanization.” The
term evokes the development of Afghanistan in the
mid-1990s: a combination of war, human suffering,
poverty, organized crime, and externally sponsored
Islamic radicalism combined to generate an explosive
situation, which the authorities are increasingly unable to respond to—and which, failing to understand
the web of problems correctly and suffering from the
constraints of their own system, they end up exacerbating.
Demographically and economically, the North
Caucasus is in a deep malaise. Unemployment rates
are sky-high, averaging 50 percent by some estimates,
with 80 percent rates of youth unemployment being
common in many areas of the region.1 Between 60 and
90 percent of the budgets of the republics consist of
direct subsidies from Moscow, suggesting the weakness of economic activity and of government ability
to raise revenues. In fact, subsidies to the North Caucasus have begun to generate a backlash in Russia
itself, with growing popular movements wanting to
stop the government from “feeding the Caucasus.”2 A
leaked Russian government report in 2006 cited that
the shadow economy constituted an estimated 44 percent of Dagestan’s economy, as opposed to 17 percent
in Russia as a whole; 50 to 70 percent of Dagestanis
with some form of employment were thought to work
in the shadow economy.3 These figures are unlikely to
have improved since then. Ethnic Russians have largely left the region, removing some of the most-skilled
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labor force. In Chechnya, where 200,000 Russians once
lived, they now number in the hundreds. In Ingushetia, the number of Russians declined by a factor of
over six. In other republics, the decline between the
censuses of 1989 and 2002 are not as dramatic but nevertheless stark: The percentage of Russians fell from
42 percent to 33 percent in Karachaevo-Cherkessiya;
from 30 to 23 percent in North Ossetia; and from 10
to 5 percent in Dagestan. The exodus of Russians has
only continued since then, although census figures are
not available.4 Meanwhile, the educational system has
largely collapsed while there is a rapid population increase due to historically high birth rates.
Since 2004, with the strengthening of the “vertical
of power” in Russia, the republics are ruled increasingly by elites whose main feature is loyalty (of an
often personal nature) to the leadership in Moscow
rather than, as had been the case, with roots in the local politics of the region. This has been a source of additional friction between Moscow and the populations
of the North Caucasus. Not only are these populations
no longer able to elect their leaders even on paper, but
their leaders are responsive mainly to the demands of
the distant capital rather than their own needs. While
the most well-known example is Chechnya, where
Moscow supported the elevation of the Kadyrov clan
to lead the republic, the most egregious case is Ingushetia. There, a highly respected but independentminded leader, General Ruslan Aushev, managed to
keep the republic stable and peaceful during the first
Chechen war and its chaotic aftermath. Deemed too
independent, he was replaced in 2002 by a Federal
Security Service (FSB) officer of Ingush descent but
with little connection to the region, Murad Zyazikov.
Zyazikov’s subsequent mismanagement, insensitivity
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to local power-brokers, and repression alienated considerable parts of the population and led numerous
young Ingush to join the armed resistance. KabardinoBalkaria (KBR), Putin similarly appointed a Moscowbased businessman with roots in the republic, Arsen
Kanokov, to the presidency in 2005, with the explicit
purpose of appointing a person without links to the
“clan politics” of the republic. However, Kanokov’s
lack of a popular base in KBR led the situation to deteriorate further.5
The North Caucasus is no longer the scene of
large-scale warfare concentrated in Chechnya, as
was the case in 1994-96 and 1999-2002. Instead, the
resistance has morphed into a low-to-medium level
insurgency that spans the entire region. Chechnya is
among the calmer areas of the region, with the epicenter of the resistance having moved first to Ingushetia,
then to Dagestan, with spikes of violence in KBR and
the other republics as well. The conflict pits Moscow
and its local allies, such as the Kadyrov clan, against
loosely coordinated multiethnic groups of insurgents
that largely remain led by ethnic Chechens. This insurgency no longer sees itself as a nationalist movement, but as part of the global jihadi movement. As
such, it seeks the establishment of a region-wide Islamic state, dubbed the “Caucasus Emirate.” Inspired
by the global jihadi movement, the insurgency targets
not only Russian forces but also civilian authorities
across the region, as well as engaging in terrorist attacks on civilians, including in Russia proper. Thus,
Chechnya has come to resemble Kashmir: a formerly
nationalist and separatist insurgency morphed into
a jihadi movement with whom central authorities
can no longer, realistically, expect to reach a political
compromise.
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HOW DID WE GET HERE?
The present condition of the conflict in the North
Caucasus is a fairly recent development, having undergone deep transformations in the past decade. An
overview of the history of the conflict makes this clear.
Indeed, it suggests that in 1989, ethnicity was increasingly politicized across the former Soviet Union. The
ethno-nationalist uprisings and movements of 1989-94
clearly provide corroboration for that assessment. By
contrast, religion was not politicized, and would not
be for another decade. Among North Caucasus ethnic groups, only the Chechens had both the incentives
and the capacity to sustain an insurgency against the
Russian state, while a religious revival gradually got
under way, centered on Dagestan. It was the first war
in Chechnya in 1994-96 that attracted militant Islamist
groups to the North Caucasus, whose ideology came
to spread across the region, fanning out from Chechnya and Dagestan to span the North Caucasus.
The Salience of the Deportations.
The resistance of Chechens as well as other North
Caucasian peoples to Russian rule in the 19th century
is legendary. It is instructive to note that Russia had
annexed Georgia by 1801, and acquired control over
Armenia and Azerbaijan gradually in 1812-13 and
1827-28. By contrast, the areas north of the mountains
were not subjugated until 1859-64. It took Russia 30
years after gaining control over the South Caucasus
to pacify the North. Chechens, Dagestanis, and the
Circassian peoples to the west fought an unequal
battle until the 1860s to escape Russian rule.6 Under
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the legendary Dagestani chieftain, Shamil, the areas
that today form southern Chechnya and inner Dagestan formed a shrinking independent Islamic state,
an Imamate, from 1824 until the Russian capture of
Shamil in 1859.7 The Circassian rebels were not defeated until the mass expulsion of Circassians to the
Ottoman Empire in 1864.
Even following the incorporation of the North
Caucasus into the Russian empire, the northeastern
regions were only partially pacified, but never appeared to become integrated with Russia in ways that
other minority-dominated areas, such as in the Volga
region, did. The physical expulsion of the majority of
the Circassian population helped Russia manage the
northwestern Caucasus; but Chechnya and Dagestan
remained unruly. Whenever Russia was at war or otherwise weakened, these lands saw rebellions of varying length and strength. This occurred after World War
I during the Russian civil war 1918-21, and, though in
a much smaller scale, during the collectivization of the
1930s and World War II. In 1944, this obstinate refusal
to submit had tragic consequences. Falsely claiming
that Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, and Balkars had collaborated with the invading German forces, Joseph
Stalin in February 1944 ordered the wholesale deportation of these peoples to Central Asia. Entire populations were loaded on cattle wagons and transported
in the middle of winter to the steppes of Central Asia,
where little preparation had been made for their arrival. An estimated quarter of the deportees died during
transport or shortly after arrival due to cold, hunger,
or epidemics.8
The largest number of the deported peoples of the
North Caucasus was the Chechens. However, until
deportation, Chechens primarily identified with their
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Teip or clan, not as members of a Chechen nation. More
than anything, deportation helped develop national
consciousness among the Chechens. The demographic consequences of deportation and the 13-year exile
of the Chechens until they were allowed to return in
1957 are very tangible. Between 1926-37, the Chechen
population increased by 36 percent; in another 11year period, between 1959 and 1970, the figure was 46
percent. But during the 20-year period from 1939-59,
the rate of increase was only 2.5 percent, although the
population would almost have doubled under normal
circumstances.9 Thus, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the deportations in the collective memory
of the punished peoples. With regard to the Chechens, it had important political consequences that did
not immediately materialize among the much smaller
Ingush, Karachai, and Balkar populations. Most leaders of the Chechen movement for independence in
the 1990s were either born or grew up in exile in Kazakhstan. The deportation convinced many Chechens
that there was no way for them to live securely under
Russian rule; it also explains the extent of support for
separation from Russia among the people and perhaps the readiness among portions of the population
to embrace radical ideologies of resistance.
After the August coup in Moscow against Mikhail
Gorbachev that spelled the end of the Soviet Union,
most constituent republics declared their independence. So did two autonomous republics within the
Russian Federation: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Tatarstan, encircled by Russia proper, began negotiations on mutual relations with Moscow that eventually led to a deal in 1994 that granted Tatarstan broad
autonomy. In Chechnya, however, the nationalist
movement in power was less compromising. Gen-
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eral Jokhar Dudayev, who had seized power from
the former communist leadership in September 1991,
was elected President of Chechnya and declared its
independence soon after. Chechnya, in this context,
stood out by being the only autonomous republic in
Russia where a nationalist movement took power and
ousted the communist party leadership. In this sense,
it resembled the developments in Georgia and Armenia more than that of the Central Asian republics or
Russia’s other autonomous republics: The leadership
consisted of true nationalists, not former Communist
elites that cloaked a nationalist mantle.
While Russian President Boris Yeltsin made an
abortive attempt to rein in Dudayev by sending special forces to Chechnya to restore Moscow’s rule, Dudayev had managed to create a presidential guard that
was enough of a deterrent to avoid Russian military
action. At this point, Russia was itself in a chaotic situation. Yeltsin was preoccupied with building Russian
statehood, and Chechnya was put on the back burner.
However, by 1994, Yeltsin had consolidated his power
after physically attacking his parliamentary opposition in October 1993—an action that indebted him to
the military and security forces. Chechnya hence remained as a thorn in the eye of a rising Russia. Moreover, Chechnya’s de facto independence and the heavily anti-Russian rhetoric emanating from Dudayev
was foiling Russian plans of asserting control over the
South Caucasus states of Azerbaijan and Georgia, in
particular controlling the westward export of Caspian
oil resources. Thus, for both internal and external reasons, the Russian government was now prompted to
“solve” the Chechnya problem. Serious negotiations
between Moscow and Grozny were never attempted,
mainly because of the personal enmity between Du-
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dayev and Yeltsin.10 After seeking briefly to use subversion to overthrow Dudayev without success, the
Russian government decided to launch a wholesale
invasion of Chechnya in late 1994.11
Importantly, the Chechen movement for independence was an almost entirely secular affair.12 Its
chief leaders, such as Jokhar Dudayev and Aslan
Maskhadov, were former Soviet officers with highly
secular lifestyles. This is not to say that Islamist elements were not present: They did develop among the
Chechen leadership, mainly through the efforts of
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Movladi Udugov, high
officials in Dudayev’s administration. However, they
remained largely marginal, being able to assert themselves only tepidly during the internal crisis that Dudayev experienced in 1993, in which he briefly began
using increasingly religious language in an attempt to
shore up legitimacy when faced with growing criticism of his mismanagement of Chechnya’s economy.
Moreover, there is significant evidence suggesting
that Yandarbiyev and Uduguov embraced Islamism
in a mainly instrumental way.13
The First War.
Contrary to Moscow’s expectations, the Russian
threat rallied erstwhile skeptics around Dudayev once
the war started. Aided by the dismal character of the
Russian military campaign, the Chechen forces were
able to resist the Russian invasion. Getting bogged
down in Chechnya, the Russian military resorted to
brutal tactics to subdue an opponent they had thoroughly underestimated, and used air bombing and
artillery to level Grozny before entering it. Only after 2 months did the Russian army manage to estab-
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lish control over the city—at the cost of thousands of
Russian casualties, over 20,000 killed civilians, a total
destruction of the city, and hundreds of thousands of
refugees. The war continued, with the Chechen forces
regrouping in the south of Chechnya. Meanwhile, Dudayev himself was killed by Russian forces in April
1996. Despite this setback, the Chechen forces in August 1996 managed to stage a counteroffensive, and
retake the three major cities of Chechnya, including
Grozny, in 3 days of fighting. This amounted to a total
humiliation of the Russian forces, and the government
was forced to end the war and pull out all its forces by
a cease-fire signed 3 weeks later.
The war led to the total devastation of Grozny and
many other Chechen towns and villages. According to
the most credible estimates, the death toll in the first
war was in the range of 50,000 people.14 Compared
with the war in Afghanistan, the Chechen war was
far more lethal for the Russian army. During 1984,
the worst year in Afghanistan, almost 2,500 Soviet
soldiers were killed. In Chechnya, Russian losses surpassed this number within 4 months of the intervention. At its highest, the shelling of Grozny, counted
by the number of explosions per day, surpassed the
shelling of Sarajevo in the early 1990s by a factor of at
least 50. Grozny was literally leveled to the ground in
a destruction that recalled the battle of Stalingrad.
Moreover, the war was dominated by massive human rights violations, which are considered the worst
in Europe since World War II. Russian forces engaged
in several well-documented massacres of civilians,
the most well-known of which occurred in the village
of Samashki in April 1995. As noted above, the first
war in Chechnya was waged almost exclusively in the
name of national independence. But it is in the context
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of the brutality of the Russian onslaught that the first
jihadi elements appeared in Chechnya. Indeed, it is
also the context in which the Chechen leadership and
fighters welcomed or tolerated these foreign recruits;
there is ample evidence that there was little love lost
between the Chechen leadership and the jihadis—but
the Chechens needed all the help that they could get,
and were hardly in a position to turn away these newfound allies, all the more since they were exceptionally effective in combat.
Similarly, this is the context in which terrorist tactics enter the Chechen war. Practiced from the outset
by the Russian detachments, some of the Chechens
commanders gradually came to employ them. Here,
the notorious Shamil Basayev deserves particular
mention, whose hostage-taking raid on a hospital in
the southern Russian town of Budyonnovsk in June
1995 was the first large-scale use of terrorism by the
Chechens. It occurred at a time when the Chechen
cause seemed all but lost, and arguably contributed
to turning the tide in the war, or at least in forestalling
defeat. Basayev himself was in one sense an unlikely
terrorist: Only 3 years earlier, he had deployed as a
volunteer to fight the Georgians in Abkhazia, being
among the North Caucasian volunteers that received
training and assistance for the purpose from the Russian military intelligence services.15
The number of foreign fighters in the first war was
small, perhaps a few hundred at most. These were
mainly the roving “Arab Afghans” who had fought in
Kashmir, Tajikistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
was the big focus of jihadi attention in the early 1990s.
Tellingly, the person who actually declared a jihad on
Russia was none other than Akhmad Kadyrov, then
mufti of Chechnya, who would switch sides in 1999,
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and became Russia’s local satrap, a position his son,
Ramzan, inherited upon his assassination in May 2004.
The Inter-War Period.
The August 1996 accords, complemented by a formal peace treaty in May 1997, granted Chechnya de
facto independence, though the issue of Chechnya’s
status was deferred until December 31, 2001. In practice, Chechnya had the opportunity to build what in
practice amounted to an independent state. Russian
law did not apply in Chechnya, and no Russian police,
army, customs, or postal service operated there.
However, for both internal and external reasons,
this second attempt at independence in a decade ended in a dismal failure. Russia consistently prevented
Chechnya from seeking outside financial help, and
though it committed funds to the reconstruction of
the war-ravaged republic, $100 million disappeared
before they even reached Chechnya. In a celebrated
statement, President Yeltsin publicly admitted “only
the devil” knew where the money had gone.16 Hence
the basis on which the Chechen government could
create a functioning state was shaky indeed.
Yet initial signals were positive. In a presidential
election that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) termed largely free and fair,
the population of Chechnya overwhelmingly voted
for Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of Staff of the Chechen
armed forces and the most moderate among the three
presidential contenders. Thus, Chechnya acquired a
legitimate government that was open to compromise
and cooperation, although it never wavered from its
commitment to an independent Chechnya. Sadly,
this initial stability did not last. Chechnya was awash
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with young, unemployed war veterans with arsenals
of weapons, whose loyalty was to individual field
commanders rather than to the central Chechen government. With the economic depression deepening,
Maskhadov’s authority over Chechnya gradually diminished, and the government became unable to uphold law and order. Various criminal groups emerged
that engaged in smuggling and kidnapping, and the
government showed its inability to effectively deal
with this problem. Most alarmingly, warlords Shamil
Basayev and the Jordanian-born Khattab began planning for the unification of Chechnya with the neighboring republic of Dagestan, still part of the Russian
Federation. Maskhadov was either unwilling or unable to rein in these warlords, fearing an intra-Chechen war. As a result, Basayev and Khattab were able to
recruit hundreds of Dagestanis and other North Caucasians, including Chechens, into what they termed
an Islamic Brigade based in Southeastern Chechnya.
This brigade would eventually launch the incursion
into Dagestan in August 1999, which precipitated the
second war.
It is instructive, at this point, to compare Chechnya to the major other armed conflict in Europe of the
time: Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, Chechnya was similar to Bosnia in terms of the level and character of the
jihadi presence; where it differed was in the absence of
a Dayton-type internationalized conflict management
mechanism.
Indeed, most jihadis that came to fight in Chechnya were veterans of the Bosnian campaign. This was
true for the poster child of Chechen jihadis, the Saudiborn Amir al-Khattab. What is seldom recalled is the
extent of the Islamist contagion in Bosnia at the time
of the Dayton Accords. Indeed, the leadership of the
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Bosnian Muslims in many ways leaned more toward
Islamism than that of the Chechens: Alija Izetbegovic,
the Bosnian Muslim leader, had a long history of Islamist inclinations dating back to his involvement
in the Young Muslim organizations in Bosnia, Mladi
Muslimani, during World War II .17 Haris Silajdzic, his
closest advisor, received Islamic education in Libya
and served as an advisor to Bosnia’s spiritual leader,
the Reis-ul-Ulema. By contrast, the only Islamist to lead
the Chechen resistance was Yandarbiyev, who only
served as interim president between Dudayev’s death
in April 1996 and Maskhadov’s election in January
1997. By contrast, Dudayev and Maskhadov were considerably more secular than the key Bosnian leaders.
The jihadi presence in Bosnia was a real problem
at the close of the war. The Bosnian leadership was
split between those wanting to rid Bosnia of the foreign radicals, and those grateful for their support and
who wanted to allow them to stay. Most jihadis were
nevertheless evicted shortly following the Dayton Accords, after several altercations with North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces brought attention
to their presence.18 Indeed, this highlights the main
difference between Bosnia and Chechnya: Chechnya
had the Khasavyurt treaty that postponed the key issue in the conflict; was never fully implemented; was
bilateral and lacked any international guarantor; and
lacked international peacekeeping forces. Bosnia, on
the other hand, had a real peace treaty, and NATO
forces to keep that treaty. Thus, most jihadis were
gradually evicted from Bosnia following the Dayton
Accords. However, small numbers remained until as
late as 2007, when the Bosnian government finally removed the last remnants.19
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In Chechnya, there was no force capable of removing the jihadi elements. Indeed, the Maskhadov administration was considerably weaker than its Bosnian
counterpart, and could not rely on an international
force, whether military such as the NATO Implementation Forces (IFOR) or civilian such as the Office of
the High Representative. Unlike Bosnia, which was
awash in international assistance already a year following the Dayton Accords, Chechnya received next to
no foreign assistance. Thus, the crippled Maskhadov
government was in no position to successfully oust
the jihadis. This was not for a lack of trying: In 1998,
there was even fire exchanged between the Chechen
government forces and jihadi groups. But unlike in
Bosnia, the jihadi forces led by Khattab had found a
powerful local ally in Shamil Basayev. Maskhadov
was thus faced with a dire choice. He could either
confront the jihadis that had ensconced themselves
in southeastern Chechnya, at the cost of a Chechen
civil war; or he could tolerate their presence, preserving peace and trying to strengthen state institutions.
In the end, he chose the latter—which appeared the
lesser of two evils. While he even sought a deal with
Moscow in rooting out the radicals, a call that went
unanswered, his decision contributed greatly to the
failure of Chechen state-building and led directly to
the second war.20
Thus, the Chechnya-based jihadis coalesced with
Wahhabi groups that had emerged independently in
Dagestan in the late 1990s. Training camps developed
modeled on those in Afghanistan, where small numbers of people from the entire North Caucasus and
beyond received training; many then fought in the
second Chechen war, and subsequently spread the
militant ideology and tactics back to their own home
republics.
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The Second War.
During the course of the second Chechen war,
which began in October 1999, concern grew over the
radicalization of the Chechen resistance movement
and its links to extremist Islamic groups in the Middle
East. Indeed, authors like Gordon Hahn have come to
conclude that the “key, if not main factor driving the
violence in the North Caucasus” is “the salience of local cultural and the Salafist jihadist theo-ideology and
the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement.”21 While this chapter takes issue with that claim,
the Chechen resistance has indeed acquired a much
stronger Islamic character. The use of Islamic vocabulary such as jihad (holy war) or mujahedin (resistance
fighters) increased markedly, as did active support for
the Chechen cause by radical Islamic groups in the
Middle East, at least until the U.S. invasion of Iraq led
jihadis to flock to that conflict.
Moscow managed to drive this point across especially after September 11, 2001 (9/11). Immediately
after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Russian leadership began drawing comparisons between
the attacks and the situation in Chechnya. Only hours
after the collapse of the World Trade Centers, Russian State television broadcast a statement by President Vladimir Putin expressing solidarity with the
American people, but also reminding the audience of
Russia’s earlier warnings of the common threat of “Islamic Fundamentalism.” This marked the beginning
of a strategy aiming to capitalize on the tragic attacks
on America by highlighting the alleged parallels between the attacks on the United States and the situation in Chechnya. “The Russian people understand
the American people better than anyone else, having
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experienced terrorism first-hand,” President Putin
said the day after the attacks.22
This turned out to be the harbinger of a diplomatic
campaign targeted at Western countries intended to
shore up legitimacy, if not support, for the Russian army’s violent crackdown in Chechnya.23 This campaign
was part and parcel of a five-step strategy to reduce
the negative fallout of the war in Chechnya. The first
component of that strategy was to isolate the conflict
zone and prevent both Russian and international media from reporting on the conflict independently. The
kidnapping of Andrei Babitsky, a reporter for Radio
Liberty, early on served as a warning for journalists
of the consequences of ignoring Moscow’s rules on
reporting the conflict. Since then, only a few journalists have actually been able to provide independent
reporting from Chechnya. Most prominent has been
the late Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya who
was murdered in Moscow in 2007, and French writer,
Anne Nivat.
The second prong in the strategy was to rename the
conflict: Instead of a “war,” it was an “anti-terrorist
operation.” Third, and stemming directly from this,
Russia sought to discredit the Chechen struggle and
undermine its leadership by accusing them individually and collectively of involvement with terrorism.
Russia’s campaign against Chechen President Aslan
Maskhadov’s chief negotiator, Akhmed Zakayev, is
one example of this. This nevertheless backfired as
first Denmark and then Great Britain refused to extradite Zakayev to Russia; Great Britain instead providing him with political asylum. Fourth, Russia sought
to “Chechenize” the conflict and turn it into an intraChechen confrontation by setting up and arming a
brutal but ethnically Chechen puppet regime in Gro-
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zny under Kadyrov, the former Mufti (a professional
jurist interpreting Muslin law) of the republic. This
would reduce Russian casualties and enable hostilities
to be depicted as a war between Chechen factions that
Russia was helping to stabilize. Fifth, after branding
the war as an anti-terrorist campaign, discrediting the
rebel leadership, and trying to turn the war into a civil
war among Chechens, Russia declared that the war
was over.
The second war proved as heavy on the civilian
population as the first. In many ways, Russian abuses
were more systematic. For example, the Russian leadership set up what they termed “filtration camps”—
essentially concentration camps that gathered male
Chechens of fighting age, and in which torture and
disappearances were rampant.24 Whereas European
countries and the United States kept a moderate but
noticeable level of criticism against Russia’s massive
human rights violations in Chechnya during both the
first war in 1994-96 and in 1999-2001, Russia succeeded in convincing western observers it was not fighting
a people, but terrorists. In an atmosphere of increased
cooperation between Russia and the West, with American need for Russian intelligence and cooperation in
Afghanistan, a halt to criticism on Chechnya became
the foremost price Russia managed to extract.
A Regional Insurgency.
Today, the nationalist Chechen leadership is almost exclusively an expatriate phenomenon. The
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has for all practical
purposes ceased to exist; instead, the insurgency
brands itself the “Caucasus Emirate” (CE), overtly
boasts of its belonging to the global jihad, and oper-
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ates across the North Caucasus. Studies of violent
incidents in the North Caucasus agree that the violence peaked in April 2001, 18 months into the second
Chechen war. From 2002 to 2006, violence was fairly
steady before declining to a low point in 2006-07.25
From 2007 onwards, however, violence has been on
a steady increase, albeit fluctuating in both intensity
and regional focus. Already in 2005, Dagestan and Ingushetia began seeing escalating violence, rivaling at
times the levels in Chechnya.26 Since 2007, the situation has continued to deteriorate, with the number of
violent incidents rising sharply every year from 2007
to 2010.27 In 2009 alone, for example, the number of
violent incidents went from 795 to 1,100, with fatalities mounting from 586 to 900.28 In the first 11 months
of 2010, federal prosecutors acknowledged the death
of 218 security personnel and the wounding of 536.29
From 2008 onward, Dagestan and Ingushetia have
alternated in the lead in the frequency of incidents.30
In 2010 and 2011, the violence escalated significantly
in the Western republic of KBR as well—marking the
diffusion of large-scale and enduring violence beyond
the republics bordering Chechnya. Thus, in 2010 political violence claimed 79 deaths and 39 wounded; the
first 11 months of 2011 saw those figures rise to 98 and
39, respectively.31 As if this was not enough, 2011 also
saw violence spread to North Ossetia, a traditionally
calm and majority Orthodox Christian republic.32
RUSSIAN POLICIES
What role did Russian policies play in transforming the conflict from a contained, nationalist rebellion
to a sprawling jihadi insurgency? Counterintuitively
as it may seem, Russian policies have contributed di-
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rectly to this development. In another parallel to the
Bosnian conflict, Russian rhetoric mirrored that of the
Serbs: misunderstood defenders of Europe against
the threat of Islamic radicalism, the “green wave.” Indeed, this line of reasoning has been visible in Russian
outreach efforts since the mid-1990s, with increasing
fervor following 9/11.33 But more than just arguing for
their case, Russian officials actively worked to make
the reality of the conflict conform to their vision of
it. Thus, there was a remarkable pattern in Russia’s
priorities during the second war: the priority given
to targeting the nationalist Chechen leadership rather
than the jihadi elements within it. Therefore, on the
battlefield, Russia targeted field commanders like
Ruslan Gelayev, as well as Maskhadov himself, whom
Russian forces killed in March 2005. On the diplomatic
front, Russian diplomats and lawyers furiously prosecuted and sought the extradition of secular leaders
like Zakayev and Maskhadov’s foreign minister, Ilyas
Akhmadov. By comparison, Islamist Chechen leaders
have fared much better. Among exiles, Movladi Udugov remains alive, among the few remaining members
of the first generation of Chechen leaders to survive.
Yandarbiyev was killed in Qatar by Russian agents,
but only in 2004. Similarly, the current leader of the
CE, Dokka Umarov, has served since June 2006. The
most notorious Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev,
was killed in 2006, but not necessarily by the Russians.
French journalist, Anne Nivat, once wrote that the
safest place in Chechnya was near Shamil Basayev:
Russian bombs never appeared to fall there. Given Basayev’s connection with Russian special forces (GRU)
through the conflict in Abkhazia, numerous conspiracy theories emerged of Basayev’s continued relationship with Russian state institutions; indeed, news re-
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ports following his death suggested that he was killed
accidently by explosives in the truck he was driving in
mountain roads in Ingushetia.34
While allegations of Basayev’s GRU connections
during the Georgia-Abkhaz war are well-established,35
those concerning subsequent periods are based mainly
on innuendo. Clearer evidence is available in the case
of Arbi Barayev, one of the most viciously militant as
well as most criminalized of Chechnya’s warlords.
Barayev was one of the key forces seeking to undermine Maskhadov’s leadership in the interwar era; it
was his group that kidnapped and beheaded foreign
telecommunications workers in 1998, effectively forcing out the small international presence in Chechnya.
Similarly, it was Barayev’s forces that engaged in firefights with Maskhadov’s troops in 1998. Following the
renewed warfare, Barayev lived freely in the town of
Alkhan-Kala, under Russian control, until his death
in 2001—despite the fact that he was responsible for
gruesome, video-recorded murders of captive Russian servicemen. As several observers have noted, his
opulent residence was only a few miles away from
a Russian checkpoint near his native Alkhan-Kala,
while his car had an FSB identification which allowed
him to race through Russian checkpoints.36 Tellingly,
Barayev was killed by a GRU hit squad only after the
FSB’s then-head of counterterrorism, General Ugryumov, had died. The apparent conclusion was that
Ugryumov provided a cover for Barayev, and the
former’s death made it possible for the GRU to take
Barayev out.
Given the nature of this conflict, evidence can at
best be inconclusive. But circumstantial evidence suggests two things: First, that during the second war
there was no clear and unified chain of command on
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either the Chechen or the Russian side. Chechen forces
paid nominal allegiance to Maskhadov but, in practice, field commanders behaved independently, and
with little coordination. On the Russian side, detachments of the army, GRU, FSB, and Ministry of Interior
played different roles in the conflict, roles that were
poorly coordinated; moreover, they each appeared
to keep ties with some Chechen commanders, while
combating others. Second, the policies of the Russian
leadership itself contributed to change the nature of
the conflict from a nationalist rebellion to one where
the enemy was Islamic jihadis. While this is likely in
the long run to be of greater danger to Russia, it did
succeed in making the conflict fit into Moscow’s desired narrative. After all, Maskhadov and the Chechen
nationalist leadership was respected in Western circles, being granted meetings with Western officials
and maintaining strong support among Western media, civil society, and human rights organizations. The
jihadi elements, needless to say, did not and do not
enjoy this status.
In a sense, however, Moscow is now faced both
with a jihadi movement and a nationalist Chechnya.
Indeed, the CE is everything it is blamed of being: a
part of the global jihad, and a terrorist incubator on
Europe’s borders. While primarily led by Chechens,
it is most active in the other republics of the North
Caucasus. But Moscow also is faced with a nationalist
Chechen leadership in Grozny. Indeed, the Kadyrov
administration appointed by Moscow has developed
in such a nationalistic direction that the secular Chechen nationalists in exile, who broke with the Islamist
faction with the establishment of the Emirate in 2007,
began mending fences with Kadyrov, their erstwhile
foe, by 2009.37 While a counterintuitive turn, the secu-
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lar nationalists concluded that Kadyrov has in practice achieved what they failed to achieve through an
armed rebellion: a Chechen republic that is for most
practical purposes behaving as an independent entity.
As early as 2005, Russian analysts began referring to
Kadyrov’s moves as “separatism-light.”38
A PACIFIED CHECHNYA?
Presently, Chechnya is arguably among the least
violence-ridden republics in the North Caucasus.
The last several years have seen widespread violence
in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KBR; by comparison,
Chechnya has been relatively stable. But the longterm outlook is clouded by the fragility on which this
relative quiet rests.
The main reason for Chechnya’s stability is the
dominance that Ramzan Kadyrov and his militia forces exert over the republic. These fighters, estimated at
over 5,000 in number, consist mainly of former resistance fighters. Moscow initially sought to balance the
Kadyrov clan with other political figures. Following
Akhmad Kadyrov’s assassination, Ramzan—who had
not yet achieved the eligible age for the presidency—
was appointed deputy prime minister. Chechnya was
instead led by career police officer Alu Alkhanov, who
had sided with Moscow already in the first war. By
March 2006, Ramzan Kadyrov was elevated to the
post of Prime Minister, replacing Sergey Abramov.
Less than a year later, Alkhanov was dismissed and
Kadyrov appointed President. Thus, by 2007, any political balances to Kadyrov had been removed; fighting forces outside his control nevertheless remained:
the “Zapad” and “Vostok” battalions, the latter commanded by Sulim Yamadayev, were nevertheless dis-
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banded in November 2008 following escalating tensions and actual armed clashes with Kadyrov’s forces.
Yamadayev loyalists were evicted from Chechnya;
Sulim Yamadayev was assassinated in Dubai in 2009,
while his brother met the same fate in Moscow, presumably at Kadyrov’s orders.39 This removed the sole
remaining check on Kadyrov’s power in Chechnya, to
the chagrin of many decisionmakers in Moscow—but
with the apparent blessing of Putin and Kadyrov’s immediate handler, the Chechen-born Vladislav Surkov,
who serves as Putin’s first deputy chief of staff and
chief ideologue.
Kadyrov has walked a fine line between vows of
absolute personal loyalty and subservience to Vladimir Putin, on the one hand, and institutional distancing from Russia. Thus, in 2007, he repeatedly urged
Putin to stay on as president for life.40 In 2009, Kadyrov said “if it was not for Putin, Chechnya would not
exist.”41 In January 2010, he added that “I am completely Vladimir Putin’s man. I would rather die 100
times than let him down.”42 Kadyrov also delivers
votes for the ruling party. In 2007, for example, official
figures showed that 99.5 percent of the Chechen electorate cast their votes, and that 99.3 percent voted for
the United Russia party.
On the other hand, Kadyrov has increasingly appealed to Chechen nationalism and sought to Islamize
Chechnya. In December 2006, he publicly sought the
prosecution of Russian officers responsible for civilian
deaths in Chechnya.43 His attitude toward the Russian military, which he sought to have expelled from
Chechnya, is best illustrated by his 2006 statement
that “as for the generals, I’m not going to say that I
care about their opinion.”44 Following his appointment as President, Kadyrov moved strongly to assert
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Chechnya’s economic and political autonomy. For
example, he has sought the creation of a Chechen oil
company that would keep the revenues of Chechnya’s
oil industry instead of sending them to Moscow; and
campaigned to have Chechens convicted elsewhere
in Russia serve prison time in Chechnya.45 Already in
2006, Kadyrov began urging women to comply with
Islamic dress codes, something that was later officially
promulgated with a program to strengthen “female
virtue.”46 He has also spoken favorably of Shariah in
general, and of both honor killings and of polygamy
in particular, and referred to women as men’s property—all of which are in violation of Russian laws.47
Adding to this, Kadyrov has made a habit of diverting the enormous funds coming to Chechnya from
the federal center. Indeed, Russian state auditors have
repeatedly noted the disappearance of the equivalent
of dozens of millions of dollars in state subsidies to
Chechnya, which amount to 90 percent of the republic’s budget.
Thus, all in all, Kadyrov has stabilized Chechnya on
the surface. But the stability rests on a very weak foundation. On the one hand, it rests solely on the personal
relationship between Kadyrov and Putin. As such, the
question is whether the stability of the republic would
outlive the departure from power of either man. Given
the average life expectancy of Chechen politicians, the
possibility of Kadyrov being assassinated is very real.
If that were to happen, would the thousands of former rebels now forming the bulk of his militia pledge
loyalty to a new leader, or would they return to the
resistance, ushering in a third Chechen war? Even if
Kadyrov remains in power, the defection of large sections of his militia to the resistance cannot be excluded.
Similarly, Kadyrov’s pragmatism is exhibited by his
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decision to switch sides from the resistance to Russia.
It is not inconceivable that he could switch sides again
under some scenario—for example, if Putin were to
leave power and his successor would discontinue the
arrangement with Kadyrov. Before her death, Anna
Politkovskaya observed that by his policies in Chechnya, Putin had essentially guaranteed a third Chechen
war at some future point. She may have turned out to
be prescient.48
CONCLUSION
The North Caucasus is sinking ever deeper into a
process of Afghanization. While the external impetus
of jihadi ideology has played a role in this development, this chapter has sought to show that the root
cause of the region’s decline is the Russian government’s policies—in particular its prosecution of the
wars in Chechnya; its over-reliance on repression in
both Chechnya and the rest of the region; its centralization of power; its unwillingness to allow the North
Caucasus to open up to the rest of the world; its failure
to provide an economic future for the region’s population; a political discourse that is making North Caucasians increasingly estranged from Russian society;
and the corruption and criminalization of the Russian
political system.
This situation destabilizes Russia, and forms its
most acute political problem. But it does not only affect Russia: It greatly affects the security and prosperity of the South Caucasus, as well as potentially all of
Europe. The impact on the South Caucasus is threefold. Most obviously, Azerbaijan and Georgia are directly affected by the violence and economic woes of
the region. This is only likely to be exacerbated in the
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future: While Azerbaijan experiences rapid growth
thanks to its oil and gas industry, Georgia has made
great strides in reforms, not least in terms of practically abolishing administrative corruption. Over
time, the contrast between these economies and the
languishing North Caucasus will have consequences,
in terms, for example, of migration flows. Secondly,
the southern neighbors of the North Caucasus are affected by the diffusion of the conflicts in the North.
Thus, flows of refugees—and fighters—from the
North Caucasus into Georgia and Azerbaijan have
been a recurring phenomenon over the past 2 decades,
with destabilizing effects on both countries. Third, the
Russian government has shown a distinctive tendency
to assign blame to its neighbors when it has proven
unable to deal with the consequences of its own failures in the North Caucasus. In the beginning of the
second Chechnyan war, both Azerbaijan and Georgia
were accused, without a shred of evidence, of serving
as conduits for thousands of foreign fighters to Chechnya; ever since, Russian accusations have focused on
Georgia, with threats of intervention into the Pankisi
Gorge on Georgian territory in 2002, and actual instances of Russian bombings of the Gorge.49 Following
the escalation of violence in 2008-11, Russian officials
have made a custom of blaming Georgia—and occasionally Western powers—for actively colluding with
the jihadi rebels in the North Caucasus. Thus, Russia’s
tendency to blame others for its failures poses a constant risk to its neighbors.
This predicament is most acute, given the upcoming Olympic Games in Sochi. Given current trends,
Moscow is unlikely to be able to pacify the North
Caucasus ahead of the Games, and will be increasingly likely to blame others for any terrorist attacks that
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would threaten this prestigious event. The alternative
option, a gigantic security operation to assert control
over the region, would itself very likely have a spillover effect on the South Caucasus.
Beyond the Caucasus itself, Russia’s misrule in the
North Caucasus poses a threat to Europe as a whole.
In fact, with the European Union (EU) now extended
to the shores of the Black Sea, it is a direct neighbor of
the North Caucasus. Through the Eastern Partnership,
Partnership for Peace, and other instruments, the EU
and NATO are seeking to contribute to the building
of stability, security, and prosperity in their eastern
neighborhood. In spite of the unresolved conflicts
of the South Caucasus and Moldova, and the mixed
scorecard for democratic development across the region, the Eastern neighborhood has indeed seen largely positive trends over the past decade. But the North
Caucasus is the sole remaining area where Europe
has little to no ability to influence developments, but
which could nevertheless have a considerably negative effect on Europe. The region is already a transshipment point for smuggled goods to Europe, and an
incubator of jihadi elements from the region and beyond. Thus far, the Islamic Emirate has stayed focused
on targets in the North Caucasus and Russia. But given
its broader ideological orientation and its perception
of Europe as a collaborator with Russia in the repression of Muslims, the prospect of groups affiliated with
the Emirate targeting Europe itself should not be excluded. After all, jihadi elements with connections to
Central Asia have already been implicated in planned
terrorist attacks in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.
Thus, Russia’s failure to stabilize the North Caucasus has amounted to the creation of an Afghanistanlike environment in Europe: a failed state within a
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state. Moscow is patently unable to remedy the situation, seeming only to design policies that are as a
whole counterproductive. Unfortunately, the failure
of Russia to address the region’s problems is related
directly to Russia’s very system. The sad fact is that as
long as Russia itself maintains a political system based
on kleptocratic authoritarianism, the prospects of the
North Caucasus will remain dim.
This poses a conundrum for Western powers. If
the situation continues to deteriorate, Western powers may not be able to afford simply treating the North
Caucasus as a domestic Russian issue. At the same
time, their policy options in designing responses to
the situation in the region are highly limited. While
efforts could be undertake in conjunction with the
South Caucasian states to contain the destabilization
emanating from the North Caucasus, addressing the
root causes of the problem will require a dialogue
with Moscow, the prospects of which are dim.
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FOREWORD
The United States has had a bitter set of experiences
with insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations,
but it is by no means alone in having to confront such
threats and challenges. Indeed, according to Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev, the greatest domestic
threat to Russia’s security is the ongoing insurgency
in the North Caucasus. This insurgency grew out of
Russia’s wars in Chechnya and has gone on for several years, with no end in sight. Yet it is hardly known in
the West and barely covered even by experts. In view
of this insurgency’s strategic importance and the fact
that the U.S. military can and must learn for other contemporary wars, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
felt the need to bring this war to our readers’ attention
and shed more light upon both sides, the Islamist (and
nationalist) rebels and Russia, as they wage either an
insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign.
While the evident and primary cause of this current war is Russian misrule in the North Caucasus in
the context of the Chechen wars, it also is true that
Russia is now facing a self-proclaimed fundamentalist, Salafi-oriented, Islamist challenge, that openly
proclaims its links to al-Qaeda and whose avowed
aim is the detachment of the North Caucasus from the
Russian Federation. Therefore, we should have a substantial interest in scrutinizing the course of this war
both for its real-world strategic implications and for
the lessons that we can garner by close analysis of it.
The three papers presented here are by well-known
experts and were delivered at SSI’s third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on
September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, Euv

ropean, and American experts to engage in a regular,
open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security; this panel realized that ambition,
as Dr. Hahn is American, Dr. Markedonov is Russian,
and Dr. Cornell is Swedish.
SSI believes that such regular international dialogue plays an important role in expanding the repertoire of ideas and potential course of action available
to Army and other strategic leaders, and we look forward to continuing this process in the future. Bearing
these objectives in mind and with the goal of informing senior Army and other strategic leaders about contemporary strategic and military developments, SSI
is pleased to present this monograph to our readers
for their consideration. We hope that it will stimulate
further debate, reflection, and learning among our
readers, as the issues of insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as Islamist-driven terrorism, will not go
away anytime soon.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE JIHADISTS:
THE SECURITY AND STRATEGIC
IMPLICATIONS
Gordon M. Hahn
In 1994, before the outbreak of the first post-Soviet
Russo-Chechen war, Shamil Basaev, the leading operative of the then self-declared independent Chechen
Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI), took a group of some 30
men from his battalion of Abkhaz fighters to Osama
bin Laden’s al-Qaeda (AQ) training camps in Khost,
Afghanistan.1 From this fleeting but nevertheless seminal contact between the ChRI and AQ, an increasingly closer relationship gradually developed between
Chechen as well as other Caucasus nationalist and
Sufi Islamic insurgents on the one hand, and AQ and
the burgeoning global jihadi revolutionary movement
on the other. After more than a decade of evolution,
this trend culminated in the full “Salafization” or “takfirization” of the ChRI’s ideology and the jihadization
of its goals, operations, and tactics.2 With the dissolution of ChRI by its then President Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov in October 2007 and his creation of the
Caucasus Emirate (CE) in its place, the Salafization
and jihadization processes were made official.
We can point to a series of factors that for more
than a decade drove the radicalization and jihadization of the Chechen/Caucasus mujahedin. These factors include: the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement and ideology realized through the
Internet and other means; brutal Russian warfighting
and counterinsurgency methods; the North Cauca-

1

sus’s colonial experience at the hands of the Russians;
the region’s relatively low standard of living and socioeconomic development; corrupt and ineffective local and Russian governance; and, Caucasus customs
of blood revenge and martial courage. What is clear
is that the CE is an explicitly self-identified global
jihadist organization. Somewhat belatedly in May
2011, the CE was placed on the U.S. State Department’s
list of specially designated international terrorist
organizations.
Still, the overwhelming weight of journalistic,
analytical, and academic work on the violence in the
North Caucasus tends to avoid mention of the global
jihad’s role in the region, the attractiveness of jihadism to a consistent portion of youth across the entire
umma, or the influence of these factors on the CE’s
ideology, goals, strategy, and tactics. The focus is
almost always on factors related to Russian responsibility for the generically named violence: the form
of siloviki brutality, poor governance, and economic
dependence and limited investment in the region’s
development. Given this chapter’s purpose of providing a strategic threat assessment of the current CE insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus and its broader
regional implications, it will focus on the CE’s theoideology, goals, strategies, tactics, and capacity to deliver violence inside Russia. Given the CE’s new place
within the global jihadi revolutionary alliance, I will
also look at the CE’s broader strategic regional and
global security implications.
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THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE: THEO-IDEOLOGY,
GOALS, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONAL
CAPACITY
The CE’s ideology and goals are now defined entirely by the global jihadi revolutionary movement’s
Salafi takfirism and jihadism. They have broadened
exponentially to include not only the internationalist aspirations of the global jihadi revolutionary alliance but also an expanded vision of the CE’s territorial claims. Those claims now extend beyond the
pan-Caucasus goal of the emirate to all of Russia’s
Muslim lands, defined so broadly as to encompass all
of Russia for all intents and purposes. Operationally,
I discuss the CE’s wide range of tactics, including the
use of the typically jihadi istishkhad, that is, martyrdom or suicide operations.
The CE’s Salafist Theo-Ideology.
The Salafist theo-ideology made serious inroads
beginning in the inter-war period and reached critical mass in 2002 when a ChRI shura subordinated the
ChRI constitution to Shariah law, approved a strategy
of bringing jihad to the entire North Caucasus, and
appointed the Islamist-oriented Abdul Khalim Sadulaev as Chairman of both the new ruling Madzhlisul Shura’s Shariah Law Committee and the Shariah
Court, and designated him successor to ChRI president and former Soviet general Aslan Maskhadov.3
With Umarov’s declaration of the CE in October 2007,
the monopoly of the Salafist theo-ideology and its violent universal jihadism over the North Caucasus mujahedin was fully secured and institutionalized. The
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CE’s ideology is now precisely the same Salafist theoideology as that proselytized by AQ and other groups
in the global jihadi revolutionary alliance (global jihad) and movement.
The key elements of this theo-ideology are tawhid,
takfir, jihad, and martyrdom. These principles have
been elaborated upon in great detail by three successive CE Shariah Court qadis (judges or magistrates).
Of the three, it was the CE’s first Shariat Court qadi
“Seifullah” Anzor Astemirov, who most effectively
propagated the principles of tawhid and takfir. Astemirov, like many of the CE’s young generation of
leaders, studied Islam abroad in the late 1990s before turning to Salafism and jihadism. Appointed
by CE amir Umarov as the CE’s qadi in early 2008,
Astemirov founded the website, Islamdin.com, which
incorporated his library of foreign Salafi jihadi texts,
audiotapes, and videos.4 By then, Islamdin.com and
the other CE vilaiyats’ websites carried jihadi literature exclusively, including numerous translations of
the writings of leading radical Saudi, Egyptian, Iraqi,
and Pakistani jihadist theologians, ideologists, and
propagandists, including AQ’s Osama bin Laden and
Ayman al-Zawahiri;5 the American Yemeni-based AQ
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Anwar AlAwlaki; and, tens of others.6 CE sites now post Russian-language summaries and translations of editions
of and articles from AQ’s English-language journal Inspire and within days of bin Laden’s death published
at least 15 articles, announcements, and testimonials.7
Among the most prominent of the foreign jihadi
theo-ideologists who Astemirov featured on Islamdin.com was the Jordanian Sheikh Abu Muhammad
Asem al-Maqdisi. According to the United States
Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center
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(CTC) among others, Maqdisi is “the most influential
living Jihadi Theorist” and “the key contemporary
ideologue in the Jihadi intellectual universe,” and
his website Minbar al-Jihad wa’l-Tawhid is “al-Qa`ida’s
main online library” and “very representative of Jihadi literature.”8 Astemirov and Maqdisi struck up a
close student-mentor relationship of correspondence
and consultations that would cement the CE’s alliance
with AQ and the global jihadi revolutionary movement. Astemirov translated and generously cited
Maqdisi’s works. Astemirov’s key video lecture “On
Tawhid” was based on Maqdisi’s Millat Ibrahim (The
Religion of Abraham), both becoming staples on CE and
other jihadi websites.9 Maqdisi’s website began publishing articles about the CE, which were translated
into Russian and posted on CE sites.10 Maqdisi endorsed the CE in September 2009 as a fervent global
jihadi organization, praising Astemirov for his Islamic
knowledge.11 In September 2010 Maqdisi urged Muslims to support the CE, “so the Emirate becomes the
door to Eastern Europe.”12 Since then, the CE has entered Europe.
The theological elements of tawhid and takfir are
encoded in Shariah law on the basis of the Koran and
Sunna as interpreted by true (and self-selected) Salafi
leaders. They have profound political, economic, and
operational implications, since they define jihadists’
political ideology and goals and thereby their militarily strategy and tactics.13 Tawid, or strict monotheism,
requires that Muslims worship only Allah; even worship of, or prayers to the Prophet Mohammed are forbidden. This puts the CE’s ideology within the mainstream of global jihadism but decidedly at odds with
the North Caucasus’s chief Islamic tendency, Sufism,
which holds a prominent place for prayer to Sufi saints

5

and teachers, the creation of shrines at their graves,
and prayers to the Prophet Mohammed. Tawhidism’s
call to “raise the word” or “raise the religion of Allah
above all others” influences every aspect of the jihadi
theo-ideology and political philosophy. It renders
all other ideologies and identities—democracy, communism, socialism, nationalism, and class or ethnic
identity—to be sacrilegious. Its exclusivist focus on
the Deity’s will for guidance in all matters, presupposes the possibility that this will is made privy to the
movement’s leaders, opening the way to a totalitarian
monopoly over thought and power.
Much as international communism’s party of professional revolutionaries were afforded a vanguard
role in divining what was best for the proletariat,
under jihadist theo-ideology the power to interpret
Allah’s will devolves by default to a small coterie of
leaders (amirs), theologians (ulema and qadis), and
ideologists among the mujahedin, regarded as the
most devout and committed of the umma’s Muslims.
The special knowledge, faith, and commitment of the
mujahedin vanguard—the amirs and qadis—justify
their monopoly on the interpretation of the Koran and
Sunna. According to Astemirov and other jihadists,
the amirs, advised by Shariah court qadis, possess dictatorial powers to take unilateral decisions on the most
important questions, such as that taken by Umarov in
formation of the CE. The CE amir holds the ultimate
reins in a circular flow of power, as he appoints the
amirs and qadis for each of its largest substructures—
the CE vilaiyats (from the Arabic word “welaiyat” for
provinces or governates). The amir cannot be challenged on any decision unless he is deemed by a qadi
to have deviated from Shariah law as interpreted by
the qadi whom he has appointed.14 The qadis’ author-
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ity to advise and confirm the decisions of the amirs
gives them great power. CE and some vilaiyat qadis
have passed death sentences, some of which have
been carried out.15 Not surprisingly then, Astemirov
and other jihadi leaders regard democratic institutions and primary allegiance to country or nationality as major deviations from monotheism and thus
sacrilege, even manifestations of nonbelief. Similarly,
all other philosophies, allegiances or interests that intervene between the all-knowing amirs and qadis and
their interpretation of the holy texts are forbidden,
since they undermine Muslims’ unity in their fight
against nonbelief and, more to the point, undermine
their monopoly over interpretation of the Koran and
Sunna, the foundations of Shariah law. Thus, nationalism is rejected as a legitimate ideological basis and is
regarded as a manifestation of nonbelief, for it places
the religion of Islam below ethnicity.16
Among Salafists and jihadists violating the principle of tawhid by worshipping these false gods leads
to what is the second basic building block of the global
jihad’s and the CE’s theology, takfirism, a trend informed by an extremely exclusivist definition of what
constitutes true Islam and a real Muslim. The designation of takfir means the excommunication from the
Islamic religious community and is reserved for those
Muslims who are deemed to have violated fundamental tenets of Islam, such as tawhid, in accordance with
Salafist interpretation. Many takfirists hold that those
ruled apostates may be subject to the death penalty.
Given the extremist nature of their monotheism, tawhidists and jihadists have a low threshold in deciding
who should be designated takfir and subjected to the
harshest of penalties. For Astemirov and the CE, those
who help the Russian infidel and those who practice
Sufism are at risk of takfir denunciation.17
7

The iconoclastic nature of the battle between those
who observe the supposedly true Salafi version of Islam and those who do not, whether Muslim or infidel,
leads to the jihadist’s third main principle: a kinetic
rather than contemplative definition of jihad and an
offensive rather than defensive global jihadism. Rather than Islam’s traditional emphasis on the greater
jihad of the inner search for faith in Allah, takfirists
require that all Muslims support to the best of their
ability an Islamic war against nonbelievers, whether
Christian, Jew, Hindu, secularist or any other nonMuslim religion, as well as fallen Muslim apostates;
otherwise, they themselves can be subject to takfir and
be deemed targets of the jihad. The implication of takfirism is that the world is divided into two camps: the
takfiri jihadists and everyone else. The catholic nature
of this schism combines with the general trend toward
globalization fostered by technology to push Salafists
towards a global rather than a local vision of jihad.
Since neither ethnicity nor state borders can trump the
principle of raising Islam’s word above all others, the
jihad cannot be confined to specific regions or targeted attacks; it must be carried out globally. Given the
maximalist, sacred, and twilight nature of the struggle
between the abode of Islam and the abode of the infidel in the takfirist jihadis’ vision, the jihadists permit themselves rather extremist methods to maximize
their capacity to attain the goal. Using Islamic holy
texts’ frequent praise for martyrdom in battle with the
infidel during the early centuries of Islam’s expansion
across the Arabian Peninsula and beyond, jihadists
routinely proselytize, train, and deploy the ultimate
form of self-sacrificial martyrdom, (istishkhad)—that
is, suicide operations. The ability to offer one’s life for
the jihad is incontrovertible evidence of one’s purity

8

and closeness to Allah.18 The remainder of this chapter
demonstrates that all of these jihadi tenets have become part and parcel of the CE’s theo-ideology, behavior and aspirations.
The CE’s Goals and Strategic Vision.
The ChRI’s implicitly expanding pan-Caucasus
ambitions became explicit and institutionalized in October 2007 with Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov’s declaration of the CE.19 Umarov’s declaration of the CE
claimed not only domain over the entire North Caucasus from the Caspian to Black Seas, but it also included a declaration of jihad against the United States,
Great Britain, Israel, and any country fighting Muslims anywhere on the globe.20 The unilateral nature of
this decision, although prompted and supported by
both foreign jihadists and many North Caucasus mujahedin as well as by their Islamic texts, demonstrates
the totalitarian essence of the Salafi takfirism. In order to achieve their local emirate, Umarov divided the
Caucasus mujahedin into some five vilaiyats loosely
based along the territorial borders of Russia’s North
Caucasus republics: the Nokchicho (Chechnya) Vilaiyat (NV), the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV); the Galgaiche
Vilaiyat (GV) covering Ingushetia and North Ossetiya;
the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya, and Karachai (OVKBK) covering the republics of KabardinoBalkaria (KBR) and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; and, the
Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat (NSV) covering Krasnodar and
Stavropol Krais. Except for the NSV, which has never
been fully developed, each is headed by an amir with
similar dictatorial powers. The chief theo-ideological
figure is the vilaiyat’s shariah court qadi. Qadis sometimes are amirs simultaneously.
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In a May 2011 interview, Umarov again elaborated
on the CE’s expansive goals:
We consider the CE and Russia as a single theater of
war.
We are not in a hurry. The path has been chosen, we
know our tasks, and we will not turn back, Insha’Allah,
from this path. Today, the battlefield is not just Chechnya and the Caucasus Emirate, but also the whole [of]
Russia. The situation is visible to everybody who has
eyes. The Jihad is spreading, steadily and inevitably,
everywhere.
I have already mentioned that all those artificial
borders, administrative divisions, which the Taghut
drew, mean nothing to us. The days when we wanted
to secede and dreamed of building a small Chechen
Kuwait in the Caucasus are over. Now, when you tell
the young Mujahedeen about these stories, they are
surprised and want to understand how those plans
related to the Koran and the Sunnah.
Alhamdulillah! I sometimes think that Allah has
called these young people to the Jihad, so that we, the
older generation, could not stray from the right path.
Now we know that we should not be divided, and
must unite with our brothers in faith. We must reconquer Astrakhan, Idel-Ural, Siberia—these are indigenous Muslim lands. And then, God willing, we shall
deal with [the] Moscow District. 21

The evidence of the CE’s adoption of the global
jihad’s universal goals as its very own is overwhelming. Yet, most analysts and activists appear unaware
or unwilling to acknowledge the fact.22 Umarov has
repeatedly associated the CE with the global jihad,
from his announcement declaring the foundation of
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the CE and its jihad against anyone fighting against
Muslims anywhere across the globe to his most recent
February 2011 “Appeal to the Muslims of Egypt and
Tunisia.”23 For example, in October 2010, Umarov addressed the global jihad:
Today, I want to describe the situation in the world because, even if thousands of kilometers separate us, those
mujahedin who are carrying out Jihad in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Kashmir and many, many other places, they
are our brothers, and we today (with them) are insisting
on the laws of Allah on this earth.

He also noted that the CE mujahedin follow the
Afghani jihad closely by radio and Internet and that
the Taliban are “opposed by Christian-Zionist forces
led by America.” In traditional jihadi fashion, Umarov calls jihadism’s enemies “the army of Iblis” or the
“army of Satan,” uniting “the Americans, who today
confess Christian Zionism, and European atheists,
who do not confess any of the religions.” Iblis fight
so “there will be no abode for Islam (Dar as-Salam)”
anywhere on earth.24 A leading ideologist for the CE’s
Ingush mujahedin of its Galgaiche (Ingushetia) Vilaiyat, Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, laid out in detail the
connection between the CE’s prospective emirate and
the grander global caliphate:
In the near future we can assume that after the liberation of the Caucasus, Jihad will begin in Idel-Ural
and Western Siberia. And, of course we will be obligated to assist with all our strength in the liberation
of our brothers’ lands from the centuries-long infidel
yoke and in the establishment there of the laws of the
Ruler of the Worlds. It is also possible that our help
will be very much needed in Kazakhstan and Central
Asia, and Allah has ordered us to render it. And we,

11

Allah willing, will destroy the laws of the infidel on
the Central Asian lands in league with the mujahedin of Afghanistan. And it is impossible to forget our
brothers in the Crimea, which is also land occupied by
non-believers.25

The CE’s top qadi has put it more explicitly and
concisely: “We are doing everything possible to build
the Caliphate and prepare the ground for this to the
extent of our capabilities.”26
Domestic Strategy.
The CE issues few documents indicating their
strategy. However, some implicit strategic approaches can be sketched from some of its statements and
propaganda articles. Essentially, the CE is attempting
to create a revolutionary situation through the establishment of a credible, alternative claim on the sovereign right to rule in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia. This state-building political strategy
includes: (1) establishing a judicial system based on
Shariah courts and qadis; (2) enforcement of Shariah
law through attacks on owners, workers, and patrons
of gaming, prostitution, drinking, and alcohol-selling
establishments; (3) tax collection in the form of the Islamic tithe or zakyat to fund CE military, police, and
judicial functions; and, (4) a more expanded propaganda strategy focused exclusively on proselytizing
the Salafist theology and jihadist ideology by multiplying the number of CE-affiliated websites.27 Military
strategy compliments this political strategy, weakening the infidel state and regime by targeting state
institutions, officials, and personnel—civilian, police,
military, and intelligence alike.
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Creating a credible alternative sovereignty requires not simply weakening local branches of the
present Russian regime and state but also the federal government in Moscow and its affiliates across
the federation. Combined with the basic homeland
strategy focused on creating dual sovereignty in the
Caucasus, there is an effort to expand operations and
eventually more state-building efforts across Russia,
using concentrations of Muslim populations in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and elsewhere as platforms
from which the network could conceivably expand.
Thus, CE amir Umarov promised to liberate not just
Krasnodar Krai—part of its still very virtual Nogai
Steppe Vilaiyat—but also Astrakhan and the entire
Volga mega-region, which would include Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, and other predominantly Muslim
Tatar-populated regions in Russia’s Volga and Urals
Federal Districts.28 Simultaneously, attacks like those
on the Nevskii Express St. Petersburg-Moscow train
in November 2009, the Moscow subway system in
March 2010, and Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport in
January 2011 serve the purpose of terrorizing the Russian elite and population, creating political disunity,
and undermining the Russian will to fight for the region’s continued inclusion in the federation.
Operational Capacity and Tactics.
Although the CE is overlooked by most terrorism
or jihadism experts, its operational capacity puts the
North Caucasus a distant third among the world’s
various jihadi fronts behind the Afghanistan-Pakistan
(AfPak) theatre of AQ including the Taliban and their
numerous allies in the region, and Yemen. In recent
years, jihadi-related violence in the North Caucasus
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has outstripped that in Iraq. From late October 2007
through June 2011, CE mujahedin have carried out
or been involved in approximately 1,800 attacks and
violent incidents, with an increase in the number of
attacks/incidents each full year of the CE’s existence,
2008-10.29 Those 1,800 attacks have killed approximately 1,300 and wounded 2,100 state agents (civilian officials and military, intelligence, and police officials and personnel) and killed 300 and wounded
800 civilians, for a total of some 4,500 casualties.30 This
amounts to nearly two attacks/incidents and more
than three casualties per day. For comparison, for the
period 2008-10, there were 1,527 U.S./North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) troops killed and 9,703
U.S./NATO casualties in Afghanistan.31
Like its allies in the global jihadi revolutionary
movement, the CE has carried out spectacular and horridly effective attacks, in particular tens of istishkhad
operations—that is, suicide bombing operations. For
example, in November 2009, the CE, perhaps its Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs Brigade (RSMB), was behind
the bombing of the Moscow-St. Petersburg Nevskii Express high speed train, which killed 21 and wounded
74 civilians. The explosion of the train was followed
by a second as investigators arrived on the scene that
slightly wounded several officials. In April 2009 amir
Umarov announced after the CE’s traditional spring
planning shura that the CE had revived warlord and
notorious terrorist Shamil Basaev’s RSMB in 2008, and
that it had already carried out two operations, including the November 2008 suicide bombing of a bus in
Vladikavkaz, Ingushetia, that killed 14 and wounded
43 civilians.32 In June 2009, the notorious ethnic BuryatRussian Muslim convert Aleksandr Tikhomirov, a.k.a.
Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, masterminded the
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suicide bombing that severely wounded and nearly
killed Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov and
the August 2009 suicide bombing of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) district headquarters in Nazran
that killed 24 MVD servicemen and wounded approximately 260 people, including 11 children, on the very
day that Yevkurov returned to Ingushetia after months
of hospitalization. Based with the CE’s GV mujahedin
and RSMB, Buryatskii wrote prolifically about the importance of istishkhad operations and his preparation
with RSMB suicide bombers.33 The equally notorious
‘Seifullah Gubdenskii’ Magomedali Vagabov, CE DV
amir and CE qadi in 2010 until his demise in August
of that year, organized the double suicide bombing of
the Moscow Metropolitan subway in March 2010 that
killed 40 and wounded 101 civilians, including some
10 traveling foreigners. (Both Buryatskii and Vagabov
received Islamic education abroad before turning to
jihad; the former—in Egypt, Yemen and perhaps Saudi Arabia; the latter in Pakistan.) On amir Umarov’s
orders, the CE’s RSMB prepared and dispatched 20year old Ingush Magomed Yevloev from Ingushetia
to carry out the January 2011 suicide attack in the international terminal of Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport that killed 37 and wounded 180.34 In total, the CE
has carried out some 36 suicide attacks since CE amir
Umarov revived the RSMB: 1 in 2008, 16 in 2009, 14
in 2010, and 5 during the first 6 months of 2011. Istishkhad bombing operations are a distinct symptom
of the CE’s global jihadist theo-ideology and a symbol of its alliance with the global jihadi revolutionary
movement.
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THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE AND THE GLOBAL
JIHADI REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
The CE’s jihadization of the Chechen and North
Caucasus insurgency, in particular its alliance with
the global jihadi revolutionary movement, imparts it
strategic importance. The process of the Salafization
of the ChRI’s ranks was a long process and was driven
by both the external influence of jihadist groups and
the weak but nevertheless existing Salafist elements
in the North Caucasus. The connections between AQ
and the ChRI were common knowledge by the late
1990s among U.S. Government officials, intelligence
analysts, and terrorism experts.35 It was well-known
and well-documented as early as the mid-1990s, for
example, that the notorious Abu Ibn al-Khattab was
an AQ operative and fought in the North Caucasus.
The declassified Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA)
Swift Knight Report documents not just Khattab’s deep
involvement, but also that of AQ and Osama bin Laden personally with the ChRI in the mid-1990s.36
After the visit by Basaev and his ethnic Circassian
or Akhaz fighters to Afghanistan, other radical nationalist and Sufi Chechen and Caucasus leaders followed
with visits to bin Laden. An important but often overlooked DIA document details the results of some of
those visits occurring in 1997. Thus, “several times in
1997 in Afghanistan bin Laden met with representatives of Movlady (Movladi) Udugov’s party ‘Islamic
Way’ (Islamskii Put’) and representatives of Chechen
and Dagestani Wahhabites from Gudermes, Grozny,
and Karamakhi.”37 Udugov would become the chief
ideologist and propagandist for both the ChRI and
CE for a decade or more. The village of Karamakhi
would be the locus of one of the self-declared Salafi
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Islamic states that popped up intermittently in the late
1990s and the focal point of Khattab’s, Basaev’s, and
Bagautdin’s incursions and ultimate full-scale invasion of Dagestan in July and August 1999 that kicked
off the second post-Soviet Russo-Chechen war. The
result of this local-global nexus rooted in a common
theo-ideology, mutual training camps, and overlapping personnel was a gradual but significant spread
of Salafism and exclusionary takfirism among young
Muslims across the Caucasus, creating an unprecedented recruitment pool for both the local and global
jihads.
AQ and the Caucasus Islamic separatists agreed to
create a jihadist movement and insurgency across Russia with AQ supplying funding, training, and fighters
towards the goal of attacking Russians and Westerners. AQ money funded the establishment of training
camps in Chechnya and Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, a
steady supply of trainers for those camps, and fighters who spread out across Chechnya and the North
Caucasus bringing the message of Salfism and global
jihadism to the ChRI insurgents and their still very
few allies in other North Caucasus regions such as the
Republic of Dagestan and the Republic of KabardinoBalkaria (KBR).38 The DIA document details AQ’s
plans for the North Caucasus and Russia’s Muslims:
[R]adical Islamic (predominantly Sunni) regimes are
to be established and supported everywhere possible, including Bosnia, Albania, Chechnya, Dagestan,
the entire North Caucasus ”from sea to sea”, Central
Asian republics, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, all of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and the
states of the Persian Gulf. Terrorist activities are to be
conducted against Americans and Westerners, Israe-
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lis, Russians (predominantly Cossacks), Serbs, Chinese, Armenians, and disloyal Muslims. . . .
Special attention should be given to the Northern Caucasus, and especially Chechnya since they are regarded as areas unreachable by strikes from the West. The
intent is to create a newly developed base for training
terrorists. Amir Khattab and nine other militants of
Usam Ben (sic) Laden were sent there with passports
of Arab countries. They work as military instructors in
Khattab’s three schools; they also work as instructors
in the army of Chechnya. Two more schools are being
organized in Ingushetiya and Dagestan.39

“’Volunteers’ from ben Laden’s ‘charity societies’ from
Pakistan and Afghanistan” went to Chechnya and the
Northern Caucasus for a “new round of jihad against
Cossacks and Russia.”40
These AQ-affilitated “charity societies” ensured a
steady flow of AQ funds, Salafist Wahhabi literature,
and equipment to the region. The DIA’s Swift Knight
Report, as well as numerous trial transcripts, document
the support rendered by the AQ-affiliated Benevolent
International Foundation (BIF) and Al-Haramain to
the ChRI or at least its radical wing beginning in the
early 1990s.41 The U.S. criminal prosecution of BIF
for supporting terrorist activity reveals much about
the AQ-BIF-ChRI connection. AQ used BIF for “the
movement of money to fund its operations” and the
support of “persons trying to obtain chemical and
nuclear weapons on behalf of AQ,” and BIF funded
and supplied the Chechen separatist mujahedin before, during, and after the first Chechen-Russian war
before Moscow forced BIF to shut down its operations
in Russia.42 AQ ruling Majlisul Shura member Seif
al-Islam al-Masry was an officer in BIF’s Grozny of-
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fice, which moved to Ingushetia in 1998.43 A BIF officer “had direct dealings with representatives of the
Chechen mujahideen (guerrillas or freedom fighters)
as well as Hezb i Islami, a military group operating in
Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.”44 BIF’s work with Hezb
i Islami in Azerbaijan was likely related to AQ’s corridor to the North Caucasus noted in the DIA document. BIF worked to provide the Chechen mujahedin
with recruits, doctors, medicine, “money, an X-ray
machine, and anti-mine boots, among other things.”45
Beginning around 2000, the pro-Khattab and likely
AQ-backed website, Qoqaz.net (Qoqaz is Arabic for
Caucasus) sought funders and recruits for the Chechen
jihad. Qoqaz.net, Qoqaz.co.uk, Webstorage.com/~azzam,
and Waaqiah.com were created and supported by the
AQ-affiliated Azzam Publications run by Babar Ahmad, both based in London. Azzam Publications produced numerous video discs featuring the terrorist
attacks carried out by Khattab and Basaev as well as
other ChRI operations.46 According to the U.S. indictment of Ahmad, through Azzam he
provided, through the creation and use of various
internet websites, email communication, and other
means, expert advice and assistance, communications equipment, military items, currency, monetary
instruments, financial services, personnel designed
to recruit and assist the Chechen Mujahideen and the
Taliban, and raise funds for violent jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other places.”

Azzam’s web sites were created for communicating
with: (1) “members of the Taliban, Chechen Mujahideen, and associated groups;” (2) others “who sought
to support violent jihad” by providing “material support;” (3) individuals who wished to join these groups,
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“solicit donations,” and arrange money transfers; and,
(4) those who sought to purchase “videotapes depicting violent jihad in Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan,
and other lands of jihad, and the torture and killing
of captured Russian troops.” Videotapes, including
those eulogizing dead fighters, were intended to help
and indeed were used to solicit donations for the jihad
in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Ahmad also assisted
terrorists to secure temporary residence in London,
and to travel to Afghanistan and Chechnya in order to
participate in jihad. He also assisted terrorists in procuring “camouflage suits; global positioning system
(GPS) equipment; and, other materials and information.” Ahmad even put Shamil Basaev in touch with
an individual who had traveled to the United States
in order to raise money and purchase footwarmers for
the ChRI fighters.47
Documents found in BIF’s trash revealed that 42
percent of its budget was spent on Chechnya. During
a 4-month period in 2000, BIF funneled $685,000 to
Chechnya in 19 wire bank transfers through the Georgian Relief Association (GRA) in Tbilisi and various
BIF accounts across the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), according to Citibank records introduced to the court. The GRA was actually a BIF front
organization and was run by the brother of Chechen
field commander Chamsoudin Avraligov, who was
operating in AQ’s training camp in Georgia’s Pankisi
Gorge.48 Given that BIF was able to function in Russia
for nearly a decade, claims made by Russian officials
that AQ sent tens of millions of dollars to the North
Caucasus mujahedin are plausible. One expert claims
that AQ has funneled $25 million to the Chechen resistance including a one-time contribution in 2000 of
$2 million, four Stinger missiles, 700 plastic explosive
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packs amounting to over 350 kilograms, remote detonators, and medical supplies.49 Basaev acknowledged
in a 2004 interview receiving funds from international
Islamists “on a regular basis,” perhaps understating
the amount he received that year at some $20 thousand.50 Despite the crackdown on Saudi-sponsored
and AQ-tied foundations like the BIF and the deaths
of Khattab in 2003 and Basaev in 2006, both the ChRI
and then its successor organization the CE continued
to receive foreign funding from Middle Eastern contributions funneled through foreign and AQ-tied mujahedin through 2010.51
There were two principal figures involved in leading AQ’s work in Chechnya and the North Caucasus:
Khattab, who turned high-ranking ChRI warlord and
Prime Minister Shamil Basaev to Salafi global jihadism
and together with him ran training camps and numerous operations, and Abu Sayif, who headed the Saudi
BIFs office in Grozny before the second war and ran
communications and the transport of supplies, fighters, and funding from AQ to the Caucasus. Upon arriving in the Caucasus, Khattab linked up with Shamil
Basaev, a notorious terrorist in Chechnya, and married
the sister of Nadir Khachilaev, the leader of the Union
of the Muslims of Russia (Soyuz musul’man Rossii) and
an ethnic Lak from Dagestan.52 By so cementing his
connection to a pan-Russian Islamist organization and
to Dagestan, Khattab was clearly using a standard AQ
approach of imbedding into the local social fabric in
the service of highjacking local Muslim nationalist and
Islamic movements for the global jihadi movement.
Excluding Khattab, AQ operative Abu Sayif, who
worked in the Chechen Foreign Ministry under Movladi Udugov in the inter-war years, played the most
important role in developing AQ’s presence in Chech-
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nya and the North Caucasus. Sayif coordinated the
travel route, which was used to route volunteers and
drug trafficking, and Sayif and Khattab were the only
ones permitted to know the real names of the foreign
volunteers. A travel route from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Chechnya, via Azerbaijan and Turkey, was established. The first group of some 25 “Afghan Arabs”
arrived in Khattab’s Vedeno camp in June 1998. Some
were to pass through Tatarstan on their way to Central Asian Republics, where they were supposed to
create “Wahhabite and Taliban cells, spreading terror
against U.S., Russian, and other Western officials and
businessmen.”53 It is now common knowledge that the
lead perpetrator of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, Mohammed Atta, was on his way to Chechnya
when he was sent to Germany and later the United
States. Rohan Gunaratna claims that already by 1995,
there were some 300 Afghan Arabs fighting in Chechnya against the Russians. They were joined by mujahedin from Bosnia and Azerbaidzhan.54 Thus, there
were perhaps as many as 500 foreign fighters in the
North Caucasus on the eve of the Khattab-Basaev-led
invasion of Dagestan. Indeed, the nexus of Dagestan,
Karamakhi, bin Laden, and Khattab’s and Basaev’s
Chechnya training camps draws a straight line from
AQ in Afghanistan to the second post-Soviet RussoChechen war and the ChRI’s expansion of operations
across the North Caucasus.
Not only did AQ mujahedin fight in the North
Caucasus during the ChRI struggle but North Caucasus mujahedin fought on other fronts in the global
jihad during the same time frame. Two ethnic Kabardins from KBR were among eight ethnic Muslims
from regions both in the North Caucasus and Volga
area captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2001
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fighting among the Taliban and AQ and sent to the
Guantanamo Bay prison camp in 2002.55 A brief official CE biography of late Dagestani amir and CE
qadi Magomed Vagabov (a.k.a. Seifullah Gubdenskii)
shows that in 2001-02 some members of his Gubden
Jamaat went to Afghanistan after the rout of the joint
Chechen-Dagestani-foreign jihadi force that invaded
Dagestan in August 1999. Among those Gubden Jamaat members who went to Afghanistan was its then
amir Khabibullah, who became the amir of “a Russian-speaking jamaat of AQ.”56 More recently, some
members of the DV-tied cell, that was uncovered in
the Czech Republic and discussed below, were at one
time based in Germany and underwent training in Afghanistan and Pakistan.57 We also know that the Tatar
jihadi “Bulgar Jamaat,” made up mostly of ethnic Tatars who made the hijra from Russia and now based
in Waziristan, Pakistan, has declared jihad against
Russia and stated that it includes “Dagestanis, Russians, Kabardins” and has carried out operations in
Afghanistan.58
If one prefers to narrow the issue to Chechens, Bryan Glynn Williams claims that after extensive travel
across Afghanistan, he was unable to find evidence
that even one Chechen fighter ever fought there.59 But
there have been numerous reports of Chechens fighting not just in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq against
U.S. forces.60 In 2003, Indian police uncovered an AQ
cell led by a Chechen planning to assassinate Vice
Admiral V. J. Metzger, commander-in-chief of the
U.S. Seventh Fleet, forcing the admiral’s trip to India to be cancelled.61 Every officer and junior officer
with whom I have had the pleasure of speaking has
claimed that he encountered a Chechen presence in
both Afghanistan and Iraq. Almost all of these officers
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spoke some Russian. It is certainly true that some of
these testimonials are cases of mistaken identity, taking Russian-speaking Central Asians for Chechens.
But it simply strains credulity to believe that not a
single Chechen has fought in Afghanistan, when we
have seen that Americans, Germans, other Westerners, Central Asians, Tatars, Kabardins, and Dagestanis
have been there.
These are a few examples of CE ties to other fronts
in the global jihad. In the same month that the CE was
formed (October 2007), the Lebanese government arrested four Russian citizens, including three ethnic
North Caucasians (one from Dagestan), who were
charged with belonging to Fatah-el-Islam, fighting
in northern Lebanon that summer, and carrying out
terrorist attacks against Lebanese servicemen while
participating in an armed revolt in the Nahr el-Barid
Palestinian refugee camp. Along with 16 Palestinians,
they formed a Fatah cell.62 According to a recent report by Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee,
a Kabardin, who allegedly was recently fighting in
Lebanon, returned home and was killed in Nalchik.63
Thus, there have been some, but very few Chechen
or other North Caucasus mujahedin who have fought
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other fronts of the global
jihad. The Chechen and then Caucasus mujahedin’s
operational connections with, and influence on the
more central fronts of the global jihad are evident.
However, these connections are less than robust and
of limited strategic significance, with the caveat that
a small number of well-funded and capable terrorists
can do great damage, as we saw on 9/11. Neither the
ChRI nor the CE ever declared themselves AQ in the
Caucasus or North Caucasus. But the close ties that
developed between the ChRI and AQ beginning in the
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inter-war period meant that the ChRI units and camps
of foreign fighters and their local allies led by Khattab and Basaev became AQ’s de facto, unofficial North
Caucasus affiliate and a key, if relatively weak, front
in the global jihad. The AQ-tied foreign fighters, many
of whom settled down and even married in Chechnya
and other North Caucasus republics after the second
war, were in large part responsible for the growing
influence of jihadist ideologies in the region and fundamentally altered the nature of what began as a secessionist struggle for Chechen independence; this is
precisely what AQ had counted on when it infiltrated
the ChRI.
AQ’s intervention and the growing influence of the
global jihadi revolutionary movement led the radical
Chechen national separatist movement down a path
traversed by many such movements across the Muslim world in recent decades. In the Caucasus, especially Dagestan, they mixed with the very limited indigenous history of Salfism and significant contemporary
flood of young Caucasus Muslims to study abroad in
the Middle East and South Asia, on the one hand, and
of Wahhabi and other Salafi teachings from there to
the Caucasus through the Internet on the other. In the
18th and certainly by the 19th centuries, Salafism was
brought in from abroad by Caucasians like Mukhamad Al-Kuduki after travels in Egypt and Yemen introduced him to scholars like Salikh al-Yamani.64 The
revival of this relatively recent, if thin, Salafi Islamist
usable past, along with the national myths during the
perestroika and post-perestroika periods, yielded the
rehabilitation and of the 19th century imams and religious teachers who led the gazavats against Russian
rule teachers.65 But the nationalist ideas and cadres
were gradually displaced by jihadist elements, trans-
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forming the secular movement into a jihadist one. This
process was increasingly legitimized and gained momentum as Islamic elements were incorporated into
the ChRI proto-state and foreign Salafists, Wahabbis,
and other Islamic extremists continued to infiltrate
the movement throughout the 1990s and early 2000s,
bringing finances, guerrilla and terrorist training and,
most importantly, a new jihadist ideo-theological orientation. The Salafist historical myth and related historical figures served as models for some local Salafists, who played key roles in the ChRI’s incomplete
Islamization even before 2007.66
The combination of AQ and other foreign Salafi intervention, a usable indigenous Salafi historical myth,
and locals studying Islam abroad influenced a small
but highly motivated group of Islamist and ultimately
jihadist leaders across the North Caucasus. Beginning
in the early 1990s, thousands of Muslims from Russia traveled abroad to receive Islamic education in
Islamic schools which were experiencing the rise of
a significant global jihadi revolutionary movement.
They returned home with Wahhabist and other forms
of Salafist zeal for jihad and a strong sense of kinship
with radical Islamists and mujahedin in Afghanistan,
Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere. Three young, foreigneducated Muslims—”Sefullah” Anzor Astemirov,
Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii (Aleksandr Tikhomirov), and “Seifullah Gubdenskii” Magomedali
Vagabov—joined the ChRI’s jihadi wing or later the
CE and rose quickly up the CE’s ranks, driving its expanding jihad on three main fronts outside Chechnya:
Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KBR.
In the early 1990s, the foreign-educated Dagestani
Salafist Ahmad-Kadi Akhtaev taught the first important post-Soviet Dagestani jihadi theo-ideologists, Ma-
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gomed Tegaev and Bagautdin Magomedov (Kebedov),
and the two leading ethnic Kabard jihadists, Musa
Mukozhev and “Seifullah” Anzor Astemirov, both of
whom studied abroad as well. Astemirov would play
a key role in the formation of a small cadre of jihadi
fighters in the KBR, in Umarov’s decision to form the
CE and jettison the ChRI Chechen nationalist project,
and in the development of the CE’s relationship with
Jordanian Sheikh Maqdisi and thus the global jihadi
revolutionary movement. In the mid-1990s, as one of
the leading students at a madrassah run by the official
Muslim Spiritual Administration (DUM) of the KBR,
Astemirov was one among many sent by the DUM to
study Islam abroad in an unknown higher education
religious school in Saudi Arabia.67 This set him and
many other young Muslims from the KBR on the path
of Islamism and ultimately jihadism.68 In summer
2005 Mukozhev and Astemirov met with Basaev, and
they agreed that they would transform their Islamist
Jamaat of KBR into the ChRI North Caucasus Front’s
Kabardino-Balkaria Sector (KBS) on the condition that
Sadulaev and Basaev saw through to the end the formation of a pan-Caucasus jihadi organization like the
future CE based on a strict takfirist interpretation of
Shariah law. In addition to this and his abovementioned role as CE qadi, Astemirov’s organizational efforts as amir of the CE’s OVKBK resulted in its becoming the CE’s second most operationally active vilaiyat
in 2010, ahead of Chechnya’s NV and Ingushetia’s
GV.69
Sheikh Buryatskii is representative of an even
more disturbing transformation which shows that one
does not need to be a victim of Russian brutality and
bad governance or the product of the Caucasus traditions of martial violence and blood revenge to join the
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Caucasus jihad and that the jihadist theo-ideology is
by itself a substantial driver of jihadism in the region.
As his jihadi nom de guerre suggests, Buryatskii was
part ethnic Buryat, a Mongol and traditionally Buddhist ethnic group, and part ethnic Russian. Born as
Aleksandr Tikhomirov in 1982, he lived in far away
Ulan-Ude, the capitol of Russia’s republic of Buryatia. His mother was Russian and Orthodox Christian;
his father was an ethnic Buryat and Buddhist. 70 Buryatskii studied at a Buddhist datsan, but at age 15 he
converted to Islam. He moved to Moscow and then to
Bugurslan, Orenburg where he studied at the Sunni
madrasah, Rasul Akram. Buryatskii then studied
Arabic at the Saudi-supported Fajr language center
in 2002-05 before traveling to Egypt to study Islamic
theology at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University as well as
under several authoritative sheikhs in Egypt, Kuwait
and, according to Russian prosecutors, Saudi Arabia.71
Buryatskii himself reveals what his education in the
core of an umma plagued by global jihadi revolutionary ideology taught him:
At one time when I was in Egypt at the lecture of one
of the scholars, who openly said to us: “Do you really think that you can so simply spread the Allah’s
religion without the blood of martyrs?! The disciples
of Allah’s prophet spilt the blood of martyrs on many
lands, and Islam bloomed on their blood!”72

Running afoul of the Egypt’s secret services, Buryatskii returned to Russia.73 Buryatskii left for the Caucasus jihad in May 2008.74
Assigned by Umarov to the CE’s GV in Ingushetia,
the fervent Buryatskii became a recruiting draw. In
2009, Buryatskii was the CE’s main, if fatal, attraction
and its most effective propagandist and operative,
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showing shades of the charisma and ruthlessness for
which Shamil Basaev became infamous. His articles
detailing his mentoring of RSMB suicide bombers and
his video lectures propagandizing jihadism and the
importance of istshkhad drew new forces to the CE’s
once relatively quiet Ingush mujahedin. Buryatskii’s
activity was perhaps the main factor making the CE’s
GV the most operationally capacious of its vilaiyats in
2008-09, leading in the number of attacks both years.75
Thus, there is a direct line between Buryatskii’s Islamic conversion and study abroad to the explosion of
terrorism in Ingushetia during 2008-09. Buryatskii is
but one of several ethnic Russian and Slavic converts
to Islam from outside Russia’s Muslim republics who
have become prominent CE terrorists in recent years,
including Pavel Kosolapov, Vitalii Razdobudko, Maria Khorsheva, and Viktor Dvorakovskii.76
In contrast to Astemirov and Buryatskii, Vagabov
was influenced by Pakistani Salafism. After studying
Islam locally in Dagestan, he began to work with missionaries of the peaceful Pakistan-based international
Salafist sect Tabligh Jamaat in Dagestan. His native
Gubden District was declared the Tablighists’ center
for the call to the Tabligh in Russia. Vagabov then
traveled in 1994 to Raiwand, Pakistan, the center of
the Tabligh Jamaat movement, and studied there for
several months in a madrassah learning the Koran by
heart and receiving the diploma of a khafiz. Traveling
on to Karachi, he studied the fundamentals of Shariah
law apparently both at university and privately with
sheikhs and became an adherent of Salafism and the
writings of imam Abul Hasan Al-Ashari, Al-Ibana,
and Risalyatu ila Aglyu Sagr-Vibabil Abvab. Vagabov
returned home in 1997, opened the School of Khafiz
in Gubden to courses on the hadiths, and traveled to
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Chechnya where he met with Khattab and underwent
military training in the AQ-funded camps. He fought
for the Salafis, who declared an independent Islamic
state in Karamakhi and two other Dagestani villages
in 1998, and in the 1999 Khattab-Basaev invasion of
Dagestan that kicked off the second Chechen war.77 In
the 2000s, Vagabov rose up the ranks of the ChRI’s
Dagestani Front and then the CE’s DV. He played a
lead role in building up the DV’s dominant Central
Sector, which has made Dagestan the locus of the
highest number of attacks of any Russian region since
April 2010. Vagabov also organized the pivotal March
2010 Moscow subway suicide bombings carried out by
the respective wives of his predecessor and successor
as DV amir. In June 2010, Umarov appointed him as
the DV’s amir, and Astemirov’s successor as the CE’s
qadi.78 Vagabov’s biography draws a direct line from
the umma’s global jihadi revolutionary movement and
radical Pakistani madrassahs, mosques, and universities to the rise of the Dagestani jihad within the overall
CE and to terrorism in Moscow itself with the Moscow
subway bombing among others. Although Astemirov,
Vagabov, and Buryatskii were killed in 2010, by then
each had left their mark on the CE’s expansion across
the Caucasus and transformation into a viable jihadist
project allied with the global jihadi revolutionary alliance inspired by AQ and its takfirist theo-ideology.
As AQ and the global jihadi revolutionary alliance
have evolved into a more decentralized network of
jihadi groups, interacting increasingly for theo-ideological sustenance, funding, training, and operational
planning through the Internet rather than directly,
the CE integrated into the AQ’s wider network of
jihadi websites. In this way, it developed relationships with jihadi leaders and philosophers such as
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Maqdisi, mentioned earlier, and AQ in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and Anwar Al-Awlaki. The AQaffiliated website, Ansar al-Mujahideen (www.ansar1.
info/), is used to recruit fighters and raise funds for the
CE by those involved in the Belgian plot uncovered
last autumn and is closely linked to AQ. The Ansar
al-Mujahideen network is typically regarded as a selfstarted jihadi and pro-AQ site that helps propagandize and recruit for the global jihad and AQ.79 Ansar al
Mujahideen’s English-language forum’s (AMEF) leading personality was “Abu Risaas” Samir Khan until
mid-2010 when he turned up working with Awlaki in
AQAP.80 The Virginian Zachary Adam Chasser, alias
Abu Talhah al-Amriki, in prison for assisting the Somalian AQ affiliate Al-Shabaab, also participated in
AMEF.81 Ansar al Mujahideen’s German-language sister site is closely associated with the Global Islamic
Media Front (GIMF), which also has produced several
operatives arrested for involvement in AQ terrorism
plots.82 The Taliban has authorized the Ansar al-Mujahideen network as one of three entities that may publish its official statements, and Ansar al-Mujahideen’s
founder noted “we have brothers from Chechnya and
Dagestan.”83
In December 2010, Ansar al-Mujahideen announced
“the Start of a New Campaign in Support of the Caucasus Emirate,” signaling a request for fighters and
funds for the CE and emphasizing: “We ask Allah to
make this year a year of constant discord and increasing enmity for the enemies of the Islamic Emirate of
the Caucasus.” The announcement welcomed emerging signs of jihadism in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan,
asking Allah for “a new generation of scholars” to replace Astemirov, Buryatskii, and AQ operative Omar
al-Sayif, all mentioned by name.84 Ansar al-Mujahedeen
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soon partnered with Astemirov’s and the CE OVKBK’s
Islamdin.com to create a new Russian-language global
jihadi website (al-ansar.info) no later than July 2010.85
In August, the webmaster of Ansar al-Mujahideen, an
ethnic Moroccan named Faisal Errai, was arrested in
Spain. Spanish authorities also reported that the website was already raising money for terrorists in Chechnya and Afghanistan.86 The Russian-language Al-Ansar.info was set up to “highlight news summaries of
the Jihad on all fronts, both in the Caucasus and in
all other lands of the fight” and publish old and new
works of scholars of the “ahli sunny ual’ jama’a.” The
fact that it contains primarily Russian-language but
also English-language content suggests, along with
other factors, that AQAP’s Awlaki may be a driving
force behind the Ansar al-Mujahideen network of which
Al-Ansar.info is a part. Thus, Islamdin.com’s announcement of the joint project with the Ansar al-Mujahideen
network extensively quotes Awlaki (who otherwise
retains a high profile on CE sites) on the value of being a “jihadist of the internet.”87 Islamdin.com posted
the first part of Awlaki’s Al-Janna the day after this
announcement, and CE websites continue to post Awlaki’s works.88 With the CE tied into the global jihadi
revolutionary alliance and once again plugged into
the AQ-affiliated Internet network, it was just a matter
of time before it developed a more international role.
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS
The CE’s more expansive aspirations and growing ties with the global jihad revolutionary movement
have been accompanied by closer propaganda and operational ties to jihadists in other regions of Russia, the
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former Soviet Union, other fronts in the global jihad
and, per Maqdisi’s call, even Europe. Moreover, there
are even broader strategic implications impinging on
both international and U.S. national security.
To the Volga and Beyond.
Aside from the abovementioned train, subway,
and airport attacks in and around Moscow, the CE
is involved in several projects inside Russia far beyond the virtual emirate’s supposed borders. But the
CE also has plans to expand operations beyond Russia. Already in January 2006, Basaev warned that by
summer, the ChRI’s combat jamaat network would
“cross the Volga,” suggesting expansion to Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, and likely beyond.89 In June 2006, then
ChRI amir Umarov issued a decree creating Volga
and Urals Fronts, hoping to expand operations to
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and other ethnic Tatar and
Bashkir communities across Russia.90 Through 2009
there was much CE propaganda targeting Tatars and
Bashkirs but few jihadi deeds. A group called Islamic Jamaat was uncovered in 2007, but there was no
evidence that it had CE ties.91 Rather, the group may
have been the predecessor of the allegedly CE-tied
so-called Oktyabrskii Jamaat uncovered in 2010, both
of which could have been connected to the so-called
Uighur-Bulgar Jamaat (UBJ), which may be one and
the same as the abovementioned Bulgar Jamaat, fighting with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.92 The UBJ, like the Bulgar Jamaat, is Tatardominated and adheres to the ideology of resettling
in order to fight the infidel (at-Takfir Val Khidzhra).
Several alleged operatives from the UBJ were arrested
in Bashkortostan in August 2008 after a shootout with
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Bashkir police in Salavat, Bashkortostan. They went
on trial in April 2009 for allegedly planning terrorist
attacks in the republic. According to Bashkir authorities, the UBJ was founded by Bashkiriya native Pavel
Dorokhov, who underwent training in al-Qaeda and
Taliban camps.93
More recently, during 2010 and early 2011, several
arrests of alleged mujahedin with ties to the CE have
been made and the first apparent jihadi attacks occurred in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Astrakhan.94
This suggests that the CE may indeed be expanding
operations to these key Muslim communities. In addition, this past winter a group from Tatarstan and/or
Bashkortostan appealed to Umarov to recognize their
self-declared Idel-Ural Vilaiyat (IUV) and provide
financial and other assistance in setting up training
camps in the southern Ural Mountains and in organizing attacks.95 As of mid-summer 2011, there had been
no public response by Umarov, though clandestine assistance cannot be ruled out. The UBJ/Bulgar Jamaat
also could be playing a role in these possible efforts by
these Tatars and Bashkirs. Bringing Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Astrakhan would help form a bridgehead to Siberia, the Far East, and Central Asia. Gaining a foothold in ethnic Bashkir and especially Tatar
communities in these regions would vastly expand the
CE’s pool of potential recruits and geographical reach
into both Russia and Central Asia, since Tatar communities can be found in almost all of Russia’s provincial
capitals, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, and
in Central Asia. Expansion along these lines would
further tax Russian resources, already burdened by
massive federal subsidies to the North Caucasus. Although it is unlikely that the CE will achieve substantial progress in expanding to a permanent presence in
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the Volga, Urals, or Siberian regions, the ChRI’s and
CE’s record in expanding operations across the North
Caucasus argues against complacency. Few expected
that Ingushetia rather than Chechnya would be the
center of gravity of the jihadi in 2008 and 2009, or that
Dagestan and KBR would supersede both Vainakh
republics in the number of jihadi operations in 2010.
Even a small IUV enterprise could significantly complicate Moscow’s coordination problems, given some
creativity and modest resources on the part of the mujahedin.
More disturbing is the threat posed by the CE mujahedin to the 2014 Olympic Games to be held in the
North Caucasus resort city of Sochi, Krasnodar. The
area comes under the CE’s NSV, which is responsible
for Russia’s Krasnodar and Stavropol regions but it
has not demonstrated much of an existence no less capacity, with a caveat: Recent suicide operations, failed
and successful, have involved ethnic Russian Islamic
converts from Stavropol. The advantage that less conspicuous ethnic Russian mujahedin might offer in an
operation targeting Sochi raises red flags. These same
ethnic Russian mujahedin’s ties to the most capacious
of the CE’s vilaiyats, the DV, raise more concerns.96
Not only have the Dagestani mujahedin carried out
the highest number of operations each month since
April 2011, but the DV has also led in the number of
suicide bombings and created its own Riyadus Salikhiin Jamaat (RSJ).97 In August 2010, Dagestani mujahedin issued an explicit promise of “operations in
Sochi and across Russia and more ‘surprises’ from the
horror of which you will blacken.”98 The CE’s OVKBK
mujahedin also might be involved in an attack on the
Sochi Games. Its field of operations, the republics of
KBR and lesser so Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (KChR),
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are geographically closer to Sochi than is Dagestan.99
In February 2011, the OVKBK carried out a series coordinated attacks against the winter ski resort area
around Mt. Elbrus. The entire operation resembled
a training operation for an attack on Sochi, and the
OVKBK warned it would continue to fight infidel Russian development efforts and international culture in
the region.100 Thus, CE plans for Sochi could include
a joint DV-OVKBK operation or separate ones by the
DV and OVKBK with built-in redundancy, utilizing
ethnic Russian suicide bombers. The possibility that
the CE might strike at the Sochi Games, an international target, is strengthened by its active support for
the global jihadi revolutionary alliance’s goals.
The Eurasian Horizon.
There already are connections between the CE
and other post-Soviet jihadists. At the most general
level, mujahedin from Central Asian states, Azerbaijan, and even Georgia, have turned up among the CE
mujahedin, but the reverse has not been true, putting
aside the CE’s use of Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge as a rear
base. The CE has declared not only all Muslim lands
in Russia, but also the entire Caucasus as its rightful
domain.101 In the Caucasus writ large, Azerbaijan, bordering and having some ethnic and Islamic overlap
with Dagestan, the present spearhead of the CE’s activity, is most vulnerable to CE penetration. Its Islamic
population includes nationalities such as the Lezgins,
who straddle the Azerbaijani-Dagestan border and are
an important nationality in Dagestan. As noted above,
the ChRI, AQ, and its affiliated charity societies used
Azerbaijan as a transit point for funneling funds, cadres, and weapons to Chechnya in the 1990s. The CE also
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seems to be taking note. Recent incursions south by
likely CE mujahedin into northern Azerbaijan as well
as jihadist activity in Baku suggest mujahedin could
threaten this strategically important state.102 Recently,
the DV added an Azerbaijan Jamaat with unidentified
locale and goals.103 The CE’s capacious vanguard DV
puts Umarov within striking range of international
and U.S. interests in Azerbaijan such as oil company
headquarters, refineries, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline carrying oil to Europe. Clearly, a CE or other
significant jihadi presence in Azerbaijan would have
security implications for the entire Transcaucasus and
the Persian Gulf region.
The bad blood between Moscow and Tbilisi created
by the 2008 Georgian-Russian 5-day war is beginning
to influence the situation in the North Caucasus. To
be sure, there is little evidence of the ethno-nationalist
mobilizational effect on Russia’s Circassian nationalities that many predicted would be a result of Russia’s
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia. However, Georgia has been speculating on the situation in
the region, especially the Circassian genocide issue,
as the Sochi Olympics approach. It has opened up a
television and radio company that broadcasts propaganda to the region, waived visa requirements for
North Caucasus residents, and adopted a parliamentary resolution calling for a boycott of the Sochi Olympics and Russian and international recognition of the
Russians’ rout and partially forced exile of Circassians
in the 1860s as a genocide. Some Georgian opposition
figures and one former U.S. official claim that President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government is providing
financial and training assistance to the CE.104 Georgia’s policies could radicalize some Circassians and
thus improve the CE OVKBK’s and NSV’s prospects
for recruitment.
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Consistent with the interrelated goals of recreating
the caliphate and extending the CE through the Volga
and southern Urals regions as a bridge to Central Asia,
the CE maintains relations with Central Asian jihadi
organizations tied to AQ and the Taliban in AfPak
such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
and the IMU splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union
(IJU). Both the IMU and IJU have fighters in Afghanistan, train in Pakistan, and fight in both as well as in
Central Asia. In a May 2007 statement, IJU amir Ebu
Yahya Muhammad Fatih stated that the IJU had “also
been working on our common targets together with
Caucasian mujahedeens.”105 In March 2011, the IJU’s
media department, Badr At-Tawhid, sent a 7-minute
video message to the CE mujahedin from the IJU’s
amirs in the “land of Horosan,” Afghanistan.106 It
praised the CE mujahedin for joining the global jihad
and noted: “In our jamaat, there are many brothers
who were trained or fought on the lands of the Caucasus Emirate.”107 The CE DV cell uncovered in the Czech
Republic discussed below could have been training
with the IJU or IMU. CE websites regularly cover and
provide at least propaganda support to Central Asia’s
leading jihadi organizations, including the IMU and
IJU. Thus, the CE reported extensively on the series of
suicide, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ambush attacks and skirmishes carried out by the IMU,
IJU, and/or a possible subunit thereof, the “Jamaat
‘Ansarullah’ in Tajikistan,” during autumn 2010 in
Hujand, Sogdo Oblast’ and elsewhere in Tajikistan.108
The CE Ingush GV’s website Hunafa.com, founded by Buryatskii, has shown a special interest in the
emergence of jihadism in Kazakhstan, carrying propaganda materials from a Kazakhstan jihadi jamaat
“Ansaru-d-din,” calling Kazakhstan’s Muslims to
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jihad and a fatwa issued by Sheikh Abul-Mundhir
Al-Shinkiti, asserting the Shariah legality of attacking
police and fighting jihad in Kazkahstan, even though
the Muslims there are weak and small in number.109
It is unclear whether the CE, GV independently, or
Absaru-d-din played a role in recent bombings and attacks on police this year.110 The CE’s main website Kavkaz tsentr also reported in March 2011 the bayat to the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammad
Omar Mujahid, the Islamic group taken by a group of
Kyrgyzstan mujahedin, Jaish Jamaat al-Mahdi (Amirul-Mu’minin), and their call to the Kyrgyz to take up
jihad.111
Thinking Globally: The CE and Jihad in Europe.
The CE’s rabid anti-infidelism is not new; the ChRI’s
websites were replete with anti-Western, anti-Semitic,
and anti-American articulations as far back as 2005.112
The CE’s growing ties with AQ and the global jihadi
revolutionary alliance produced in 2010 what appears
to have been the first CE-tied activity in Europe: the
plot by “Shariah4Belgium” broken up in November
2010, and the DV-tied Czech cell uncovered in April
2011. On November 23, 11 suspects tied to the jihadi
Shariah4Belgium group were arrested in Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Morocco, and Saudi
Arabia on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks in Belgium, recruiting “jihadist candidates” and financing
the CE. Earlier in 2010, Shariah4Belgium leader Abou
Imran declared that the White House would “be conquered,” and “Europe will be dominated by Islam.”113
The Belgian-based detainees included six Moroccan
Belgian citizens detained in Antwerp, three Moroccan
Belgian citizens arrested in the Netherlands, and two

39

Chechens apprehended in the German city of Aachen
near the Belgian border 114 All the suspects held dual
citizenship and belonged to the Antwerp-based Shariah4Belgium.115 Belgian police said the Shariah4Belgium cell had ties to a local Islamic Center and had
been under investigation since at least 2009. One of
the Russian nationals was a 31-year-old “Chechen” arrested in Aachen, Germany, under a European arrest
warrant issued by Belgium who was suspected of having recruited young people to fight in Chechnya. All
the detainees, including the two Chechens, were said
to have been involved in both recruiting and financing for the CE and planning attacks in Belgium 116 A
third Chechen supporter of Doku Umarov allegedly
involved in the Shariah4Belgium plot was arrested on
December 1 at Vienna’s Schwechat airport on the basis
of one of nine international arrest warrants issued by
the Belgian government.117 The 32-year old Aslambek
I., as he was identified by the authorities, was detained
upon his return from the hajj to Mecca in connection
with an international plot to attack “a NATO facility
in Belgium.”118 Aslambek I. reportedly lived in the
Austrian town of Neunkirchen with this family and
was planning to bomb a train carrying NATO troops.
Earlier, he reportedly lost both his hands in a grenade
attack in Chechnya and had been arrested in Sweden
for smuggling weapons, was released, and then left
for Mecca 119
It remains unclear whether this CE-connected plot
was part of the reported AQ plan to carry out a series
of Christmas terrorist attacks in the United States and
Europe last holiday season. 120 Besides the Chechen origins of three members of the Belguim4Shariah cell and
their assistance to the CE, there was other evidence
of the plot’s connection simultaneously to the CE,
.

.

.

.

40

AQ, and the global jihad. On June 20, the OVKBK’s
Islamdin.com posted an appeal from Belgian Muslims
to Maqdisi, underscoring once again the way in which
the CE’s tie to Maqdisi unites it with the larger global
jihadi revolution.121 More significantly, the arrested
Shariah4Belgium suspects were said to have been using the jihadi website Ansar al-Mujahidin in carrying
out their activity.122 As noted above, the CE OVKBK’s
Islamdin.com co-sponsored with Ansar al-Mujahidin the
Russian-language forum Al-Ansar.info.
In April 2011, counterterrorism officials in the
Czech Republic uncovered an international cell in
Bohemia connected to the CE’s DV. According to the
chief of the Czech Unit for Combating Organized
Crime (UOOZ) Robert Slachta, the group included
one Chechen, two or three Dagestanis, two or three
Moldovans, and two Bulgarians, who are accused
variously of weapons possession, document falsification, financing and supplying terrorist organizations,
specifically the DV’s new members, with weapons
and explosives.123 Documents relating to the Dagestan
mujahedin in both Arabic and Russian were found
during the arrests. The apartment of the Chechen
involved in the Czech cell was reported to have contained significant quantities of arms and ammunition.
Six of the eight accused were arrested in the Czech
Republic, with two members still at large in Germany.
There was also an unidentified ninth member. Profits made from the falsification of passports and other
documents were sent to Dagestan as were weapons
and explosives purchased by the cell. None of those
arrested were suspected of planning terrorist attacks
in the Czech Republic.124 However, one press report
claimed that the Bulgarian members of the group were
involved in planning terrorist attacks in unidentified
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other states.125 In June 2011, two more unidentified
Russian citizens were arrested in Germany engaging
in the same activity for the DV and perhaps working
with the abovementioned DV Czech cell.126 The CEand DV-tied Czech Republic cell represents global jihadi thinking and suggests the CE and its DV as clear
and present dangers to the Sochi Games.
On July 5, 2010, French police and security carried
out a counterterrorism operation arresting five Chechens, three men aged 21 to 36, and two women, in several districts across the city of Le Mans. One of the
three males was described as an imam and father of
five. Reportedly, French counterterrorism was tipped
off by Russian security after they arrested a Chechen
citizen in Moscow in possession of weapons, explosives, plans for making bombs, and a residence permit issued by France’s Prefecture de la Sarthe. Russian investigators also discovered that the wife of the
arrested Chechen lives in Le Mans. The three males
were arraigned on July 9 and charged on suspicion of
“criminal association in relation with a terrorist enterprise.”127 The CE also could be connected directly or
indirectly to several Chechens arrested individually
in Europe in recent years; for example Lors Doukaev,
who was sentenced in May 2011 to 12 years in prison
for planning an attack on the offices of the newspaper
Jyllands-Posten, which published the famous 12 caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005.128 In sum, the
CE and perhaps lone wolf terrorists inspired by it are
posing a new threat to Europe and the West.
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Potential Threats to U.S. Interests.
The CE also poses a potential threat to U.S. interests
and citizens, if not the homeland. It may be significant
that both the Nevskii Express and Domodedovo Airport attacks targeted transport infrastructure where
foreigners, in particular Americans, are often present.
The potential threat to U.S. interests and even personnel is suggested by the Nevskii Express attack. The
Moscow-St. Petersburg rail route is located within 100
miles of the northern stretch of the Northern Distribution Route (NDR) supplying U.S. and NATO troops in
Afghanistan. Beginning in Latvia, it traverses through
northeast Russia on its way to Central Asia and Afghanistan. If the Shariah4Belgium plot was intended
to target NATO transport, then a similar project to
one that would target the NDR has already been on
the CE-tied jihadists’ agenda. Finally, aside from the
numerous propaganda attacks on the U.S. extant on
CE websites, in 2010 two sites taken together thrice
published the infamous al-Fahd fatwa calling for the
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against
the Americans.129 To be sure, in contrast to the ChRI,
there is only limited evidence to suggest that CE operatives intend or have attempted to acquire chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear materials.130 However, the CE’s jihadization and the al-Fahd posting
suggest a theo-ideological orientation that could so
incline CE operatives to employ such tactics, and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Aleksandr
Bortnikov’s claim in June 2010 that terrorists continue
to “attempt to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical components” across the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) underscores the point.131
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RUSSIAN COUNTER-JIHADISM POLICY
How is Moscow dealing with the CE insurgency
and its alliance with the global jihad? It must be noted
that the derision that many in the West devoted to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims that Russia was
dealing with international terrorism was misplaced.
Putin was exaggerating his claim but not inventing it
out of whole cloth, as the discussion above of AQ’s
ties to those ChRI elements involved in the 1999 invasion of Dagestan clearly shows. There is probably
some truth to the assumption that Putin’s claim was
intended to serve as a justification for Russia’s heavyhanded tactics in dealing with the ChRI and CE. Russian military, police, and special security forces have
committed and, to a much lesser degree, continue to
commit atrocities. However, the last few years have
seen a considerable shift in the Russian strategy and
tactics to include more elements of soft power in its
overlapping counterinsurgency and counterterrorism,
including attempts to combat jihadism theo-ideologically and through greater investment in the socioeconomic development of the North Caucasus.
Federal Policy.
Already during Putin’s second term, there was a
shift to include nonmilitary means: (1) better intelligence gathering and dissemination and better interoperational coordination among the siloviki with the
creation of federal and regional anti-terrorism committees for searching out and destroying CE amirs
and operatives; (2) the removal from office of the oldest, longest-serving, and most odious of the North
Caucasus republics’ presidents, with the exception of
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Chechenya’s Ramzan Kadyrov and Ingushetia’s Murat Zyazikov; and, (3) “draining the pond” of mujahedin through a fourth amnesty in 2006 which brought
in 600 mujahedin from the forest.132 Russian security
and local police forces have become quite efficient at
eliminating top CE leaders, with the exception of CE
amir Umarov.133 On June 9, 2009, the FSB managed for
the first time to capture rather than kill a major CE
amir, the CE’s military amir, and the CE GV’s amir and
vali “Magas” Ali Taziyev (a.k.a. Akhmed Yevloyev).
His capture likely led to actionable intelligence that
has facilitated many of the increasing number of CE
amirs killed since then. Also during his second term,
Putin undertook a massive reconstruction effort for
Chechnya, which after years of slow progress finally
achieved considerable results. Groznyi has been almost completely rebuilt, and Chechnya’s second city,
Gudermes, is also making progress. The reconstruction efforts provided some employment for Chechen
youth, but unemployment remains high, and Kadyrov
has been criticized for funneling work to his Benoi and
political clans. Putin-era anti-extremism laws remain
in force and far too broad, allowing Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and FSB operatives to apply them
occasionally against journalists, moderate Muslims,
and certain Islamic texts.
Under the Medvdev presidency, Russia has moved
further in complimenting hard power with a robust
soft power component in attempting to tackle jihadism in the Caucasus. In his first annual presidential
address to Russia’s Federal Assembly in November
2009, President Dmitry Medvedev called the North
Caucasus Russia’s “most serious domestic political
problem” and announced a federal program to invest
800 billion rubles in Ingushetia, which since the sum-
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mer of 2007 had been the center of gravity of the jihad,
with the largest number of CE attacks of any North
Caucasus region.134 Medvedev also fired the extremely
unpopular, incompetent, and violence-prone Ingushetiyan president Murat Zyazikov, who, largely on
the strength of his FSB career, had been ensconced in
power by Putin through a series of electoral manipulations. Under Zyazikov, Ingushetia saw abductions
skyrocket, with many suspecting Zyazikov’s cousin,
who headed the security forces, of organizing the abductions. The final straw for Zyazikov came when Ingushetia’s top opposition leader Magomed Yevloyev
was shot while in the custody of the Ingushetia’s MVD
chief, after arguing with Zyazikov on a plane flight
in August 2008. Zyazikov’s removal and the security
forces’ killing of Buryatskii and GV amir Taziyev were
followed since March 2010 by a fall both in attacks by
the CE and abductions in the republic. Medvedev’s
federal assistance program for Ingushetia has made it
since 2009 the most highly subsidized region in Russia, with 91 percent of the republic’s budget being
federally funded. From 2008 to 2010, expenditures increased for sectors crucial to socioeconomic development and jobs: by 282 percent for housing, 110 percent
for economic development, 103 percent for education,
with slightly lower increases for state agency expenditures, culture, health, and sport.135
Medvedev also moved to increase, better target,
and ensure proper use of funding for the North Caucasus as a whole by creating the North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO) and appointing as its presidential
envoy and as federal government deputy premier,
the former businessman and Krasoyarsk Governor
Aleksandr Khloponin. It is planned to fold the federal
targeted programs for the North Caucasus, Chechnya,
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and Ingushetia into a single program, with one-third
of the unified program designated for the most jihadplagued republic, Dagestan.136 Medvedev’s June 2011
proposal to decentralize aspects of government to the
regions and municipalities appears to be dictated in
part by the situation in the North Caucasus, as SKFO
envoy Khloponin has been assigned to draft the details
for the decentralization of interbudgetary relations
along with his fellow vice premier Dmitrii Kozak.137
Since 2008, federal expenditures have increased in all
the SKFO’s regions, except for Chechnya. This has led
to some modest economic growth for the SKFO as a
whole, with some republics’ economic growth outpacing the federal average. However, unemployment remains high, especially youth unemployment.138
In line with Medvedev’s overall liberalization
policies and his turn to more use of soft power in the
North Caucasus, Prime Minister Putin announced a
radical departure in Kremlin policy in the Caucasus,
unveiling an ambitious economic development program for the region that was long overdue. He also
called for the North Caucasus governments to open
up in order to attract private investment, to pay more
attention to the views of human rights activists, to encourage the development of civil society, and to air
more federal broadcasts offering “objective and honest stories about life in the North Caucasus” and not an
“artificially” drawn “soft and pleasing picture.” The
new development strategy detailed in Putin’s speech
is to integrate the North Caucasus into the Russian
and global economies and to create 400,000 new jobs
in the region by 2020 by: (1) plugging the region into
the international North-South transit corridor linking
Russia and Europe with Central Asian and Gulf states;
(2) organizing several major public works and con-
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struction projects toward that end, to include building
a major oil refinery in Chechnya’s capital; (3) creating a modern tourism industry including a system of
ski and other recreational resorts; and, (4) increasing
North Caucasians’ access to university education.139
Specifically, these goals are to be achieved by
building a network of highways, renovating airports,
and developing energy projects and recreation resort
areas across the region. The construction and resulting
resort-related businesses will help solve the region’s
unemployment problem. The government is already
constructing highways around and between cities
such as Mozdok in Republic of Ingushetia, Nalchik
(the capital of the KBR), and Stavropol (capital of Stavropol Krai or Territory). A highway is being designed
for Chechnya’s second largest city, Gudermes, and another for Beslan, North Ossetia, will be commissioned
by 2015. Another approximately 150-kilometer highway will link Cherkassk with Sukhum, the capital of
Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia, through
a six-kilometer tunnel to be constructed through
the mountains. The airports in Magas (Ingushetia),
Beslan, and Stavropol’s Shpakovskoye and Mineralny Vody airports will be modernized. In the field of
energy, he announced new hydroelectricity projects
for the mountainous region and the construction of
a Rosneft oil refinery in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny,
to be commissioned in 2014. The total sum of investments for these anticipated economic projects will be
3.4 trillion rubles, according to Putin. The government
is ready to cover risk for private investors guaranteeing up to 70 percent of project costs. The government
will choose investors and distribute money through
a new North Caucasian branch of Russia’s Development Bank. This year, three federal programs—one
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for the entire region and one each for Chechnya and
Ingushetia—will invest 20 billion rubles (some $700
million) in social and economic development projects
in the North Caucasus. Putin also announced plans
to develop the education infrastructure in the North
Caucasus. A new proposal is to require that Russia’s
leading universities admit 1,300 students from North
Caucasian republics annually. A project to build one
of the eight federal universities in the North Caucasian District was announced in January.140
Putin also proposed “alpine skiing, ethnographic,
or family” tourism. Specifically, he proposed creating
a network of ski resorts across the region stretching
from the Caspian to Black Seas building on the Elbrus
ski resort in KBR. Mt. Elbrus is the highest mountain in
Europe. This resort area was targeted by the OVKBK in
February 2011, which issued an explicit statement that
it would fight to prevent any resort development and
keep out Russian and foreign infidel influence.141 The
planned tourism cluster will include resorts in Dagestan, North Ossetia, KBR, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and
Adygeya. The resorts should accommodate 100,000
tourists and create 160,000 jobs. Putin also announced
plans to upgrade the Mineralnyi Vody hot springs
and spa resort in Stavropol into a “hi-tech resort” and
the nucleus of the healthcare and tourism industries of
the region. He promised eight billion rubles in investments to kick start the tourism industry component
of the development strategy.142 At the June 2011 St.
Petersburg International Economic Forum, Medvedev
endorsed Khloponin’s additional proposal to attract
foreign direct investment of some 300 billion rubles
on the basis of a 60 billion rubles initial investment to
lay down infrastructure in the first 4 years followed
by 240 billion rubles in tax breaks and investment.143
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Credit Suisse and the United Arab Republic’s (UAR)
Abu Dhabi Investment Company (Invest AD) have already declared their readiness to invest in the project.
Included among these plans is the KBR’s 2008 plan for
five major investment projects that would be able to
entertain 25,000 visitors at any one time and provide
20,000 jobs. In 2009 the South Korean company Hanok and Russia’s Olimp agreed to invest 600 million
euros in Elbrus to build 300 kilometers of trails, eight
lifts totaling 100 kilometers, a skating rink, hotel, and
sports complexes.144 Following a joint statement on development of the North Caucasus by President Medvedev and French leader Nicolas Sarkozy during the
G8 summit in Deauville, France’s Caisse des Depots et
Consignations holding company signed an investment
agreement at the June 2011 St. Petersburg Economic
Forum.145
Local Policy.
Each Muslim republic where the CE has a permanent network—Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and
the KBR—has its own style and counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism (anti-jihadism) policies. Under
Ramzan Kadyrov’s brutal rule, Chechnya maintains
the harshest regime, while Ingushetia and the KBR
have taken a softer line with the arrival of new presidents, and Dagestan falls in the middle between Ramzan Kadyrov’s harsh rule and the more conciliatory
line in Ingushetia and the KBR. Kadyrov has made
some gains in reducing insurgent and terrorist activity in Chechnya, which by 2010 was the least active
of the CE’s four main vilaiyats in terms of the number of jihadi attacks and related casualties. This result
has been achieved through a mixture of the carrot and
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the stick, with a clear emphasis on the latter but with
far less violence than that inflicted by the mujahedin.
Localized counterterrorist operations are carried out
ruthlessly, on occasion with casualties among civilians
or innocent family members of mujahedin. Abductions, though fewer and sometimes driven by blood
revenge rather than jihad-related problems, continue
at a somewhat lower level in several of the Caucasus
republics. Kadyrov’s policy towards the families of
mujahedin differs significantly from that of his North
Caucasus counterparts. The families of known or suspected mujahedin are often harassed, detained, and
beaten, and their homes are occasionally demolished.
Such policies negate any progress Kadyrov has made
in the battle for “hearts and minds” by attempting to
co-opt the banner of Islam claimed by the CE. This cooptation effort has been built around the construction
of Europe’s largest mosque and an Islamic university
and moderately enforcing some Islamic holidays and
customs, including restrictions on female dress. At the
same time, Kadyrov, like his Caucasus counterparts,
has supported the traditional Sufi clerics under theoideological and physical attack from the takfirist mujahedin, and he has tried to enlist clerics in efforts to
counter the CE’s increasingly sophisticated and effective propaganda.
Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov has
employed a very different policy—the most liberal
policy of any North Caucasus leader—initiating a sea
change from Zyazikov’s brutal regime and showing
enormous courage in the process. Upon assuming
office in 2008, he reached out to the nationalist and
democratic opposition, offering them positions in his
government, and created an advisory body of societal
and opposition organizations. Yevkurov also moved
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aggressively to talk young Muslims out of joining the
jihad and into leaving it, working with families, councils of village elders, and teip or clan councils.146 According to Yevkurov, 16 mujahedin were convinced
to turn themselves in during 2009 and 36 in 2010, and
there were only 15 mujahedin active in the republic by
early 2010.147 In some cases, the courts applied no punishment to those who surrendered, and many were
provided work or education.148
Yevkurov was targeted by Buryatskii in a car
bomb assassination attempt in June 2009 that left the
Ingush President severely wounded. Nevertheless, after rehabilitation, Yevkurov returned to work within
2 months, publicly forgave his attackers, and continued to work with families of mujahedin to convince
them to leave the jihad. In February 2010, Yevkurov
reiterated the cornerstone of his anti-jihadism policy
of “showing good will towards those who have deviated from the law” and even offered mujahedin an
amnesty of sorts, promising that if mujahedin turned
themselves in, they would receive soft sentences and
would be eased back into society:
Today a unique opportunity has been created, and a
chance to become a fully engaged citizen of society included in the process of the economic rebirth of our
Ingushetia, applying your strength and knowledge in
creative places of work and showing yourselves favorably in any of the spheres of social and public political
life, is still being preserved for each of you [mujahedin].149

Two days after Buryatskii’s demise in March 2010,
Yevkurov met with the relatives of those who had
sheltered Buryatskii and the other mujahedin who
were planning a major terrorist attack in Ingushetia.
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Yevkurov told these families and, by extension, all
Ingushetia’s families, that they should know who is
coming into their homes. He added that the authorities would continue his policy of trying to persuade
mujahedin to abandon jihad, but that the security infrastructure would go into action for those who could
not be persuaded.150 Similarly, Yevkurov has led in
reducing violent outcomes of the notoriously violent
Caucasus tradition of blood feuds that contribute to
both jihadi and non-jihadi violence in the region. In
a 2-year period, the Ingush authorities reconciled 150
families, according to Yevkurov, in part by raising the
ransom for resolving them from 100 thousand rubles
to one million rubles.151
Compared to his colleagues in the North Caucasus,
which is plagued more by corruption than any other
region, Yevkurov has carried out the most aggressive
anti-corruption campaign. Greater social expenditures
and economic investment plus Yevkurov’s struggle
against corruption and clean bookkeeping is improving the situation, but slowly. Yevkurov policies have
allowed Ingushetia to double its revenues from 810
million rubles in 2008 to 1.744 billion rubles in 2010!152
This is not to say that Yevkurov has ignored the stick.
In early January, rumors claimed that Yevkurov had
requested 20 units of additional military intelligence
(GRU) forces for the republic.153 However, whereas
Kadyrov has overemphasized the “stick” of hard
power, Yevkurov has heavily favored the “carrot” of
soft power. Yevkurov’s policies have corresponded
with a significant decline in the number of attacks in
Ingushetia, according to my own estimates, from some
138 in 2008 and 175 in 2009, to only 99 in 2010 and approximately 40 in the first 6 months of 2011.154 However, it remains unclear whether Yevkurov’s policies
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are responsible for the decline, factoring in the killing
of Buryatskii and the capture of CE military amir and
GV amir “Magas” Ali Taziyev.
Since Putin’s removal of the ailing Valerii Kokov
(the KBR’s ancient Soviet-era communist party first
secretary) from the KBR presidency in 2005, the republic has adopted policies closer to Yevkurov’s. Like Zyazikov, Kokov had been harshly criticized by official
Islamic clergy, the general populace, young Muslim
Islamists, and jihadists. He was replaced by the energetic 48-year-old ethnic Kabardin businessman Arsen
Kanokov. He immediately moved to address the concerns of Muslims as well as the ethnic Balkar minority. Kanokov replaced the republic’s premier with an
ethnic Balkar and its hard-line MVD chief Khachim
Shogenov with an ethnic Russian, Yurii Tomchak.
Shogenov had been sharply criticized by almost everyone in the republic, including the KBR’s DUM, for
his heavy-handed and broad-brushed crackdown on
Muslims in 2003-04 in an effort to contain the burgeoning jihadi movement in the republic. Tomchak
took immediate steps to assuage the KBR’s Muslims,
especially the more volatile young generation, including the inclusion of KBR DUM representatives on the
MVD’s public council. The ministry also signed a cooperation agreement with the DUM and other confessions’ public organizations.155 Not a single jihadi attack was carried out in the KBR in 2006.156 KBR DUM
chairman, mufti Anas Pshikhachev, quickly acknowledged the MVD’s efforts under Tomchak to address
the DUM’s grievances but warned that the threat of
Islamic extremism persists in the KBR.157 In addition,
Kanokov set aside 4.5 million rubles in April 2007 for
the construction of two new mosques in the capital
Nalchik. The closing of mosques by the authorities in
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2004 had helped spark the rise of the jihadist combat
jamaat “Yarmuk” in 2004 and irritated moderate Muslims and official clergy alike. Kanokov also attracted
new investments for developing tourism in the Elbrus
District resort area.
However, rather than seeing a decline in jihadi
attacks, Kanokov presided over a marked increase:
28 in 2008, 23 in 2009, and 113 in 2010, despite amir
Astemirov’s demise in March 2010.158 In January 2011,
OVKBK mujahedin killed chief mufti of the KBR’s
DUM, Anas Pshikhachev, in the republic’s capital of
Nalchik. The KBR plunged into a state of desperation.
In February, the Council of Elders of the Balkar people
called for the introduction of direct federal rule and
Kanokov’s resignation. Kanokov, speaking before
the KBR parliament, appealed to the federal authorities for additional assistance in combating jihadism
in the republic, adding that the mujahedin “are not
afraid.”159 At the end of February, the OVKBK carried
out the noted series of attacks across the Elbrus resort
area. In May, the OVKBK attempted to assassinate
Kanokov in the largest attack in the KBR since Basaev’s and Astemirov’s October 2005 Nalchik raid by
exploding a bomb under the VIP reviewing stand at a
horse racing track during Nalchik’s May Day festivities. The attack killed at least one civilian, a 97-yearold Great Patriotic War veteran, and wounded some
40 civilians and officials. Among the wounded were
the KBR’s Culture Minister Ruslan Firov and former
MVD chief Khachim Shogenov.160 At this point, Kanokov or someone in the KBR may have adopted Kadyrov’s approach of forming special units to fight the
mujahedin. A group calling itself the “Black Hawks”
(chernyie yastreby) declared war on the OVKBK, but
nothing much seems to have come of the group. In
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April, security forces killed Astemirov’s successor,
OVKBK amir “Abdullah” Asker Dzhappuev, along
with his naibs and several other top OVKBK amirs.
Since then, there has been a slight decline in the rate
of attacks in the KBR.
In Dagestan, today the CE’s spearhead, a new
president and his team, have borrowed more elements
from Yevkurov than from Kadyrov. Unlike Chechnya,
the origins of jihadism in Dagestan are driven entirely
by intra-confessional tensions created by the emergence of a significant Salafi community at odds with
traditional Sufis. Successive leaders have failed to resolve the religious tensions. In February 2006, Putin
replaced long-standing ethnic Dargin Dagestan President Magomedali Magomedov with the ethnic Avar
chairman of Dagestan’s Legislative Assembly, Mukhu
Aliev. His tenure saw a steady increase in jihadi activity and no perceptible improvement in the civility
of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism polices in
the region. Aliev was replaced in 2010 with Magomedov’s son, Magomedsalem Magomedov, who endeavored to engage the Salafi community in Dagestan, coordinating the formation of a council of Salafi Islamic
scholars (ulema), which drafted a series of demands
for the government to meet. According to the Russian
human rights group “Memorial,” a government representative was authorized to meet with the council, but
the dialogue has not produced notable results other
than the regular appearance of Salafi representatives
at public ceremonies. Magomedov has also endeavored to replicate Yevkurov’s efforts in Ingushetia by
succeeding in enticing some young mujahedin from
the forest and back to civilian life, and institutionalizing the process in November 2010 in the form of an
adaptation commission. The commission includes the
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imam of Dagestan’s Central Mosque and the head of
the Salafist umbrella organization, Akhlyu-s-sunna,
A. K. Kebedov and is chaired by Rizvan Kurbanov,
deputy premier in charge of the power ministries in
the republic who personally led talks with prospective defectors from the mujahedin. Kurbanov was
described by Memorial as “open to representatives
of civil society, reacted without fail, personally, and
immediately to reports about the crudest violations of
human rights . . . met with the relatives of abductees,
[and] cooperated with lawyers in specific cases.”161
Magomedov has also worked on the economy. Dagestan’s government has developed a joint project with
the majority state-owned Russian Copper Company
to develop the North Caucasus’s largest ore deposit of
Kizil-Dere in southern Dagestan’s Ahtynsky District.
The mining project plus the accompanying development of transport infrastructure and utilities should
provide considerable employment.162 Another investment project for the region is Dagestani oligarch Suleiman Kerimov’s purchase of the republic’s Anzhi
Makhachkala (AM) premier soccer team. This is being
followed up by further investments of $1.4 billion by
Kermiov into AM’s stadium and Makhachkala hotels
and AM’s recent $30 million purchase of global soccer superstar Samuel Eto’o in August 2011. Kerimov
is also investing in the North Caucasus tourist resort
cluster project.163
During his still short tenure, Magomedov’s new
course has yielded few results unless one can show
that jihadi violence would be even more prevalent
without his policies. The CE’s DV has been able to step
up its violence, threatening Magomedov and killing
numerous government officials. Since April 2010, the
DV has been the most prolific of the CE’s vilaiyats in
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terms of number of attacks, including suicide bombings, with approximately 267 total attacks (including
six suicide attacks) in 2010 and 200 attacks (including three suicide attacks) during the first 6 months of
2011, compared to 144 total attacks, including one suicide bombing, in 2009.164 Nor is there a demonstrable
improvement in the republic’s human rights record,
either.165
Siloviki.
A key problem is that neither the republic presidents nor SKFO envoy Khloponin exercise much, if
any, control over the siloviki as the latter continue to
violate Muslim citizens’ human, civil, and political
rights. How much Moscow or the civilian leadership
controls federal forces in the North Caucasus also remains a question, though not their responsibility for
rights violations. Both federal forces and local police,
often working jointly in counter-terrorist operations,
continue to employ detention on the basis of mere
suspicion and falsified evidence, beatings, and torture
during detentions, and extrajudicial punishments, including abductions and killings. The European Court
for Human Rights continues to hand down judgments
against Russian authorities regarding such violations.166
Federal forces still deployed in the region include
military, FSB specially designated forces (spetsnaz),
and GRU. MVD forces, which according to federal law
are supposed to be under federal control, are often
an object of contestation in numerous regions across
Russia. Kadyrov appears to control not only his own
forces but the MVD and perhaps its Internal Troops in
Chechnya, both of which have made incursions into
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Ingushetia sometimes coordinated with Ingushetia’s
MVD and sometimes not. Military forces, including
new mountain fighting forces created a few years ago
and based in Botlikh (Dagestan) and Zelenchukskaya
(Karachaevo-Cherkessia), maintain a low profile, remaining on their bases. In rare cases when military
units are called upon to take part in counterterrorist
operations, military helicopters, and more rarely artillery are called in to target mujahedin uncovered in
mountainous areas. For example, CE amir Umarov’s
naib Supyan Abduallev was killed in March 2011 in an
operation that used helicopters and artillery. Military
and other convoys occasionally come under ambush
by mujahedin in all four of the main republics where
the CE maintains a permanent presence. The creation
of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK) and
regional counterparts appears to have improved coordination and intelligence-sharing between the various
power ministries. Security and police forces have become proficient in tracking and killing leading amirs,
but they have been less successful in capturing high
value targets that would provide invaluable additional intelligence. The only such case was the July 2010
capture of GV amir and CE military amir “Magas” Ali
Taziyev; ever since, the Ingushetia mujahedin’s fortunes have been in steady decline.
Chechnya’s Kadyrov maintains considerable control over MVD forces in his republic and deploys his
own presidential guards, which in the past have come
into conflict with special battalions subordinated to
federal power ministries and led by the leaders of families and teips or clans in competition with Kadyrov
as a counterweight to Kadyrov’s power. In 2010 the
federal authorities decided that the dire situation in
Dagestan required a new approach. It was decided to
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replicate the Chechenization of the conflict in Chechnya under Kadyrov with the formation of special battalions under the control of various federal organs
of coercion, and by establishing under the Dagestan
MVD a separate volunteer special motorized battalion
of native Dagestanis for carrying out counterinsurgency operations. The first 300 volunteers were trained by
November 2010, with another 400 intended to complete the 700-man force.167 There is no evidence that
this measure has produced any appreciable results.
In sum, Russian and North Caucasus authorities’
continuing rights violations largely, if not entirely,
negate the positive development of an increased use
of soft power methods in fighting jihadism pushed by
Medvedev, Yevkurov, and Kanokov. However counterintuitive it may be, the steepest decline in jihadi
activity has occurred in the republics with the harshest policy line, Kadyrov’s Chechnya, and the softest,
Yevkurov’s Ingushetia.
THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The rise of the CE, and attendant theoretical concepts, have concrete security policy implications for
Russia, the United States, and globally. The CE’s rise
refutes many widespread assumptions, biases, hypotheses, and theories extant in the scholarly, analytical, activist, and policymaking communities regarding the violence in the North Caucasus and the
organization and causality of terrorism and jihadism
in general. The CE’s continuing capability to recruit
and attack is not simply a response to Russian brutality and poor governance, but is also a consequence of
the CE’s effective deployment of jihadi propaganda,
training, leadership, and substantial ties to AQ, as
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well as the global jihadi revolutionary alliance, and an
umma in the throes of radicalism and revolution. The
CE’s long-standing though evolving relationship with
AQ and the larger global movement and its organization and structure do not confirm the leaderless jihad
hypothesis which argues that AQ has lost much of its
relevance and the global jihadi movement is devolving into a diffusion of atomized lone wolves.168 Similarly, the CE’s own decentralized network structure
and functioning and the nature of its relationship with
AQ and the global jihadi alliance supports a more
traditional view of a network inspired and loosely
grouped around AQ and its affiliates. The CE, like the
inspirational, if not institutional, AQ hub and more
nodal elements among the global jihad’s innumerable
groups, is likewise decentralized, but it retains a hub
consisting of Umarov and top amirs and qadis and
loosely coordinating interconnected nodes or vilaiyats
working largely independently but towards one and
the same set of goals: The creation of an Islamist CE
state and a confederated global caliphate.
If one regards AQ as the inspirational core, if not
the organizational leader, of a highly decentralized
global jihadi revolutionary movement, then a conceptualization of the CE’s place would find it several
degrees removed from the core, comprised of AQ central and affiliates like AQAP and AQ in the Maghreb
(AQIM). Groups like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba
comprise the first concentric circle around the AQ core
because of both their involvement in international
attacks and their deep involvement with, and geographical proximity to AQ central. The CE’s position
is similar to that of as-Shabaab in Somali and other
groups in the second concentric circle, since they are
not located near and do not cooperate as closely with
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AQ central, are only just beginning to participate in
international operations, and prefer to, or because of
resource shortages must, focus largely on establishing
their local emirate. The third concentric circle would
be lone wolves inspired by but having no ties to a formal jihadi group. The fourth, most outer concentric
circle lies outside the alliance but within the movement. It consists of groups that ascribe to the violent
establishment of their own Islamist government but
reject the goal of creating a caliphate and cooperation
with other global jihadi revolutionary groups.
Nor do patterns in the CE correlate with the conclusion put forward by Robert Pape that suicide terrorism is largely a response to foreign occupation, having
little or no connection to jihadi ideology or goals.169
Leaving aside the fact that suicide terrorism is almost
exclusively a jihadist phenomenon, this mono-causal
explanation is simplistic, especially when it comes
to any jihadi organization, including the North Caucasus. CE suicide bombers’ videotaped martyrdom
testaments state explicitly that their motivation is to
“raise the banner of Allah above all others.” The CE’s
chief propagandist and organizer of suicide terrorism
from mid-2008 to early 2010, Sheikh Said Abu Saad
Buryatskii was an ethnic Buryat-Russian, converted to
Islam, and never set foot in the Caucasus until spring
2008 after he returned from abroad to study Islam in
Egypt and Kuwait. The goals and strategy of the CE
and other global jihadi revolutionary groups are not
simply local or defensive, seeking merely to drive out
occupiers, but are explicitly offensive and expansionist. Thus, the CE’s expansionist goals aimed at seizing
all of Russia and the Transcaucasus and recreating the
Islamist caliphate defuse Pape’s theory.
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These theoretical conclusions have policy implications: First, the CE’s ties to AQ, its own sophisticated
organization and decentralized functioning, and its
religious rather than nationalist motives are transforming it from a local to an international actor and
emerging threat. Second, even if it were, like the ChRI,
only a threat to Russian national security, this threat
would still have international security implications,
since Russia remains an important Eurasian power
and is emerging as a useful ally of the United States
and the West in the war against jihadism. Third, the
CE’s emergence as a transnational threat with growing radicalization, capacity, and aspirations marks a
newly emerging threat to U.S. national and international security. Fourth, the CE’s transformation and
integration into the global jihadi revolutionary alliance demonstrate the ability of AQ and its affiliated
movements to evolve, adapt, and flourish in response
to Western counter-jihadism efforts. Fifth, the global
jihadi revolutionary alliance’s ability to evolve and
adapt is facilitated by the existence of the larger jihadi
and Islamist social movements emerging from a prerevolutionary Muslim world that includes democratic,
nationalist, communist, Islamist, and jihadist forces.
Sixth, except in the most failed states like Yemen and
Somalia, the groups that make up the global jihadi
revolutionary alliance are unlikely to seize power precisely because of the limited appeal of their narrow
and strict ideological orientation. Seventh, given this
larger revolutionary and radicalizing context, international, Western, Eurasian, American, and Russian
security are likely to be threatened by this revolution’s
intended and unintended destabilizing and violent effects for decades to come; the most virulent of which
are the global jihadi revolutionary alliance and its in-
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dividual groups. Finally, the jihadi revolutionary alliance’s globalism dictates a global and cooperative
response on the part of those whom it targets.
Operationally, Caucasus jihadists are now recruits
for major terrorist attacks against the West. Sheikh alMaqdisi has designated the CE as the global jihad’s
bridgehead into Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the
CE inserted cells into Belgium and the Czech Republic
and its apparent involvement in its first international
terrorist plot in Belgium. The CE itself could attempt
to attack U.S. targets in Russia or elsewhere, including the northern supply route for U.S. and NATO
troops fighting in Afghanistan. Its most capacious DV
and its Azerbaijan Jamaat put Umarov within striking
range of international and U.S. interests in Azerbaijan
such as oil company headquarters, refineries, and the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carrying oil to Europe.
Clearly, a CE or other significant jihadi presence in
Azerbaijan would have security implications for the
entire Transcaucasus and the Persian Gulf region. In
addition, the CE is a recruiting ground of mujahedin
for other fronts in the global jihad. Moreover, Russia has the largest stockpiles of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials and WMD in the
world. The CE adds potential demand to this supply.
In the past, there have been reports of Chechen separatist and Caucasus jihadi attempts to acquire WMD
in Russia, and the CE websites’ posting of the famous
2003 Al-Fahd fatwa three times in 2010 suggests that
some in the CE may wish to obtain them.
Given the emerging CE threat, the U.S. Government should maximize cooperation across Eurasia to
include Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the war against jihadism. The United
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States and Europe should also attempt to stabilize
the Caucasus by resolving the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and at least minimizing
Russian-Georgian tensions, so these do not play into
the hands of CE or other jihadists. One goal might be
to rein in Georgian efforts to whip up trouble in the
North Caucasus, especially among the Muslim Circassian ethnic groups. Tbilisi has opened up a television
and radio company that broadcasts anti-Russian propaganda to the region, and some Georgian opposition
figures and one former U.S. official have claimed that
President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government is providing financial and training assistance to the CE.170 Speculating on the Circassian genocide issue as the Sochi
Olympics approach, Tbilisi adopted a parliamentary
resolution calling for a boycott of the Sochi games and
for Russian and international recognition of the Tsarist forces’ rout and exile of the Circassians in the 1860s
as a genocide. Georgia’s policies could radicalize
some Circassians and thus improve the CE prospects
for recruitment and attacking the Sochi games. Tbilisi
also waived visa requirements for Iranians and North
Caucasus residents, which could facilitate the movement of global jihadists from South Asia and the Persian Gulf region to the North Caucasus and Europe.
Finally, Western-Eurasian (NATO-CSTO) cooperation can be used to nudge Eurasia’s authoritarian
regimes, including Moscow, to conduct their anti-jihadism and other policies with a greater eye towards
citizens’ human, civil and political rights, and the
implications of all of the above for the war against jihadism. Only with broad and effective regional cooperation involving all of the post-Soviet states will the
United States and the West be able to defeat the global
jihadi threat.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN RUSSIA
AND RUSSIA IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS:
STATE APPROACHES AND POLITICAL
DYNAMICS IN THE TURBULENT REGION
Sergey Markedonov
Any attempts to make generalizations about Russian policy on the North Caucasus face serious methodological difficulties. In spite of analysts’ personal
attitude to the problem, all observers agree that this
area is the most acute one in Russia. Here the problem
of Russia’s territorial integrity and sustainability is being resolved.
The growth of political violence (the most impressive example is the tragic terrorist bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport in January
2011) has brought the danger of growing instability
in the region to the attention of foreign countries, especially on the eve of the Sochi Olympics of 2014 and
World Soccer Cup of 2018. While in the 1990s violence in the North Caucasus was primarily based in
Chechnya, over the last years it has increased for other
republics like Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KabardinoBalkaria (KBR). The North Caucasus agenda today
is extremely tense with the events and challenges of
terrorism and counterterrorism. In 2009, the counterterrorist operation (CTO) regime in Chechnya was
cancelled, but in 2010 there was not only a quantitative but also qualitative rise in the attacks in this republic (like the attack on Tsentoroy, the native village
of Ramzan Kadyrov, as well as that of the Chechen
parliament in Grozny). At the same time, violence in
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the neighboring republics (Dagestan, Ingushetia, and
KBR) has not declined either. In 2010, KBR, which had
a reputation of being a “Sleeping Beauty” during the
1990s surpassed Chechnya in the number of acts of
terrorism, taking a place in the top three, after Dagestan and Ingushetia, with 48 explosions, 21 shootings,
and 14 attempts on the life of law enforcement officials and special troops. During the same period, local CTOs were launched twice in the republic, with
the operation in Tyrnauza lasting from October 20
through December 25. For the first time in the recent
history of North Caucasus terrorism, there was an attack on an industrial facility in 2010: targeted at the
Baksan Hydroelectric Plant in KBR.1 Almost every
day, sabotage and terrorist attacks on representatives
of law enforcement and military personnel take place
along with civilian murders. We can also observe the
revival of ethnic nationalism (despite the fact that radical Islamism has not handed over its positions, rather,
on the contrary, it has grown), and at the same time,
we see a fundamentally important step to resolving
long-standing ethno-political confrontation between
North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The struggle for power
inside the Caucasus constituencies repeatedly makes
itself felt through corrupt, authoritarian, and even occasionally violent means.
Apart from the growing violence that plagues
the region, the Caucasus has become a subject of
great importance in Russia. This thesis was proven
by the events on Manege Square in December 2010
and increasing interethnic clashes between Russians
and Caucasian peoples (Chechens and Dagestanis).2
This is becoming a serious issue. Interestingly, the
phenomenon of Russian ethnic chauvinism directed
against the peoples of the Caucasus has recently as-
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sumed a macro-economic veneer. In April 2011, the
Russian Civil Union movement organized a rally in
Moscow under the slogan: “Stop feeding the Caucasus.”3 Participants objected to the federal government
subsidizing its counterparts in Chechnya, Dagestan,
and other republics, likening the North Caucasus to “a
voracious crocodile which demands more blood and
money.” This problem could become more serious if
the Russian officials attempt to exploit these ideas. We
can already see attempts to use anti-Caucasus public
opinion to obtain additional popularity on the eve of
both parliamentary and presidential elections.4
However, Russian policy in the region has not
really been conceptualized or even verbalized, and
this circumstance creates many obstacles (first and
foremost for Russian authorities) for adequately
comprehending what Moscow wants to do. There is
a great paradox in this situation. Identifying itself as
a guarantor of Caucasus stability and security and
demonstrating its willingness to pretend to be a key
stakeholder for the whole region, including newly
independent and de facto states of the South Caucasus, Russia faces challenges inside its own country
regarding the North Caucasus area. Moreover, in 2009
the situation there was characterized as the most important domestic policy issue by President Dmitry
Medvedev in his Presidential Address to the Federal
Assembly (Parliament).5 As a result, the Kremlin and
the federal government brought in an official position
of special plenipotentiary—with broadened functions
in the newly created North Caucasus Federal District.
For the first time in Russia’s post-Soviet history, this
official has the rank of deputy prime-minister.
In this chapter, some basic aspects will be considered. To what extent has recognition of the systemic
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and internal natures of the North Caucasus challenges
helped to change political dynamics in the region?
Why has the activity of the new plenipotentiary not
been effective and failed to reach expectations? What
new challenges would define the agenda in the most
turbulent area of Russia? The purpose of this report
is to examine major social and political trends in the
North Caucasus region, with an emphasis on the last 3
years because historical aspects (including the 1990s)
are separate topics for discussion.
“SOFT POWER”: MADE BY ALEXANDER
KHLOPONIN
In the early 2000s, the Russian authorities were
all too ready to speak about the North Caucasus. Discussion centered on several topics. The first was the
Caucasus as a platform for international terrorism,
where Russia was being put to the test. The image of
the “international terrorist” changed according to the
political situation of the time. Sometimes the face had
Georgian features, at other times Afghan and sometimes even the “treacherous West” seemed to be involved. The role of the West in affairs of the North
Caucasus was actually interpreted in two ways. On
the one hand, the West was seen as a natural ally at
risk from Third World intrigues, and on the other, an
unimaginative and bothersome partner trying to impose its incorrect ideas (or “double standards”) upon
Russia. The second topic was the swiftly stabilizing
Caucasus, an image that effectively came to mean
Chechnya under the wise leadership of Akhmad and
then Ramzan Kadyrov, father and son. There were
attempts to diversify the North Caucasus issue: The
most outstanding examples were the speeches by
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Dmitry Kozak, the Russian President’s representative
in the South (in this position from September 2004 to
September 2007). He tried to focus the attention of his
immediate superiors and society on the problems of
the clan system and the inefficiency of the regional
administrations (particularly in conditions of budget
dependency on the federal centre). However, Russia’s
ruling elite was not concerned with the region’s domestic situation, at least until the middle of 2011.
The decision to end CTO in Chechnya in April
2009, dictated as it was by public relations considerations, did not have the effect of reducing the number
of terrorist acts in that republic. Diversionary terrorist activity actually spread to the neighboring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia. That summer saw a
brazen attempt to assassinate Ingushetia’s president
Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, which temporarily put him out
of action. Aldigirei Magomedtagirov, Interior Minister of Dagestan, the largest North Caucasus republic,
was murdered. All this required some coherent explanation. It was impossible just to keep saying that
the region would soon be stabilized, although “some
people are working against this.”
Medvedev’s Makhachkala speech on June 9, 2009,
marked the moment when the focus changed from
external to internal threats. The Russian President
talked of “systemic problems” in the North Caucasus
region. For the first time since the 1990s, the head of
state was officially admitting that socio-political turbulence in the Russian Caucasus was not the result of
foreign interference, but of internal problems like corruption, unemployment, and poverty. However, both
the President and the Prime Minister still kept talking
about the battle with “bandits” and “organized crime
groups,” as if the current problems of the Caucasus
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could be compared to the situation in Harlem, New
York, or Southeast Washington, DC, in the 1980s. The
failures of government in the North Caucasus were
not honestly discussed. Blame was laid on the regional and local authorities, while the federal authorities
escaped criticism. This was the origin of bizarre ideas
like the introduction of special jurisdiction for matters
involving terrorism. Regardless, in his address last
year, Medvedev called the North Caucasus the main
problem of Russian domestic politics. That was when
another idea emerged: a new bureaucratic structure,
backed by Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, entrusted
with “establishing order” in the North Caucasus.
As a result, Alexander Khloponin arrived in the
Caucasus in January 2010 as Moscow’s plenipotentiary. This looked like an innovation. The man responsible for Russia’s most unstable region was not one of
the siloviki (members of the central bureaucracy), but
a manager who had worked for “Norilsk Nickel” enterprise and served as governor of the Taymyr Peninsula and Krasnoyarsk. The media adopted a different
language when discussing the North Caucasus. Apart
from the usual reference to “terrorists” and “extremists,” they began talking of “clusters,” “investments,”
and “innovations.”
But Khloponin’s appointment had nothing to do
with modernization. It was a typical behind-the-scenes
advancement of a person lacking the appropriate experience, motivated by internal bureaucratic logic,
rather than pressing national interest. In addition, the
functions of this new head of the Caucasus were very
limited. Khloponin was thrown in the deep end of the
pool, without being given the necessary political powers to keep himself afloat. And how can there be any
real investment or innovation in a region so close to
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a state of war? In the end, things did not turn out for
the better, but as usual, as Viktor Chernomyrdin so
memorably put it in 1993: “We wanted the best but it
came out like it always does.”
The economy and the social sphere were recognized as important. The Kremlin and the Federal
Government put all their efforts into developing these
sectors, but political themes (ethnic conflicts and the
relations between the different religions) remained
taboo. They were seen as merely superficial, a function of the socio-economic situation. This has made
it impossible to produce a large-scale strategy for the
development of the Caucasus. When the politics of the
region are as unstable as they are, socio-economic conditions matter, but while unquestionably important,
they do not play a determining role.
Still, on July 6, 2010, Putin asked for a strategy document to be delivered “within a period of 2 months,”
a reasonable amount of time for a good academic article or a chapter of a book, but not for a document
with a 15-year perspective. By September 6, 2010, the
draft of the strategy was ready. In less than a month,
it went through the entire cycle from being signed to
publication by the federal government. The aims and
objectives of “Strategy-2025,” as set out in the initial
“General Provisions,” are skewed from the very beginning. We read that:
The Strategy takes account of:
• The current state of the economy of Russian
Federation administrative entities which are part
of The North Caucasus Federal District;
• The Russian economy;
• The global economy;
• Their potential for development; and,
• Regional and inter-regional projects and their outcomes.6
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But what about the political development of the
Caucasus? Don’t the facts of terrorism, subversive
actions, and an ethnocratic leadership automatically make any business plan a “risky undertaking”?
Shouldn’t future investors be taking this into account
(unless the money comes from the federal budget,
which does not depend on public opinion)?
The North Caucasus District offers favorable conditions for developing the agro-industrial complex, the
spheres of tourism and health tourism, electricity,
mining and manufacturing. It also affords developed
transit facilities. However, economic and socio-political instability mean that natural advantages remain
unrealized and make the North Caucasus Federal District an unattractive environment for investment.7

The political element is mentioned in passing, after the economy, and is not elaborated upon in any
way. What does socio-political instability mean? Is it
the separatist threat or the “religious revival” which is
incompatible with the constitutional and legal regulations and laws of the Russian Federation? According
to Strategy-2025, “The main goal of the Strategy is to
provide conditions conducive to the rapid growth of
the real sector of the economy in Russian Federation
administrative units that make up the North Caucasus
Federal District. Also to create new jobs, and improve
the standard of life.” What a wonderful goal! But is this
possible in an area that is practically on a war footing
(This is the felicitous description of the present situation given by the head of the Prosecutor General’s
Office Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin
in an interview with radio “Moscow Echo”)8? It is not
the grey economy, which makes its living from illegal
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or semi-legal deals, that is being discussed in this document. Incidentally, Strategy-2025 does not set itself
to deal with institutional change, i.e. creating a new
generation of managers who could give the economy
the chance to breathe without killing it with their kickbacks and pay-offs. The abuse of power and illegal
methods of carrying out anti-terrorist operations give
rise to a lack of trust in the authorities, and even a situation where people start regarding law enforcers as
enemies. Young people who are constantly victimized
become particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the
rebels. There is plenty of evidence that the activity of
the armed underground has been growing recently.
The crisis will only get worse if the state keeps fighting
the insurgents using methods like kidnapping and executions without trial. Two incomplete subsections of
Strategy-2025 are devoted to ethnic relations, but they
are limited to generalities. There is no real information and no analysis. “The current socio-political and
ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus Federal District is characterized by several pronounced
negative social tendencies, manifestations of ethnopolitical and religious extremism, and a high risk of
conflict.”9
Any specialist could probably find a great many
negative tendencies in any part of the Russian Federation, if he or she so desired. They exist in Moscow
and St. Petersburg (Is not xenophobia a “negative social tendency”?), and in the Volga area (where there
is both ethnic and religious extremism). But the difference between the Caucasus and the Volga area is
that only in the North Caucasus is there a situation
akin to war. This document of considerable strategic
importance offers no explanation for why events developed as they did. The reader is left to guess. The
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Strategy’s analytical section does not even have a subsection dealing with the religious revival, although
radical Islam is the main vehicle for protests in the
Caucasus. Anything to do with relations between the
religions is relegated to the subsection “Ethnic Relationships.” The reasons for the growth of radical Islam
are set out with alarming simplicity: “Radical forms
of Islam (have been) imported into the said Federal
District.” The text offers no explanation as to what
these “imported forms” are, why they have been imported into the region, what the expectations of the
importers are, or the extent to which the importers
have gained indigenous support.10 In the interests of
objectivity, one can say, of course, that other reasons
for the dissemination of extremist views (the Strategy
makes no special distinction between nationalists and
Islamists) include “widespread corruption” or “questions relating to the owning and disposing of land,
which are unregulated and the cause of most of the
ethnic conflicts, including at the level of the man in
the street,” and also “ethnic tension as a result of illdefined civic identity.”11 But again, none of this can be
linked to the need for institutional change in the Caucasus. In short, the objectives of “Strategy-2025” are
clearly unachievable. It focuses on economic growth
without addressing the socio-political preconditions
that make the North Caucasus explosive and unstable.
This document seems to isolate the economy and the
social sphere from the rest of the complex whole.
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NORTH CAUCASUS: RADICAL ISLAMISM
ON THE RISE
Since the Beslan tragedy in September 2004, the
main anti-Russian discourse in the North Caucasus
has not been under the slogans of ethno-political selfdetermination but under the green banner of radical
Islam. On October 31, 2007, President of the so-called
“Chechen Republic of Icheria,” Doku Umarov, built
upon his powers as the head of the separatist government and proclaimed a new formation —the Caucasus Emirate (CE).
Umarov proclaimed himself as “the only legitimate
authority in all areas where there are Mujahideen.” He
also said that he denies the laws of the secular authorities that exist in the North Caucasus. It is hard to define Umarov personally and many of his supporters as
real Islamists in the fullest sense of the word; they lack
the necessary theological training and, in some cases,
elementary education base. But for such unskilled Islamists the ideals of “pure Islam” are the main drivers of protest activities against the Russian State. With
them, they have to determine the effectiveness of its
potential for mobilizing extremists. To some extent,
belonging to a radical Islamist current is a marker of
radicalism in general (ethnic nationalism in this context is regarded as a moderate political movement that
could include dialogue and certain concessions to the
Russian State).
However, at the same time, we can report the presence in the ranks of the North Caucasian Islamists
trained preachers who fully meet the standards of
“Mujahedin of the future” (that is competent theologians, who could exploit both explosives and Kalashnikovs). The most famous of them were not ethnic

109

Chechens by origin. In 2009 they came to the forefront
in the Caucasus radical Islamist movement. They
brought new characters into the anti-Russian struggle in the North Caucasus. It is unlikely that such a
man as Said Buryatskii (1982-2010, a.k.a. Alexander
Tikhomirov, on his father’s side a Buryat and on his
mother’s side a Russian) could inspire the defenders
of a secular nationalist project to fight. Rather his appeal was religious.
In June 2009, Umarov’s supporters claimed responsibility for the murder of the interior minister
of Dagestan, Adilgerei Magomedtagirov as well as
murders of Aza Gazgireeva, deputy Chairman of
the Supreme Court of Ingushetia, and Bashir Aushev, former Deputy Prime Minister of Ingushetia. In
July 2009, they announced their involvement in the
attempted assassination of the President of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In August, 2009, they issued a statement saying that the “accident” at the
Sayano-Shushenskaya power plant was a matter of
their hands. In November-December 2009, militants
claimed responsibility for the murder of an Orthodox
priest, Father Daniel (Sysoev) and the explosion of
the train “Nevsky Express.” On March 31, 2010, in his
video address, Doku Umarov talked about his own orders for the suicide bombing in the Moscow subway,
carried out on March 29. In January 2011, he claimed
credit for the Domodedovo Airport terrorist attack.
Even if the responsibility for one or another of
these attacks is not true, and is part of a public relations campaign, the struggle for “true faith” is selling
and becoming a popular political commodity. This
product will be even more in demand than would
be the level of social injustice, judicial, and administrative efficiency. The aforementioned Buryatskii is
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a phenomenon in this regard. Not being a preacher
from Pakistan or Arab countries, he found a fertile
environment in the Caucasian audience as a result of
his own religious and political evolution. Note that
nowadays this audience knows the Soviet and Russian reality far less than what Jokhar Dudayev and
Aslan Maskhadov did. The works of Sheikh Anwar
al-Awlaki, Sheikh Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi, and
others feature prominently on various web portals
associated with the Caucasus rebels. The Caucasus
rebels have indeed embraced the political lexicon of
the “global jihad,” styling their leaders as “amirs”
and establishing a “Caucasus Emirate” with its own
“Shariah Court.” It is much less connected with the
nationwide socio-cultural environment. However,
while assessing the “Islamic factor” it is necessary to
add some nuances. Often many stories regarding the
intra-administrative-bureaucratic struggle are hidden
under the “Wahhabis” (as the Russian media define
radical Islam). It would seem that the authorities both
at regional and federal levels must do their utmost to
understand where there are religious radicals or simple criminals, and where their synthesis takes place
(the latter is extremely important to discredit the militants and their ideological patrons). But instead of doing this, officials repeat propaganda theses about the
“agonizing bandits.”
ETHNIC NATIONALISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES?
The last 3 years showed, among other things, that
the hope of “self-liquidation” of nationalism has not
been justified. Rallies of Balkars and Circassians, interethnic relations in Dagestan and tensions between
Ossets and Ingushsis forced the authorities to pay at-
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tention to the problem, which by the early 2000s had
seemed generally to be clearing up. A revival of ethnic nationalism in the North Caucasus has taken place
since 2008. For this development, there are both internal and external prerequisites. The Circassian issue revival has occurred after a series of personnel decisions
of the fourth president of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya
Republic (KCR), Boris Ebzeev. Russia’s recognition
of Abkhazia’s independence on August 26, 2008, also
played a role in the revitalization of Circassian ethnic
nationalism as well as the upcoming Sochi Olympic
Games. Since 2010, the “Circassian question” has become one of the focal points of the Georgian foreign
policy agenda. Two conferences (March and November 2010), began the discussion at the parliamentary
level of the problem of the so-called “Circassian genocide” in the Russian Empire in the 19th century, and
finally Georgian recognition of this massacre as a case
of genocide in May 2011 created a serious precedent.
Before it, Russian policy in the Caucasus was not recognized as genocide by foreign states. This charge
therefore contributes to the internationalization of
debates about this troubled Russian region. Thus it
requires from the Russian government and society
more thoughtful action. Moscow must find competent
answers to this problem as soon as possible.
However, the “new” nationalists in their statements remain within the Russian political-legal space.
Balkars, the Ingush human rights activists, and Circassian activists are trying to appeal to the Federal Russian government, and not to the Council of Europe,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE), or the European Union (EU)/United States.
In March 2010, at a meeting dedicated to the 66th anniversary of the Russian deportation—of Balkars, Kara-
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chais, Chechens, Ingush, and Kalmyks to Siberia—the
representatives of the Council of Elders of the Balkar
people prepared an appeal to the presidential envoy
in the North Caucasus Alexander Khloponin.
It is necessary to make a distinction between nationalism in the period of the “parade of sovereignties” in the early 1990s, and that of 2009-10. “The old
nationalism” was a political riposte to the Soviet (and
to a lesser extent the imperial) era. The current Balkar
or Circassian movements, though using the historical
material, have another nature. This is the reaction to
today’s realities (e.g., land issues and the attendant
corruption, human resource policies, and issues of local self-government). Using quantitative approaches
(and certain of their manifestations we see in KBR in
the form of conciliation of the national movements)
the danger of nationalism’s revival can be minimized
(but not eliminated completely). However (and 20092010 have demonstrated it), there are cases when the
republican authorities try to extinguish the fire of Islamist activity by using nationalist kerosene. Such a
tool (playing the ethnic card) is extremely dangerous
(as shown in 1989-91).
The Ossetian-Ingush reconciliations have inspired
cautious optimism. The third President of Ingushetia, Yunus Bek Evkurov, has played a great role in
its promotion. Ingushetia now insists on the return of
displaced persons who fled their homes during the
conflict in October-November 1992, namely in the
villages of the Suburban District (Prigorodnyi rayon)
where they lived before the conflict, but the Ingush
leadership clearly rejects the claims for the return of
the district itself! At a meeting on the problems of displaced persons held on October 2, 2009, the President
of North Ossetia, Teimuraz Mamsurov, said that the

113

Ingush would be free to return to the Suburban District and the authorities of his republic, North Ossetia,
would not be an obstacle.
According to various sources, approximately 1520,000 displaced people (DP) could return to their
former places of residence. In this case, both the conflicting parties are dissatisfied with federal policy to
resolve this problem. The Ossetian side said that the
return of the Ingush is being done at a forced pace,
while the Ingush are unhappy with the low intensity
of the return. Soft apartheid is preserved. In particular, on March 1, 2009, during the elections of local bodies in the Suburban District, the vote was conducted in
the villages settled by the Ingushis. The situation for
all these years is complicated by the conflict between
Georgia and South Ossetia because North Ossetia was
forced to place Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia
and interior regions of Georgia in its territory. Regardless of this, on December 17, 2009, the leaders of the
two republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed
a bilateral agreement.
For the first time in the post-Soviet era Ingush DPs
had the right to return to their homes in an official
document. (Previously they were offered different
versions of arrangements at the new location.) Human and civil rights took precedence over the “right
of blood.” Practically for the first time since 1992, it
was recognized that the Ossetians and the Ingush are
two peoples of the Russian nation-state project that
should be more than just neighbors, and become fellow citizens of one country.
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NORTH CAUCASUS: PUBLIC POLICY
OF LIMITED DURATION
In addition to Islam and ethnic nationalism, bureaucratic competition for dominance in the framework of a single republic has been a serious challenge.
This management struggle has once again proved that
disputes over power are not maintained in rigid adherence to an ethnic or religious affiliation. This is a
complex configuration of clan interests and pressure
groups both in Moscow and within the region itself.
Perhaps the most exemplary republic in this respect
is Dagestan, the largest (in territory and population)
of the North Caucasian republics. It is no accident because the year of 2009 was a preparatory period for the
Republican presidential elections (in February 2010,
the Presidential term of Mukhu Aliev expired). In the
absence of direct elections of the Republic’s president,
we witnessed complex bureaucratic fights with very
specific ideas about public policy.
As a result, the procedure for determining a candidate for the presidency in Dagestan unprecedentedly
dragged on from November 2009 until February 2010.
In fact, it took 2 additional weeks beyond the legal
procedure for Moscow to announce the final decision
on the candidacy of the head of the Republic. Finally,
Magomedsalam Magomedov got the support of the
Federal Center. But as the Russian political scientist
and journalist Ivan Sukhov justly remarked, “[The]
appointment of the president in Dagestan looked like
the most problematic one for the entire period.”12
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THE NORTH CAUCASUS FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF THE KREMLIN
At first glance, the tragic events at the Manege
Square on December 11, 2010 (and their echoes in St.
Petersburg and Rostov-on-Don), are not connected
directly with ethno-political and religious dynamics. Activity, clashes, and pogroms under the Russian
ethno-nationalist slogans are not a response to one
or another act of terrorism, sabotage, or injustice to
the ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus republics.
The Manege incident was provoked by the murder of
Spartak soccer club fan Yegor Sviridov. In other cases, reasons are different, but they do not refer to the
North Caucasus regional issues. Meanwhile, it would
be very naïve to consider those clashes as absolutely
isolated problems. The Sviridov case became a kind
of trigger for anti-Caucasus opinions existing in the
central parts of Russia. It also showed that Russia
lacks a coherent national policy (or rather, it substituted folklore and ethnographic considerations) and
that the inhabitants of the Caucasus and the rest of
Russia had long lists of grievances against each other.
Regardless of what it was, it revitalized the problem
of a divided community and actualized the necessity
to find ways for a civic nation option. It also demonstrated the challenge of Russian separatism because
it displayed numerous groups of Russian citizens
who would be ready to separate from the Caucasus.
This fact violates the stereotype that the region can
only be put beyond Moscow’s strategic influence by
means of a conscious campaign to free itself of Russia’s suzerainty. But what if the unilateral separation
of the Caucasus by Russian power took place? In this
scenario, it would matter little whether the North
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Caucasus followed a nationalist or Islamist agenda. It
does not mean that Russia would have great benefits
from the realization of this scenario. But now it has
created new options for Caucasus politics as well as
Russian domestic policy as a whole. The fact that the
central government on the eve of the election year decided to play the Russian chauvinist bargaining chip
is also dangerous because it makes two groups of the
citizens of one country (ethnic Russians and Caucasus
peoples) confront each other.
Thus, the North Caucasus has not become a more
secure, and most importantly, predictable region. The
region poses for the Russian state and society a wide
variety of challenges, ranging from Islamic radicalism
to sophisticated closed bureaucratic confrontation and
Russian separatism. Despite the fact that in 2009 the
Russian central government had recognized the crisis
in the North Caucasus, breakthrough strategies for
the development of the region have not surfaced. The
state bodies continue focusing on bureaucratic methods of improving the situation, refuse to be engaged in
dialogue with the civil society, and use “soft power”
(integration projects, the introduction of elements of
civic identity, and attempts to redefine the religious
sphere such as ”Euro-Islam” as an alternative to radical Islamism) in promoting their own interests. While
modernization has been proclaimed as the strategic
goal of the Russian policy, the North Caucasus has
not been meaningfully considered in this context. By
inertia, it is regarded rather as an underdeveloped
outskirt, rather than an integral part of the nationwide
political-legal space. Encouragingly, there is some
safety margin; the region’s population is interested in
strengthening the Russian state’s presence and the effectiveness of arbitration by the central government,
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while there is simultaneously a more active desire of
the Russian authorities to make a critical assessment of
the regional realities. However, an ad hoc situational
response remains the dominant political and managerial style of the Russian elite for the Caucasus region.
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CHAPTER 3
THE “AFGHANIZATION” OF THE NORTH
CAUCASUS: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS
OF A CHANGING CONFLICT
Svante E. Cornell
The situation in the North Caucasus, particularly
in Chechnya, frequently made headlines in the 1990s
and early 2000s. In fact, it was a key issue in affecting Western views of Russia, a particular mobilizing
factor for the democracy and human rights agenda as
Russia was concerned. This changed, however, with
President Vladimir Putin’s successful curtailing of
media freedoms in Russia, and the gradual decline of
violence in Chechnya, with violence sinking to a low
point in 2006. For the past 5 years, the North Caucasus
has hardly had an effect on relations between the West
and Russia; in fact, both the media and policy communities in the West have largely ignored the region.
That has nevertheless begun to change in the recent
past, for two main reasons: First, there has been a clear
upsurge in violence in and related to the North Caucasus since 2007, with the completion of the process of
transformation of a Chechen nationalist rebellion to a
region-wide Islamist insurgency. It has become clear
that far from pacifying the region, Moscow is failing
to exert sovereignty there. Second, the International
Olympic Committee’s decision to hold the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi on the Russian Black Sea coast
adjacent to the North Caucasus has made the North
Caucasus a magnet for attention. This chapter seeks to
assess the current situation in the North Caucasus, the
reasons behind the evolution of the past decade, and
its implications for Russia, the region, and the West.
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THE NORTH CAUCASUS TODAY
The republics of the North Caucasus are presently characterized by a combination of factors that the
present author has likened to “Afghanization.” The
term evokes the development of Afghanistan in the
mid-1990s: a combination of war, human suffering,
poverty, organized crime, and externally sponsored
Islamic radicalism combined to generate an explosive
situation, which the authorities are increasingly unable to respond to—and which, failing to understand
the web of problems correctly and suffering from the
constraints of their own system, they end up exacerbating.
Demographically and economically, the North
Caucasus is in a deep malaise. Unemployment rates
are sky-high, averaging 50 percent by some estimates,
with 80 percent rates of youth unemployment being
common in many areas of the region.1 Between 60 and
90 percent of the budgets of the republics consist of
direct subsidies from Moscow, suggesting the weakness of economic activity and of government ability
to raise revenues. In fact, subsidies to the North Caucasus have begun to generate a backlash in Russia
itself, with growing popular movements wanting to
stop the government from “feeding the Caucasus.”2 A
leaked Russian government report in 2006 cited that
the shadow economy constituted an estimated 44 percent of Dagestan’s economy, as opposed to 17 percent
in Russia as a whole; 50 to 70 percent of Dagestanis
with some form of employment were thought to work
in the shadow economy.3 These figures are unlikely to
have improved since then. Ethnic Russians have largely left the region, removing some of the most-skilled
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labor force. In Chechnya, where 200,000 Russians once
lived, they now number in the hundreds. In Ingushetia, the number of Russians declined by a factor of
over six. In other republics, the decline between the
censuses of 1989 and 2002 are not as dramatic but nevertheless stark: The percentage of Russians fell from
42 percent to 33 percent in Karachaevo-Cherkessiya;
from 30 to 23 percent in North Ossetia; and from 10
to 5 percent in Dagestan. The exodus of Russians has
only continued since then, although census figures are
not available.4 Meanwhile, the educational system has
largely collapsed while there is a rapid population increase due to historically high birth rates.
Since 2004, with the strengthening of the “vertical
of power” in Russia, the republics are ruled increasingly by elites whose main feature is loyalty (of an
often personal nature) to the leadership in Moscow
rather than, as had been the case, with roots in the local politics of the region. This has been a source of additional friction between Moscow and the populations
of the North Caucasus. Not only are these populations
no longer able to elect their leaders even on paper, but
their leaders are responsive mainly to the demands of
the distant capital rather than their own needs. While
the most well-known example is Chechnya, where
Moscow supported the elevation of the Kadyrov clan
to lead the republic, the most egregious case is Ingushetia. There, a highly respected but independentminded leader, General Ruslan Aushev, managed to
keep the republic stable and peaceful during the first
Chechen war and its chaotic aftermath. Deemed too
independent, he was replaced in 2002 by a Federal
Security Service (FSB) officer of Ingush descent but
with little connection to the region, Murad Zyazikov.
Zyazikov’s subsequent mismanagement, insensitivity
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to local power-brokers, and repression alienated considerable parts of the population and led numerous
young Ingush to join the armed resistance. KabardinoBalkaria (KBR), Putin similarly appointed a Moscowbased businessman with roots in the republic, Arsen
Kanokov, to the presidency in 2005, with the explicit
purpose of appointing a person without links to the
“clan politics” of the republic. However, Kanokov’s
lack of a popular base in KBR led the situation to deteriorate further.5
The North Caucasus is no longer the scene of
large-scale warfare concentrated in Chechnya, as
was the case in 1994-96 and 1999-2002. Instead, the
resistance has morphed into a low-to-medium level
insurgency that spans the entire region. Chechnya is
among the calmer areas of the region, with the epicenter of the resistance having moved first to Ingushetia,
then to Dagestan, with spikes of violence in KBR and
the other republics as well. The conflict pits Moscow
and its local allies, such as the Kadyrov clan, against
loosely coordinated multiethnic groups of insurgents
that largely remain led by ethnic Chechens. This insurgency no longer sees itself as a nationalist movement, but as part of the global jihadi movement. As
such, it seeks the establishment of a region-wide Islamic state, dubbed the “Caucasus Emirate.” Inspired
by the global jihadi movement, the insurgency targets
not only Russian forces but also civilian authorities
across the region, as well as engaging in terrorist attacks on civilians, including in Russia proper. Thus,
Chechnya has come to resemble Kashmir: a formerly
nationalist and separatist insurgency morphed into
a jihadi movement with whom central authorities
can no longer, realistically, expect to reach a political
compromise.
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HOW DID WE GET HERE?
The present condition of the conflict in the North
Caucasus is a fairly recent development, having undergone deep transformations in the past decade. An
overview of the history of the conflict makes this clear.
Indeed, it suggests that in 1989, ethnicity was increasingly politicized across the former Soviet Union. The
ethno-nationalist uprisings and movements of 1989-94
clearly provide corroboration for that assessment. By
contrast, religion was not politicized, and would not
be for another decade. Among North Caucasus ethnic groups, only the Chechens had both the incentives
and the capacity to sustain an insurgency against the
Russian state, while a religious revival gradually got
under way, centered on Dagestan. It was the first war
in Chechnya in 1994-96 that attracted militant Islamist
groups to the North Caucasus, whose ideology came
to spread across the region, fanning out from Chechnya and Dagestan to span the North Caucasus.
The Salience of the Deportations.
The resistance of Chechens as well as other North
Caucasian peoples to Russian rule in the 19th century
is legendary. It is instructive to note that Russia had
annexed Georgia by 1801, and acquired control over
Armenia and Azerbaijan gradually in 1812-13 and
1827-28. By contrast, the areas north of the mountains
were not subjugated until 1859-64. It took Russia 30
years after gaining control over the South Caucasus
to pacify the North. Chechens, Dagestanis, and the
Circassian peoples to the west fought an unequal
battle until the 1860s to escape Russian rule.6 Under

125

the legendary Dagestani chieftain, Shamil, the areas
that today form southern Chechnya and inner Dagestan formed a shrinking independent Islamic state,
an Imamate, from 1824 until the Russian capture of
Shamil in 1859.7 The Circassian rebels were not defeated until the mass expulsion of Circassians to the
Ottoman Empire in 1864.
Even following the incorporation of the North
Caucasus into the Russian empire, the northeastern
regions were only partially pacified, but never appeared to become integrated with Russia in ways that
other minority-dominated areas, such as in the Volga
region, did. The physical expulsion of the majority of
the Circassian population helped Russia manage the
northwestern Caucasus; but Chechnya and Dagestan
remained unruly. Whenever Russia was at war or otherwise weakened, these lands saw rebellions of varying length and strength. This occurred after World War
I during the Russian civil war 1918-21, and, though in
a much smaller scale, during the collectivization of the
1930s and World War II. In 1944, this obstinate refusal
to submit had tragic consequences. Falsely claiming
that Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, and Balkars had collaborated with the invading German forces, Joseph
Stalin in February 1944 ordered the wholesale deportation of these peoples to Central Asia. Entire populations were loaded on cattle wagons and transported
in the middle of winter to the steppes of Central Asia,
where little preparation had been made for their arrival. An estimated quarter of the deportees died during
transport or shortly after arrival due to cold, hunger,
or epidemics.8
The largest number of the deported peoples of the
North Caucasus was the Chechens. However, until
deportation, Chechens primarily identified with their
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Teip or clan, not as members of a Chechen nation. More
than anything, deportation helped develop national
consciousness among the Chechens. The demographic consequences of deportation and the 13-year exile
of the Chechens until they were allowed to return in
1957 are very tangible. Between 1926-37, the Chechen
population increased by 36 percent; in another 11year period, between 1959 and 1970, the figure was 46
percent. But during the 20-year period from 1939-59,
the rate of increase was only 2.5 percent, although the
population would almost have doubled under normal
circumstances.9 Thus, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the deportations in the collective memory
of the punished peoples. With regard to the Chechens, it had important political consequences that did
not immediately materialize among the much smaller
Ingush, Karachai, and Balkar populations. Most leaders of the Chechen movement for independence in
the 1990s were either born or grew up in exile in Kazakhstan. The deportation convinced many Chechens
that there was no way for them to live securely under
Russian rule; it also explains the extent of support for
separation from Russia among the people and perhaps the readiness among portions of the population
to embrace radical ideologies of resistance.
After the August coup in Moscow against Mikhail
Gorbachev that spelled the end of the Soviet Union,
most constituent republics declared their independence. So did two autonomous republics within the
Russian Federation: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Tatarstan, encircled by Russia proper, began negotiations on mutual relations with Moscow that eventually led to a deal in 1994 that granted Tatarstan broad
autonomy. In Chechnya, however, the nationalist
movement in power was less compromising. Gen-
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eral Jokhar Dudayev, who had seized power from
the former communist leadership in September 1991,
was elected President of Chechnya and declared its
independence soon after. Chechnya, in this context,
stood out by being the only autonomous republic in
Russia where a nationalist movement took power and
ousted the communist party leadership. In this sense,
it resembled the developments in Georgia and Armenia more than that of the Central Asian republics or
Russia’s other autonomous republics: The leadership
consisted of true nationalists, not former Communist
elites that cloaked a nationalist mantle.
While Russian President Boris Yeltsin made an
abortive attempt to rein in Dudayev by sending special forces to Chechnya to restore Moscow’s rule, Dudayev had managed to create a presidential guard that
was enough of a deterrent to avoid Russian military
action. At this point, Russia was itself in a chaotic situation. Yeltsin was preoccupied with building Russian
statehood, and Chechnya was put on the back burner.
However, by 1994, Yeltsin had consolidated his power
after physically attacking his parliamentary opposition in October 1993—an action that indebted him to
the military and security forces. Chechnya hence remained as a thorn in the eye of a rising Russia. Moreover, Chechnya’s de facto independence and the heavily anti-Russian rhetoric emanating from Dudayev
was foiling Russian plans of asserting control over the
South Caucasus states of Azerbaijan and Georgia, in
particular controlling the westward export of Caspian
oil resources. Thus, for both internal and external reasons, the Russian government was now prompted to
“solve” the Chechnya problem. Serious negotiations
between Moscow and Grozny were never attempted,
mainly because of the personal enmity between Du-
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dayev and Yeltsin.10 After seeking briefly to use subversion to overthrow Dudayev without success, the
Russian government decided to launch a wholesale
invasion of Chechnya in late 1994.11
Importantly, the Chechen movement for independence was an almost entirely secular affair.12 Its
chief leaders, such as Jokhar Dudayev and Aslan
Maskhadov, were former Soviet officers with highly
secular lifestyles. This is not to say that Islamist elements were not present: They did develop among the
Chechen leadership, mainly through the efforts of
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Movladi Udugov, high
officials in Dudayev’s administration. However, they
remained largely marginal, being able to assert themselves only tepidly during the internal crisis that Dudayev experienced in 1993, in which he briefly began
using increasingly religious language in an attempt to
shore up legitimacy when faced with growing criticism of his mismanagement of Chechnya’s economy.
Moreover, there is significant evidence suggesting
that Yandarbiyev and Uduguov embraced Islamism
in a mainly instrumental way.13
The First War.
Contrary to Moscow’s expectations, the Russian
threat rallied erstwhile skeptics around Dudayev once
the war started. Aided by the dismal character of the
Russian military campaign, the Chechen forces were
able to resist the Russian invasion. Getting bogged
down in Chechnya, the Russian military resorted to
brutal tactics to subdue an opponent they had thoroughly underestimated, and used air bombing and
artillery to level Grozny before entering it. Only after 2 months did the Russian army manage to estab-
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lish control over the city—at the cost of thousands of
Russian casualties, over 20,000 killed civilians, a total
destruction of the city, and hundreds of thousands of
refugees. The war continued, with the Chechen forces
regrouping in the south of Chechnya. Meanwhile, Dudayev himself was killed by Russian forces in April
1996. Despite this setback, the Chechen forces in August 1996 managed to stage a counteroffensive, and
retake the three major cities of Chechnya, including
Grozny, in 3 days of fighting. This amounted to a total
humiliation of the Russian forces, and the government
was forced to end the war and pull out all its forces by
a cease-fire signed 3 weeks later.
The war led to the total devastation of Grozny and
many other Chechen towns and villages. According to
the most credible estimates, the death toll in the first
war was in the range of 50,000 people.14 Compared
with the war in Afghanistan, the Chechen war was
far more lethal for the Russian army. During 1984,
the worst year in Afghanistan, almost 2,500 Soviet
soldiers were killed. In Chechnya, Russian losses surpassed this number within 4 months of the intervention. At its highest, the shelling of Grozny, counted
by the number of explosions per day, surpassed the
shelling of Sarajevo in the early 1990s by a factor of at
least 50. Grozny was literally leveled to the ground in
a destruction that recalled the battle of Stalingrad.
Moreover, the war was dominated by massive human rights violations, which are considered the worst
in Europe since World War II. Russian forces engaged
in several well-documented massacres of civilians,
the most well-known of which occurred in the village
of Samashki in April 1995. As noted above, the first
war in Chechnya was waged almost exclusively in the
name of national independence. But it is in the context
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of the brutality of the Russian onslaught that the first
jihadi elements appeared in Chechnya. Indeed, it is
also the context in which the Chechen leadership and
fighters welcomed or tolerated these foreign recruits;
there is ample evidence that there was little love lost
between the Chechen leadership and the jihadis—but
the Chechens needed all the help that they could get,
and were hardly in a position to turn away these newfound allies, all the more since they were exceptionally effective in combat.
Similarly, this is the context in which terrorist tactics enter the Chechen war. Practiced from the outset
by the Russian detachments, some of the Chechens
commanders gradually came to employ them. Here,
the notorious Shamil Basayev deserves particular
mention, whose hostage-taking raid on a hospital in
the southern Russian town of Budyonnovsk in June
1995 was the first large-scale use of terrorism by the
Chechens. It occurred at a time when the Chechen
cause seemed all but lost, and arguably contributed
to turning the tide in the war, or at least in forestalling
defeat. Basayev himself was in one sense an unlikely
terrorist: Only 3 years earlier, he had deployed as a
volunteer to fight the Georgians in Abkhazia, being
among the North Caucasian volunteers that received
training and assistance for the purpose from the Russian military intelligence services.15
The number of foreign fighters in the first war was
small, perhaps a few hundred at most. These were
mainly the roving “Arab Afghans” who had fought in
Kashmir, Tajikistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
was the big focus of jihadi attention in the early 1990s.
Tellingly, the person who actually declared a jihad on
Russia was none other than Akhmad Kadyrov, then
mufti of Chechnya, who would switch sides in 1999,
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and became Russia’s local satrap, a position his son,
Ramzan, inherited upon his assassination in May 2004.
The Inter-War Period.
The August 1996 accords, complemented by a formal peace treaty in May 1997, granted Chechnya de
facto independence, though the issue of Chechnya’s
status was deferred until December 31, 2001. In practice, Chechnya had the opportunity to build what in
practice amounted to an independent state. Russian
law did not apply in Chechnya, and no Russian police,
army, customs, or postal service operated there.
However, for both internal and external reasons,
this second attempt at independence in a decade ended in a dismal failure. Russia consistently prevented
Chechnya from seeking outside financial help, and
though it committed funds to the reconstruction of
the war-ravaged republic, $100 million disappeared
before they even reached Chechnya. In a celebrated
statement, President Yeltsin publicly admitted “only
the devil” knew where the money had gone.16 Hence
the basis on which the Chechen government could
create a functioning state was shaky indeed.
Yet initial signals were positive. In a presidential
election that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) termed largely free and fair,
the population of Chechnya overwhelmingly voted
for Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of Staff of the Chechen
armed forces and the most moderate among the three
presidential contenders. Thus, Chechnya acquired a
legitimate government that was open to compromise
and cooperation, although it never wavered from its
commitment to an independent Chechnya. Sadly,
this initial stability did not last. Chechnya was awash
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with young, unemployed war veterans with arsenals
of weapons, whose loyalty was to individual field
commanders rather than to the central Chechen government. With the economic depression deepening,
Maskhadov’s authority over Chechnya gradually diminished, and the government became unable to uphold law and order. Various criminal groups emerged
that engaged in smuggling and kidnapping, and the
government showed its inability to effectively deal
with this problem. Most alarmingly, warlords Shamil
Basayev and the Jordanian-born Khattab began planning for the unification of Chechnya with the neighboring republic of Dagestan, still part of the Russian
Federation. Maskhadov was either unwilling or unable to rein in these warlords, fearing an intra-Chechen war. As a result, Basayev and Khattab were able to
recruit hundreds of Dagestanis and other North Caucasians, including Chechens, into what they termed
an Islamic Brigade based in Southeastern Chechnya.
This brigade would eventually launch the incursion
into Dagestan in August 1999, which precipitated the
second war.
It is instructive, at this point, to compare Chechnya to the major other armed conflict in Europe of the
time: Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, Chechnya was similar to Bosnia in terms of the level and character of the
jihadi presence; where it differed was in the absence of
a Dayton-type internationalized conflict management
mechanism.
Indeed, most jihadis that came to fight in Chechnya were veterans of the Bosnian campaign. This was
true for the poster child of Chechen jihadis, the Saudiborn Amir al-Khattab. What is seldom recalled is the
extent of the Islamist contagion in Bosnia at the time
of the Dayton Accords. Indeed, the leadership of the
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Bosnian Muslims in many ways leaned more toward
Islamism than that of the Chechens: Alija Izetbegovic,
the Bosnian Muslim leader, had a long history of Islamist inclinations dating back to his involvement
in the Young Muslim organizations in Bosnia, Mladi
Muslimani, during World War II .17 Haris Silajdzic, his
closest advisor, received Islamic education in Libya
and served as an advisor to Bosnia’s spiritual leader,
the Reis-ul-Ulema. By contrast, the only Islamist to lead
the Chechen resistance was Yandarbiyev, who only
served as interim president between Dudayev’s death
in April 1996 and Maskhadov’s election in January
1997. By contrast, Dudayev and Maskhadov were considerably more secular than the key Bosnian leaders.
The jihadi presence in Bosnia was a real problem
at the close of the war. The Bosnian leadership was
split between those wanting to rid Bosnia of the foreign radicals, and those grateful for their support and
who wanted to allow them to stay. Most jihadis were
nevertheless evicted shortly following the Dayton Accords, after several altercations with North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces brought attention
to their presence.18 Indeed, this highlights the main
difference between Bosnia and Chechnya: Chechnya
had the Khasavyurt treaty that postponed the key issue in the conflict; was never fully implemented; was
bilateral and lacked any international guarantor; and
lacked international peacekeeping forces. Bosnia, on
the other hand, had a real peace treaty, and NATO
forces to keep that treaty. Thus, most jihadis were
gradually evicted from Bosnia following the Dayton
Accords. However, small numbers remained until as
late as 2007, when the Bosnian government finally removed the last remnants.19
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In Chechnya, there was no force capable of removing the jihadi elements. Indeed, the Maskhadov administration was considerably weaker than its Bosnian
counterpart, and could not rely on an international
force, whether military such as the NATO Implementation Forces (IFOR) or civilian such as the Office of
the High Representative. Unlike Bosnia, which was
awash in international assistance already a year following the Dayton Accords, Chechnya received next to
no foreign assistance. Thus, the crippled Maskhadov
government was in no position to successfully oust
the jihadis. This was not for a lack of trying: In 1998,
there was even fire exchanged between the Chechen
government forces and jihadi groups. But unlike in
Bosnia, the jihadi forces led by Khattab had found a
powerful local ally in Shamil Basayev. Maskhadov
was thus faced with a dire choice. He could either
confront the jihadis that had ensconced themselves
in southeastern Chechnya, at the cost of a Chechen
civil war; or he could tolerate their presence, preserving peace and trying to strengthen state institutions.
In the end, he chose the latter—which appeared the
lesser of two evils. While he even sought a deal with
Moscow in rooting out the radicals, a call that went
unanswered, his decision contributed greatly to the
failure of Chechen state-building and led directly to
the second war.20
Thus, the Chechnya-based jihadis coalesced with
Wahhabi groups that had emerged independently in
Dagestan in the late 1990s. Training camps developed
modeled on those in Afghanistan, where small numbers of people from the entire North Caucasus and
beyond received training; many then fought in the
second Chechen war, and subsequently spread the
militant ideology and tactics back to their own home
republics.
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The Second War.
During the course of the second Chechen war,
which began in October 1999, concern grew over the
radicalization of the Chechen resistance movement
and its links to extremist Islamic groups in the Middle
East. Indeed, authors like Gordon Hahn have come to
conclude that the “key, if not main factor driving the
violence in the North Caucasus” is “the salience of local cultural and the Salafist jihadist theo-ideology and
the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement.”21 While this chapter takes issue with that claim,
the Chechen resistance has indeed acquired a much
stronger Islamic character. The use of Islamic vocabulary such as jihad (holy war) or mujahedin (resistance
fighters) increased markedly, as did active support for
the Chechen cause by radical Islamic groups in the
Middle East, at least until the U.S. invasion of Iraq led
jihadis to flock to that conflict.
Moscow managed to drive this point across especially after September 11, 2001 (9/11). Immediately
after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Russian leadership began drawing comparisons between
the attacks and the situation in Chechnya. Only hours
after the collapse of the World Trade Centers, Russian State television broadcast a statement by President Vladimir Putin expressing solidarity with the
American people, but also reminding the audience of
Russia’s earlier warnings of the common threat of “Islamic Fundamentalism.” This marked the beginning
of a strategy aiming to capitalize on the tragic attacks
on America by highlighting the alleged parallels between the attacks on the United States and the situation in Chechnya. “The Russian people understand
the American people better than anyone else, having
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experienced terrorism first-hand,” President Putin
said the day after the attacks.22
This turned out to be the harbinger of a diplomatic
campaign targeted at Western countries intended to
shore up legitimacy, if not support, for the Russian army’s violent crackdown in Chechnya.23 This campaign
was part and parcel of a five-step strategy to reduce
the negative fallout of the war in Chechnya. The first
component of that strategy was to isolate the conflict
zone and prevent both Russian and international media from reporting on the conflict independently. The
kidnapping of Andrei Babitsky, a reporter for Radio
Liberty, early on served as a warning for journalists
of the consequences of ignoring Moscow’s rules on
reporting the conflict. Since then, only a few journalists have actually been able to provide independent
reporting from Chechnya. Most prominent has been
the late Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya who
was murdered in Moscow in 2007, and French writer,
Anne Nivat.
The second prong in the strategy was to rename the
conflict: Instead of a “war,” it was an “anti-terrorist
operation.” Third, and stemming directly from this,
Russia sought to discredit the Chechen struggle and
undermine its leadership by accusing them individually and collectively of involvement with terrorism.
Russia’s campaign against Chechen President Aslan
Maskhadov’s chief negotiator, Akhmed Zakayev, is
one example of this. This nevertheless backfired as
first Denmark and then Great Britain refused to extradite Zakayev to Russia; Great Britain instead providing him with political asylum. Fourth, Russia sought
to “Chechenize” the conflict and turn it into an intraChechen confrontation by setting up and arming a
brutal but ethnically Chechen puppet regime in Gro-
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zny under Kadyrov, the former Mufti (a professional
jurist interpreting Muslin law) of the republic. This
would reduce Russian casualties and enable hostilities
to be depicted as a war between Chechen factions that
Russia was helping to stabilize. Fifth, after branding
the war as an anti-terrorist campaign, discrediting the
rebel leadership, and trying to turn the war into a civil
war among Chechens, Russia declared that the war
was over.
The second war proved as heavy on the civilian
population as the first. In many ways, Russian abuses
were more systematic. For example, the Russian leadership set up what they termed “filtration camps”—
essentially concentration camps that gathered male
Chechens of fighting age, and in which torture and
disappearances were rampant.24 Whereas European
countries and the United States kept a moderate but
noticeable level of criticism against Russia’s massive
human rights violations in Chechnya during both the
first war in 1994-96 and in 1999-2001, Russia succeeded in convincing western observers it was not fighting
a people, but terrorists. In an atmosphere of increased
cooperation between Russia and the West, with American need for Russian intelligence and cooperation in
Afghanistan, a halt to criticism on Chechnya became
the foremost price Russia managed to extract.
A Regional Insurgency.
Today, the nationalist Chechen leadership is almost exclusively an expatriate phenomenon. The
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has for all practical
purposes ceased to exist; instead, the insurgency
brands itself the “Caucasus Emirate” (CE), overtly
boasts of its belonging to the global jihad, and oper-
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ates across the North Caucasus. Studies of violent
incidents in the North Caucasus agree that the violence peaked in April 2001, 18 months into the second
Chechen war. From 2002 to 2006, violence was fairly
steady before declining to a low point in 2006-07.25
From 2007 onwards, however, violence has been on
a steady increase, albeit fluctuating in both intensity
and regional focus. Already in 2005, Dagestan and Ingushetia began seeing escalating violence, rivaling at
times the levels in Chechnya.26 Since 2007, the situation has continued to deteriorate, with the number of
violent incidents rising sharply every year from 2007
to 2010.27 In 2009 alone, for example, the number of
violent incidents went from 795 to 1,100, with fatalities mounting from 586 to 900.28 In the first 11 months
of 2010, federal prosecutors acknowledged the death
of 218 security personnel and the wounding of 536.29
From 2008 onward, Dagestan and Ingushetia have
alternated in the lead in the frequency of incidents.30
In 2010 and 2011, the violence escalated significantly
in the Western republic of KBR as well—marking the
diffusion of large-scale and enduring violence beyond
the republics bordering Chechnya. Thus, in 2010 political violence claimed 79 deaths and 39 wounded; the
first 11 months of 2011 saw those figures rise to 98 and
39, respectively.31 As if this was not enough, 2011 also
saw violence spread to North Ossetia, a traditionally
calm and majority Orthodox Christian republic.32
RUSSIAN POLICIES
What role did Russian policies play in transforming the conflict from a contained, nationalist rebellion
to a sprawling jihadi insurgency? Counterintuitively
as it may seem, Russian policies have contributed di-
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rectly to this development. In another parallel to the
Bosnian conflict, Russian rhetoric mirrored that of the
Serbs: misunderstood defenders of Europe against
the threat of Islamic radicalism, the “green wave.” Indeed, this line of reasoning has been visible in Russian
outreach efforts since the mid-1990s, with increasing
fervor following 9/11.33 But more than just arguing for
their case, Russian officials actively worked to make
the reality of the conflict conform to their vision of
it. Thus, there was a remarkable pattern in Russia’s
priorities during the second war: the priority given
to targeting the nationalist Chechen leadership rather
than the jihadi elements within it. Therefore, on the
battlefield, Russia targeted field commanders like
Ruslan Gelayev, as well as Maskhadov himself, whom
Russian forces killed in March 2005. On the diplomatic
front, Russian diplomats and lawyers furiously prosecuted and sought the extradition of secular leaders
like Zakayev and Maskhadov’s foreign minister, Ilyas
Akhmadov. By comparison, Islamist Chechen leaders
have fared much better. Among exiles, Movladi Udugov remains alive, among the few remaining members
of the first generation of Chechen leaders to survive.
Yandarbiyev was killed in Qatar by Russian agents,
but only in 2004. Similarly, the current leader of the
CE, Dokka Umarov, has served since June 2006. The
most notorious Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev,
was killed in 2006, but not necessarily by the Russians.
French journalist, Anne Nivat, once wrote that the
safest place in Chechnya was near Shamil Basayev:
Russian bombs never appeared to fall there. Given Basayev’s connection with Russian special forces (GRU)
through the conflict in Abkhazia, numerous conspiracy theories emerged of Basayev’s continued relationship with Russian state institutions; indeed, news re-
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ports following his death suggested that he was killed
accidently by explosives in the truck he was driving in
mountain roads in Ingushetia.34
While allegations of Basayev’s GRU connections
during the Georgia-Abkhaz war are well-established,35
those concerning subsequent periods are based mainly
on innuendo. Clearer evidence is available in the case
of Arbi Barayev, one of the most viciously militant as
well as most criminalized of Chechnya’s warlords.
Barayev was one of the key forces seeking to undermine Maskhadov’s leadership in the interwar era; it
was his group that kidnapped and beheaded foreign
telecommunications workers in 1998, effectively forcing out the small international presence in Chechnya.
Similarly, it was Barayev’s forces that engaged in firefights with Maskhadov’s troops in 1998. Following the
renewed warfare, Barayev lived freely in the town of
Alkhan-Kala, under Russian control, until his death
in 2001—despite the fact that he was responsible for
gruesome, video-recorded murders of captive Russian servicemen. As several observers have noted, his
opulent residence was only a few miles away from
a Russian checkpoint near his native Alkhan-Kala,
while his car had an FSB identification which allowed
him to race through Russian checkpoints.36 Tellingly,
Barayev was killed by a GRU hit squad only after the
FSB’s then-head of counterterrorism, General Ugryumov, had died. The apparent conclusion was that
Ugryumov provided a cover for Barayev, and the
former’s death made it possible for the GRU to take
Barayev out.
Given the nature of this conflict, evidence can at
best be inconclusive. But circumstantial evidence suggests two things: First, that during the second war
there was no clear and unified chain of command on
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either the Chechen or the Russian side. Chechen forces
paid nominal allegiance to Maskhadov but, in practice, field commanders behaved independently, and
with little coordination. On the Russian side, detachments of the army, GRU, FSB, and Ministry of Interior
played different roles in the conflict, roles that were
poorly coordinated; moreover, they each appeared
to keep ties with some Chechen commanders, while
combating others. Second, the policies of the Russian
leadership itself contributed to change the nature of
the conflict from a nationalist rebellion to one where
the enemy was Islamic jihadis. While this is likely in
the long run to be of greater danger to Russia, it did
succeed in making the conflict fit into Moscow’s desired narrative. After all, Maskhadov and the Chechen
nationalist leadership was respected in Western circles, being granted meetings with Western officials
and maintaining strong support among Western media, civil society, and human rights organizations. The
jihadi elements, needless to say, did not and do not
enjoy this status.
In a sense, however, Moscow is now faced both
with a jihadi movement and a nationalist Chechnya.
Indeed, the CE is everything it is blamed of being: a
part of the global jihad, and a terrorist incubator on
Europe’s borders. While primarily led by Chechens,
it is most active in the other republics of the North
Caucasus. But Moscow also is faced with a nationalist
Chechen leadership in Grozny. Indeed, the Kadyrov
administration appointed by Moscow has developed
in such a nationalistic direction that the secular Chechen nationalists in exile, who broke with the Islamist
faction with the establishment of the Emirate in 2007,
began mending fences with Kadyrov, their erstwhile
foe, by 2009.37 While a counterintuitive turn, the secu-
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lar nationalists concluded that Kadyrov has in practice achieved what they failed to achieve through an
armed rebellion: a Chechen republic that is for most
practical purposes behaving as an independent entity.
As early as 2005, Russian analysts began referring to
Kadyrov’s moves as “separatism-light.”38
A PACIFIED CHECHNYA?
Presently, Chechnya is arguably among the least
violence-ridden republics in the North Caucasus.
The last several years have seen widespread violence
in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KBR; by comparison,
Chechnya has been relatively stable. But the longterm outlook is clouded by the fragility on which this
relative quiet rests.
The main reason for Chechnya’s stability is the
dominance that Ramzan Kadyrov and his militia forces exert over the republic. These fighters, estimated at
over 5,000 in number, consist mainly of former resistance fighters. Moscow initially sought to balance the
Kadyrov clan with other political figures. Following
Akhmad Kadyrov’s assassination, Ramzan—who had
not yet achieved the eligible age for the presidency—
was appointed deputy prime minister. Chechnya was
instead led by career police officer Alu Alkhanov, who
had sided with Moscow already in the first war. By
March 2006, Ramzan Kadyrov was elevated to the
post of Prime Minister, replacing Sergey Abramov.
Less than a year later, Alkhanov was dismissed and
Kadyrov appointed President. Thus, by 2007, any political balances to Kadyrov had been removed; fighting forces outside his control nevertheless remained:
the “Zapad” and “Vostok” battalions, the latter commanded by Sulim Yamadayev, were nevertheless dis-
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banded in November 2008 following escalating tensions and actual armed clashes with Kadyrov’s forces.
Yamadayev loyalists were evicted from Chechnya;
Sulim Yamadayev was assassinated in Dubai in 2009,
while his brother met the same fate in Moscow, presumably at Kadyrov’s orders.39 This removed the sole
remaining check on Kadyrov’s power in Chechnya, to
the chagrin of many decisionmakers in Moscow—but
with the apparent blessing of Putin and Kadyrov’s immediate handler, the Chechen-born Vladislav Surkov,
who serves as Putin’s first deputy chief of staff and
chief ideologue.
Kadyrov has walked a fine line between vows of
absolute personal loyalty and subservience to Vladimir Putin, on the one hand, and institutional distancing from Russia. Thus, in 2007, he repeatedly urged
Putin to stay on as president for life.40 In 2009, Kadyrov said “if it was not for Putin, Chechnya would not
exist.”41 In January 2010, he added that “I am completely Vladimir Putin’s man. I would rather die 100
times than let him down.”42 Kadyrov also delivers
votes for the ruling party. In 2007, for example, official
figures showed that 99.5 percent of the Chechen electorate cast their votes, and that 99.3 percent voted for
the United Russia party.
On the other hand, Kadyrov has increasingly appealed to Chechen nationalism and sought to Islamize
Chechnya. In December 2006, he publicly sought the
prosecution of Russian officers responsible for civilian
deaths in Chechnya.43 His attitude toward the Russian military, which he sought to have expelled from
Chechnya, is best illustrated by his 2006 statement
that “as for the generals, I’m not going to say that I
care about their opinion.”44 Following his appointment as President, Kadyrov moved strongly to assert
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Chechnya’s economic and political autonomy. For
example, he has sought the creation of a Chechen oil
company that would keep the revenues of Chechnya’s
oil industry instead of sending them to Moscow; and
campaigned to have Chechens convicted elsewhere
in Russia serve prison time in Chechnya.45 Already in
2006, Kadyrov began urging women to comply with
Islamic dress codes, something that was later officially
promulgated with a program to strengthen “female
virtue.”46 He has also spoken favorably of Shariah in
general, and of both honor killings and of polygamy
in particular, and referred to women as men’s property—all of which are in violation of Russian laws.47
Adding to this, Kadyrov has made a habit of diverting the enormous funds coming to Chechnya from
the federal center. Indeed, Russian state auditors have
repeatedly noted the disappearance of the equivalent
of dozens of millions of dollars in state subsidies to
Chechnya, which amount to 90 percent of the republic’s budget.
Thus, all in all, Kadyrov has stabilized Chechnya on
the surface. But the stability rests on a very weak foundation. On the one hand, it rests solely on the personal
relationship between Kadyrov and Putin. As such, the
question is whether the stability of the republic would
outlive the departure from power of either man. Given
the average life expectancy of Chechen politicians, the
possibility of Kadyrov being assassinated is very real.
If that were to happen, would the thousands of former rebels now forming the bulk of his militia pledge
loyalty to a new leader, or would they return to the
resistance, ushering in a third Chechen war? Even if
Kadyrov remains in power, the defection of large sections of his militia to the resistance cannot be excluded.
Similarly, Kadyrov’s pragmatism is exhibited by his
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decision to switch sides from the resistance to Russia.
It is not inconceivable that he could switch sides again
under some scenario—for example, if Putin were to
leave power and his successor would discontinue the
arrangement with Kadyrov. Before her death, Anna
Politkovskaya observed that by his policies in Chechnya, Putin had essentially guaranteed a third Chechen
war at some future point. She may have turned out to
be prescient.48
CONCLUSION
The North Caucasus is sinking ever deeper into a
process of Afghanization. While the external impetus
of jihadi ideology has played a role in this development, this chapter has sought to show that the root
cause of the region’s decline is the Russian government’s policies—in particular its prosecution of the
wars in Chechnya; its over-reliance on repression in
both Chechnya and the rest of the region; its centralization of power; its unwillingness to allow the North
Caucasus to open up to the rest of the world; its failure
to provide an economic future for the region’s population; a political discourse that is making North Caucasians increasingly estranged from Russian society;
and the corruption and criminalization of the Russian
political system.
This situation destabilizes Russia, and forms its
most acute political problem. But it does not only affect Russia: It greatly affects the security and prosperity of the South Caucasus, as well as potentially all of
Europe. The impact on the South Caucasus is threefold. Most obviously, Azerbaijan and Georgia are directly affected by the violence and economic woes of
the region. This is only likely to be exacerbated in the
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future: While Azerbaijan experiences rapid growth
thanks to its oil and gas industry, Georgia has made
great strides in reforms, not least in terms of practically abolishing administrative corruption. Over
time, the contrast between these economies and the
languishing North Caucasus will have consequences,
in terms, for example, of migration flows. Secondly,
the southern neighbors of the North Caucasus are affected by the diffusion of the conflicts in the North.
Thus, flows of refugees—and fighters—from the
North Caucasus into Georgia and Azerbaijan have
been a recurring phenomenon over the past 2 decades,
with destabilizing effects on both countries. Third, the
Russian government has shown a distinctive tendency
to assign blame to its neighbors when it has proven
unable to deal with the consequences of its own failures in the North Caucasus. In the beginning of the
second Chechnyan war, both Azerbaijan and Georgia
were accused, without a shred of evidence, of serving
as conduits for thousands of foreign fighters to Chechnya; ever since, Russian accusations have focused on
Georgia, with threats of intervention into the Pankisi
Gorge on Georgian territory in 2002, and actual instances of Russian bombings of the Gorge.49 Following
the escalation of violence in 2008-11, Russian officials
have made a custom of blaming Georgia—and occasionally Western powers—for actively colluding with
the jihadi rebels in the North Caucasus. Thus, Russia’s
tendency to blame others for its failures poses a constant risk to its neighbors.
This predicament is most acute, given the upcoming Olympic Games in Sochi. Given current trends,
Moscow is unlikely to be able to pacify the North
Caucasus ahead of the Games, and will be increasingly likely to blame others for any terrorist attacks that
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would threaten this prestigious event. The alternative
option, a gigantic security operation to assert control
over the region, would itself very likely have a spillover effect on the South Caucasus.
Beyond the Caucasus itself, Russia’s misrule in the
North Caucasus poses a threat to Europe as a whole.
In fact, with the European Union (EU) now extended
to the shores of the Black Sea, it is a direct neighbor of
the North Caucasus. Through the Eastern Partnership,
Partnership for Peace, and other instruments, the EU
and NATO are seeking to contribute to the building
of stability, security, and prosperity in their eastern
neighborhood. In spite of the unresolved conflicts
of the South Caucasus and Moldova, and the mixed
scorecard for democratic development across the region, the Eastern neighborhood has indeed seen largely positive trends over the past decade. But the North
Caucasus is the sole remaining area where Europe
has little to no ability to influence developments, but
which could nevertheless have a considerably negative effect on Europe. The region is already a transshipment point for smuggled goods to Europe, and an
incubator of jihadi elements from the region and beyond. Thus far, the Islamic Emirate has stayed focused
on targets in the North Caucasus and Russia. But given
its broader ideological orientation and its perception
of Europe as a collaborator with Russia in the repression of Muslims, the prospect of groups affiliated with
the Emirate targeting Europe itself should not be excluded. After all, jihadi elements with connections to
Central Asia have already been implicated in planned
terrorist attacks in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.
Thus, Russia’s failure to stabilize the North Caucasus has amounted to the creation of an Afghanistanlike environment in Europe: a failed state within a
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state. Moscow is patently unable to remedy the situation, seeming only to design policies that are as a
whole counterproductive. Unfortunately, the failure
of Russia to address the region’s problems is related
directly to Russia’s very system. The sad fact is that as
long as Russia itself maintains a political system based
on kleptocratic authoritarianism, the prospects of the
North Caucasus will remain dim.
This poses a conundrum for Western powers. If
the situation continues to deteriorate, Western powers may not be able to afford simply treating the North
Caucasus as a domestic Russian issue. At the same
time, their policy options in designing responses to
the situation in the region are highly limited. While
efforts could be undertake in conjunction with the
South Caucasian states to contain the destabilization
emanating from the North Caucasus, addressing the
root causes of the problem will require a dialogue
with Moscow, the prospects of which are dim.
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